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This thesis provides an English law analysis on collaboration and contract 
management in the context of offshore upstream oil and gas contracts in light of the 
Maximising Economic Recovery [hereinafter ‘MER’] Strategy. The predominant 
subject of the thesis is the impact on offshore contracting of the MER Strategy. The 
thesis firstly considers that the Strategy is not merely another statute to regulate the 
offshore sector – its impact is of paramount importance because it sets a 
comprehensive framework for the coming decades until the cessation of operations in 
the North Sea. The MER Strategy seeks to address the field ‘maturity’ in the North 
Sea, which causes high extraction costs and questions the current business and 
contracting model. Secondly, the thesis focuses on the contracting model and 
relationship among operators and contractors, i.e. oil and gas companies and the 
supply chain. This niche area of contract law has been in the spotlight of academics 
and practitioners for many years, and abundant literature exists focusing on so-called 
‘risk allocation’ clauses. However, the thesis approaches the subject in an original 
manner: looking beyond the traditional legal standpoint, it introduces the element of 
‘contract and commercial management’ and focuses on the potential of 
‘collaboration’. It argues that these two elements are key to the future of offshore 
contracting in light of the MER Strategy. The explanation of where these two terms 
‘sit’ from an academic, practical and taxonomic standpoint is not an easy task. 
Contract and commercial management is a management-based discipline that goes 
beyond certain limitations imposed on the role of contract, championed by ‘strict’ 
school of thoughts on contract law. It perceives the contract to be mainly a device of 
‘problem solving’ rather than ‘failure management’. Collaboration is a notion with 
great potential for contracting in general – and offshore contracting in particular – 
which nevertheless brings with it substantial challenges that need to be addressed. 
Collaboration is a crucial concept in the MER Strategy, and the thesis seeks to 
ascertain its meaning both within and beyond the context of the Strategy. Most 
importantly, the thesis explores the legal meaning and ramifications of collaboration, 
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THESIS STRUCTURE AND RATIONALE 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The present thesis examines the notions of collaboration and contract management in 
the context of offshore oil and gas contracts in the United Kingdom [hereinafter 
‘UK’]. The UK offshore oil and gas industry has reached a phase of ‘maturity’ such 
that oil and gas exploration and production have become more challenging, and the 
profit margins have decreased. In order to address this downward spiral, the UK 
government introduced the Maximising Economic Recovery Strategy [hereinafter 
‘MER Strategy’] to implement the recommendations of the Wood Review, a report 
commissioned to address this issue. The MER Strategy challenges the contracting 
paradigm that the offshore oil and gas industry has been following thus far. It affects 
both the relationships among operators, as well as the relationship among operators 
and the supply chain. One of the parameters of the MER Strategy is the element of 
‘collaboration’, which the thesis seeks to explain. Beyond the context of the MER 
Strategy, however, ‘collaboration’ is also a nebulous notion in the English law of 
contract. This thesis explains the notion of collaboration both within and beyond the 
context of the MER Strategy, and aims at clarifying its commercial and legal 
dimensions. The thesis argues that the commercial dimension must be disentangled 
from the legal dimension in order to reach a clear sight of the legal impact.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis utilises the notion of contract and commercial management, 
both as a methodological approach in terms of the research methodology, as well as a 
substantive tool that could enhance successful contracting.
1
 The evolution of 
contracting in the construction industry is another dimension that is taken into 
account, as it offers an elucidating explanation of the evolution of contracting and 
                                                 
1 The notion of ‘contracting’ as opposed to the notion of ‘contract’ and the traditional understanding of 
the role of contract law is examined in detail in chapter 3.  
15 
 
how it could cross-fertilise offshore oil and gas industry contracting. The following 
introductory chapter sets out the background information of the UK offshore oil and 
gas industry; also, it explains the rationale of the decision process regarding the 
research aims and direction, i.e. the theoretical framework, research question, 
methodology and significance of the research. 
 
1.2 MAPPING THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
 
1.2.1 Background information about the offshore oil and gas industry  
 
The oil and gas industry (on- and offshore) is of paramount importance in many 
contexts such as the economical, environmental, and (geo) political. As energy 
sources, oil and gas still account for a significant percentage of world energy 
consumption.
2
 The offshore oil and gas sector in particular accounts for a significant 
percentage of the global oil and gas production. In the early 2010s, offshore 
production accounted for 30% of global oil production and 27% of global gas 
production.
3
 In 2014, offshore oil production amounted to 21.5 million barrels per 
day, representing about 25% of world oil production; offshore gas production 
amounted to 90 billion cubic feet per day, corresponding to approximately 25% of 
world gas production.
4
 Offshore fields also account for an estimated 20% of the 
world's oil reserves and 30% of global gas reserves.
5
 The offshore industry also 
represents an important sector for investments adding to growth. The figures 
eloquently demonstrate the mutli-dimensional importance of the offshore oil and gas 
industry.  
 
                                                 
2International Energy Agency, ‘Key World Energy Statistics’ (2015) 28 
<http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorldStatistics2015.pdf>; The 
figures for world total final consumption in 2013 are 39.9% for oil and 15.1% for natural gas.; See also 
BP Energy Outlook (2016 Edition) < http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-
economics/energy-outlook-2016/bp-energy-outlook-2016.pdf>. 
3Planete-energies.com, ‘A Growing Share of Oil and Gas Production Now Comes From Offshore’ (5 
February 2016) <http://www.planete-energies.com/en/medias/close/growing-share-oil-and-gas-
production-now-comes-offshore>.; See also World Ocean Review, 17 
<http://worldoceanreview.com/wp-content/downloads/wor3/WOR3_chapter_1.pdf>. 





In comparison to onshore oil and gas production, offshore exploration and production 
is much more complex.
6
 Briefly, the most significant differences are the level of the 
technical challenges, the high-risk high-reward nature, and the complex supply chain, 
which in turn necessitates sophisticated commercial and contractual relationships.
7
 
Recent technological advancements have allowed oil and gas extraction from fields 
previously believed to be unexploitable, such as deep- and ultra-deepwater and heavy 
oil.
8
 The exploration and production of oil and gas (‘upstream’ operations) is only the 
first stage in an equally complex value chain running up to the final distribution of 
petroleum to end-consumers. 
9
 The thesis focuses on the commercial and contracting 
phenomena of the upstream phase.  
 
1.2.2 Tides of change: The offshore oil and gas industry in transition 
 
The offshore oil and gas industry is currently facing major challenges. Sector 
revenues decreased rapidly in 2015, reflecting the impact of reduced capital 
expenditures by oil and gas companies.
10
 The most pronounced declines were 
experienced by companies in the services, asset, and equipment categories, with 
respective revenue falls of 15, 12 and 9 percent.
11
 On top of this hardship, the costs of 
exploration and production are expected to rise even further.
12
 A further major factor 
which needs to be taken into account is the cost of decommissioning, which must also 
be factored into the final extraction costs in the UKCS. The Oil and Gas Authority has 
recently estimated a range of the total cost of decommissioning in the UKCS – 
                                                 
6 For the technical differences between onshore and offshore oil and gas production, see Joseph 
Hilyard, The Oil & Gas Industry: A Nontechnical Guide (PennWell 2012); For a general introduction 
to the industry: Samuel A. Van Vactor, Introduction to the Global Oil & Gas Business (Penn Well 
2010); James G. Speight, Handbook of offshore oil and gas operations (Elsevier 2015); For a general 
overview see also Offshoreenergy.dk, ‘Offshore Book Oil & Gas’ (3rd edn, 2014) 
<http://www.offshoreenergy.dk/Files/Filer/Publications/OffshoreBook_2014.pdf>. 
7Adedeji B. Badiru, Samuel O. Osisanya, Project Management for the Oil and Gas Industry: A World 
System Approach (CRC Press 2013) 
8 For more information about deepwater operations see William L. Leffler, Richard Pattarozzi and 
Gordon Sterling, Deepwater Petroleum Exploration & Production: A Nontechnical Guide (2nd edn, 
PennWell 2011). 
9 Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil & Gas Industry: Management, Strategy, and 
Finance (PennWell 2011). 
10 McKinsey & Company, ‘Quarterly Perspective on Oil Field Services and Equipment’ (August 2015) 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/oil_and_gas>. 
11 Ibid. 




although several scenarios have been taken into account – from £44.5bn to £82.7bn in 
2016 prices.
13
 One of the thorniest issues regarding decommissioning is the 
distribution of the costs among the stakeholders; however, decommissioning is an 
important and niche subject in its own right and a detailed examination is not within 
the thesis’ scope.  
 
In light of those challenges, the industry has responded with cost-cutting measures, 
which resulted in extensive layoffs and cancellation of new investments and current 
projects.
14
 Market analysts pointed out that ‘since oil prices started falling late last 
year, oil companies have demanded and received significant price discounts from all 
suppliers’.
15
 However, a report by Wood Mackenzie suggests that ‘extracting lower 
prices from vendors does not always result in commensurate reductions in total 
costs’.
16
 However, after the spasmodic first reactions, the industry must develop more 
efficient short and mid-term strategies in order to adapt to the new environment. 
There have been discussions and reports by major consultancies, trade associations, 
universities and industry institutions, which have proposed changes at all possible 
levels: operational, technical, financial, and legal.  
 
The first level that came under closer scrutiny by the industry is project management. 
The trend in project management is to achieve ‘integrated project delivery’,
17
 which 
                                                 
13 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘UKCS Decommissioning 2017 Cost Estimate Report’ (29 June 2017) 3 
<https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/media/3815/ukcs-decommissioning-cost-report-2.pdf>. 
14 Nick Cunningham, ‘27 Billion Barrels Worth Of Oil Projects Now Cancelled’, (Oilprice.com, 14 
January 2016) < http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/27-Billion-Barrels-Worth-Of-Oil-Projects-Now-
Cancelled.html>.  
15David Yager, ‘Should Oil Field Services Companies Stand Their Ground More?’ (Oilprice.com, 2 
October 2015) < http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Should-Oil-Field-Services-Companies-
Stand-Their-Ground-More.html>.; an interesting quote by the author in the same article is that ‘the 
adversarial love/hate relationship between oil companies and their suppliers is broken. Success will 
follow if we fix it.’ 
16 Ibid. 
17 A Deloitte oil and gas report defines integrated project delivery as having ‘[evolved] beyond 
traditional contractual models that emphasize a two-party, owner-contractor relationship to integrate 
the full range of project participants, including owners, engineers, contractors, and major suppliers, into 
project teams. These integrated teams are generally more capable of managing changing circumstances 
whilst minimizing commercial conflicts than conventional two-party relationships. Engaging 
participants from project inception to final closeout also helps them to understand better the project. 
The preferred contracting strategy in this method aligns participants’ commercial objectives with the 
project’s success as well as weighs collective team performance against individual 
performance.’;Deloitte, ‘Oil and Gas Reality Check 2014: A look at the top issues facing the oil and 
gas sector’ (2014) 20 <http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ru/Documents/about-
deloitte/Oil_and_gas_reality_check_2014.pdf >.; The same findings are repeated in the 2015 Deloitte 
Reality Check Report, ‘Deloitte, Oil and Gas Reality Check 2015: A look at the top issues facing the 
18 
 
means that project players (operators, contractors, sub-contractors) should work 
closely throughout the project lifecycle. Collaboration is closely linked and can be 
seen as a prerequisite for integrated project delivery. In a study of the Australian oil 
and gas market, EY concludes that the three most important factors for project success 
are: (a) innovation, (b) improved competitive positioning, and (c) collaboration.
18
 A 
follow-up study in 2014 reiterates the previous results and the importance of 
collaboration and stresses the fact that a significant percentage of industry players 




A second observation is the rising importance of standardisation at the technical level. 
A recent report from Deloitte identifies the lack of standardisation as one of the main 
reasons for project delays and cost overruns.
20
 The industry has taken steps to 
improve standardisation at the operational level. For example, major industry players 
have inaugurated a joint-industry project to establish new international standards for 
offshore oil and gas projects by formalising common and global best practices 
for components and equipment, thus minimising the number and variety of 
                                                                                                                                            
oil and gas sector’ (2015) <http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-
and-Resources/gx-er-oil-and-gas-reality-check-2015.pdf>.  
18 The report defines collaboration as ‘the ability of the various players in the industry to design 
‘healthy, dynamic and resilient interconnected networks’, capable of mobilising the right resources, at 
the right time, to execute and innovate as barriers emerge’; EY, ‘Delivering a step change in 
organisational productivity: Findings from the Australian Oil & Gas Productivity and Innovation 
Survey’ (May 2013) 7 
<http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Delivering_a_step_change_in_organisational_productiv
ity/$FILE/Delivering_a_step_change_in_org_prod.pdf >. 
19‘In our first productivity study, “contract constraints” emerged as a barrier to success. In our second 
study, we asked additional questions about contracts in order to identify how they might help or hinder 
productivity. The result: 32% of respondents cited ‘contract constraints’ as barriers to productivity, 
making it one of the most prevalent barriers in the study. Of these constraints, ‘scope changes in 
projects’ and ‘inequitable risk sharing’ stood out as key concerns. A number of our interviews suggest 
that poorly-designed contracts tend to contribute to an environment of distrust and inflexibility, 
resulting in a negative impact on innovation and collaboration. (…) Rather, there is a real need to 
critically and regularly review the portfolio of contracts being managed by a firm. The review should 
allow, where necessary, changes to contract management practices, changes to contract terms and even 
changes to contract types.’, see EY & UQ Business School, ‘Adapt to win: How Australian oil and gas 
companies improve productivity in challenging times’ (April 2014) 
<http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-
_Oil_and_Gas_Productivity_report_Adapt_to_win/$FILE/EY-oil-gas-adapt-to-win-report.pdf >.  
20 ‘There are myriad reasons for these overruns (…). Less benign factors exist as well, including (…) 
an insistence on customizing each project rather than looking for ways to standardize’, see Deloitte, 





requirements.21 The same is the case with the standardisation for subsea equipment.22 
The thesis draws attention to the fact that standardisation should not only take place at 
the technical and operational level, but also in the wider commercial and contractual 
process, which accounts for a significant portion of the costs and overall performance 
of a project. 
 
1.2.3 The Wood Review and the redesigning of the UK offshore oil and gas 
strategy 
 
The UK has a long history in the energy sector
23
 and in offshore oil and gas 
exploration.
24
 Today, the UK part of the North Sea is still the most important offshore 
oil and gas province in the EU
25
 and an important oil and gas field at a global level, 
due to the level of experience and technology sophistication.
26
 However, it is widely 
acknowledged that the industry has long been facing major challenges, such as a 
decrease in production efficiency and increased costs due to the maturity of the fields, 
which, alongside the low oil price, led to the unsustainable situation of more being 




The multi-dimensional challenges alarmed the UK government, which responded by 
commissioning Sir Ian Wood to redesign the UK offshore strategy, the result of which 
was the Wood Review. In June 2013, the UK government appointed Wood to conduct 
                                                 
21 Offshore-mag.com, ‘EPC giants, classification societies sign offshore engineering standardization 
agreement’ (18 May 2016) < http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/2016/05/epc-giants-classification-
societies-sign-offshore-engineering-standards-agreement.html>.  
22 Offshore Magazine, ‘Industry moves subsea processing toward standardization, consistency’ 
(Offshore Magazine, 11 March 2015) <http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-75/issue-
3/subsea/industry-moves-subsea-processing-toward-standardization-consistency.html>.  
23 Greg Gordon, Aileen McHarg and John Paterson, ‘Energy Law in the United Kingdom’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Anita Ronne and Inigo Del Guayo (eds), Energy Law in Europe 
(OUP 2016) 
24 For the history of the UKCS see Alex Kemp, The Official History of North Sea Oil and Gas: Vol. I: 
The Growing Dominance of the State (Routledge 2011); Alex Kemp, The Official History of North Sea 
Oil and Gas: Vol. II: Moderating the State's Role (Routledge 2011); see also Norman J. Smith, The Sea 
of Lost Opportunity: North Sea Oil and Gas, British Industry and the Offshore Supplies Office 
(Elsevier 2011); For a perspective from the Oil and Gas UK trade association see Oil and Gas UK, 
Britain’s Offshore Oil and Gas Book (2013) < http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/product/britains-offshore-oil-
and-gas-book/>. 
25 EU Offshore Authorities Group, ‘Offshore oil and gas production in Europe’, 
<http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/63>. 
26 For facts and figures of the UK oil and gas industry see Oil and Gas UK, ‘Economic Report 2015’ 6-
9 <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/economic-report-2015.cfm>.  
27 Ibid, 5. 
20 
 
an independently led review of UKCS oil and gas recovery, specifically looking at 
how to maximise the economic recovery from the remaining North Sea oil and gas 
resources. The final report, published in February 2014, identified as one of the roots 
of the problem that the ‘light touch regulation applied in the early days of large fields 
and large operators, must now be evolved to take account of a basin with over 300 
fields, much smaller new discoveries, many marginal fields and much greater inter 
dependence in exploration, development and production’.
28
 The Review made four 
main recommendations, including the establishment of a new and adequately-
resourced regulator (the Oil and Gas Authority)
29
 tasked with the development of a 
‘cohesive tripartite approach’ among itself, the Government (HM Treasury), and 
industry. The Wood Review received wide acceptance from industry and regulators
30
 
alike, and the Government accepted all recommendations
31
 and committed to take the 
necessary administrative steps to implement them through the provisions of the 
Infrastructure Act 2015 and the Energy Act 2016.
32
 Moreover, the Infrastructure Act 
2015 created an obligation on the Secretary of State to produce a strategy for enabling 
the objectives to be met. The Strategy, after being put out to consultation by the 
Government,
33
 came into force in March 2016.
34
 There is no doubt that analysing the 
content of the MER UK Strategy will monopolise the interest of industry 
professionals for some time in order to decode its full meaning. For the purposes of 
                                                 
28 Sir Ian Wood, ‘UKCS Maximising Recovery Review: Final Report’ (24 February 2014) 5 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/497727/UKCS_Maxim
ising_Recovery_Review_FINAL_72pp_locked.pdf>. [hereinafter ‘Wood Review Final Report’]. 
29 The Oil and Gas Authority is the Regulator which will oversee the implementation of the Wood 
Review recommendations and the MER Strategy. For further information see 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/oil-and-gas-authority>. 
30 The Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the regulatory body that oversees safety regulation, issues a 
report on its strategy that is also aligned with the Wood Report; HSE, Offshore Oil and Gas Sector 
Strategy: 2014 to 2017 (March 2014) <http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/offshore-oil-and-gas.pdf>.  




32 Department of Energy & Climate Change, ‘The Energy Bill 2015/16’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-energy-bill-201516>. 
33 Department of Energy & Climate Change, ‘Maximising Economic Recovery of Offshore UK 
Petroleum: Draft Strategy For Consultation’ (18 November 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/maximising-economic-recovery-of-offshore-uk-
petroleum-draft-strategy-for-consultation>.  
34 Department of Energy & Climate Change and Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Maximising economic 
recovery of UK petroleum: the MER UK strategy’ (18 March 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/maximising-economic-recovery-of-uk-petroleum-the-
draft-mer-uk-strategy> [hereinafter ‘MER UK Strategy’]. 
21 
 
the thesis, however, the main focus is the obligation in the Strategy to collaborate, and 
its potential impact on offshore contracting. 
 
1.2.4 The current offshore oil and gas contracting model  
 
In the context of the thesis, the terms ‘contract’ and ‘contracting’ have separate 
meanings: according to the traditional definition, a contract is ‘an agreement giving 
rise to obligations which are enforced or recognised by law’.35 ‘Contracting’, on the 
other hand, is not a term of art, but rather is generally used to signify the process of 
negotiating, signing and administering a contract from the beginning to the end of its 
lifecycle. Efficient contracting is especially important in complex industries such as 
the oil and gas industry. For example, Boston Consulting Group reports that the 
‘value leakage’ observed in the oil and gas supply chain can be addressed by more 
efficient contracting practices.36 For this reason, the research focuses on the 
contracting practice in the offshore industry. The section below briefly analyses the 
dominant contracting paradigm in the offshore sector. Then, modern developments in 
contracts and contracting are discussed to provide a comprehensive picture of wider 
developments that could potentially improve the offshore contracting practice.  
 
From a contractual point of view, the offshore industry developed from an early stage 
tailor-made contractual practices that were – and still are – innovative compared to 
other areas of the English law of contract. For example, the offshore industry 
developed the so-called ‘mutually hold harmless indemnification system’ for personal 
injuries and property damage (known as the ‘knock-for-knock’ model).
37
 The knock-
for-knock model has been upheld by the English courts, and judicial dicta summarises 
its function as ‘a crude but workable allocation of risk and responsibility’
38
 and ‘a 
market practice that has developed to take account of the peculiar features of offshore 
                                                 
35G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (14th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 1-001. 
36 Boston Consulting Group, ‘E&P Supplier Contracts: Where Does All the Value Go?’ (22 July 2015) 
<https://www.bcgperspectives.com/Images/EandP-Supplier-Contracts-July-2015_tcm80-193220.pdf>.; 
‘We believe that the challenge of value leakage is one that E&P companies can address, but it will 
require them to rebalance their focus in their supply-chain efforts. Specifically, they will have to assign 
less urgency to the design of ever-more sophisticated contracts and incentives and spend more time 
improving basic contract framing, supervision, and management practices.’ 
37 Further analysis about case law regarding ‘knock for knock’ and other risk allocation clauses is 
provided in chapter 3.  





 This example serves to highlight the importance of the contractual 
mechanisms that have been developed to suit the needs of a complex industry. 
 
 The main function of an offshore services contract, apart from defining the scope of 
work and price/remuneration, is to function as a ‘risk allocation’ mechanism among 
the operator of a field and the contractors hired to deliver specialised services. Each 
party tries to secure its interests by carefully drafting certain key clauses of the 
contract: the so-called ‘risk allocation’ clauses. In a nutshell, the risk allocation 
process includes allocating risk to the party best able to control it, with the rationale 
that this party is generally best placed to reduce the likelihood of the risk eventuating. 
Moreover, a combination of limitation of liability, exclusion of liability and indemnity 
clauses is used to cover liability for negligence, breach of statutory duty and breach of 
contract, for events such as: death and personal injury, property loss or damage, loss 
or damage to third parties and environmental liability.
40
 Eminent practitioners and 
academics have written about the peculiarities of offshore contracting and have 




Although in theory, the industry accepts the maxim that ‘risk should lie with the party 
best able to control/bear it’, very often each party tries to transfer the potential 
liability to its counterparty, with the final outcome reflecting most of the times the 
respective bargaining power of each party. This practice has been criticised as a ‘risk 
transfer’ culture which ultimately does not mitigate risk effectively. A report on the 
Australian construction market offers a succinct critique of risk transferring: ‘the 
traditional risk management strategy adopted by clients has been to transfer as much 
of this risk as possible to others. (…)However, this strategy often fails, creating an 
adversarial climate, a high level of commercial disputation, time and cost overruns 
                                                 
39 Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 553, HL. 
40For a brief overview see Wilson Sharon, ‘Contractual Allocation of risk in upstream oil and gas 
projects’ (2008) Energy Source 3, 5. 
41 The necessary literature on this subject includes the following titles: Baris Soyer and Andrew 
Tettenborn (eds), Offshore Contracts and Liabilities (1st edn, Informa Law 2015); Peter Roberts, 
Petroleum Contracts- English Law and Practice (1st edn, OUP 2013); Greg Gordon, John Paterson 
and Emre Üşenmez (eds), Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends (2nd edn, Dundee 
University Press 2011); Simon Rainey, The Law of Tug and Tow and Offshore Contracts (3rd edn, 
Informa Law 2011); Anthony Jennings, Oil and Gas Exploration Contracts (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2008); Anthony Jennings (ed), Oil and Gas Production Contracts (1st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2008); David Sharp, Upstream and Offshore Energy Insurance (2nd edn, Witherby Insurance 2008); 
Stuart Beadnall and Simon Moore, Offshore Construction: Law and Practice (Informa Law 2017) 
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and overall poor performance.(…) Given the adversarial nature of relationships, it 
may be in the contractor’s interest to allow a problem to unfold rather than to deal 
with it positively’.
42
 In the UK industry, the main standard form contracts are LOGIC 
contracts, which also criticise the practice of risk transferring.
43
 However, despite the 
aim set out in the Guidance Notes, in practice, LOGIC contracts are closer to the 
culture of risk transfer than the culture of collaboration and joint risk management.  
 
Despite the critique on the culture of risk transfer, the contracting model of the 
industry is generally perceived to have served the needs of the industry reasonably 
well so far. Thus, the thesis does not seek to disregard the contracting model in its 
entirety, but rather to focus on how it can adapt to include the new requirements set 
out by the MER Strategy.  
 
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Having discussed background information about the offshore oil and gas industry and 
the recent changes in the commercial environment, the hypothesis and the underlying 
assumptions of the research may now be articulated. As previously mentioned, the oil 
and gas industry in general, and the offshore industry in particular, are in a transitional 
phase. Three trends are drastically changing the business environment: (a) the current 
and – in the foreseeable future – low oil price, (b) a strong project management 
preference for collaboration and integrated project delivery, and (c) a strong 
preference by regulators (at least in the UK) for collaboration among the industry 
players. 
 
The first factor, the oil price, is traditionally one of the most – if not the most – 
important element that shapes the oil and gas industry. Oil price is notoriously 
                                                 
42Australian Constructors Association, ‘Relationship Contracting: Optimising Project Outcomes’ 
(1999) 8 < http://www.constructors.com.au/wp-content/uploads/1999/02/Relationship-Contracting-
Optimising-Project-Outcomes-1999.pdf>. 
43 LOGIC, ‘General Conditions of Contract for Services On- and Off-shore’ (3rd edn, March 2014); 
See Guidance Notes 1 < https://www.logic-oil.com/content/standard-contracts-0>; ‘What did or does 
this process achieve? For many who have worked with this arrangement over many years the belief is 
that it achieves very little. Risk is not managed or allocated where it can most appropriately be borne, 
rather it is pushed from one party to another depending on prevailing market conditions. Additional 




difficult to predict, and estimations from even acknowledged institutions vary 
significantly. In the basic scenario from the International Energy Agency [hereinafter 
‘IEA’], the market is set to rebalance at $80/bbl in 2020, with further increases in 
price thereafter.
44
 However, IEA also foresees oil prices remaining ‘lower for longer’ 
as the second most probable scenario.
45
 Whichever the case might be, the oil price is 
likely to remain low for at least the foreseeable future, which means that the industry 
needs to develop a short-term strategy. However, in the case of the UKCS, the oil 
price challenge is further amplified by other factors: field maturity and high extraction 
costs, low level of investments, and cancellation of projects, to name a few. 
Therefore, even if the market rebalances by 2020 as IEA estimates, a long and 
challenging way lies ahead, and oil price will undoubtedly apply pressure to the UK 
offshore oil and gas industry.  
 
The second factor is the trend in project management towards integrated project 
delivery, which means that the various stakeholders of a project (operator, contractor 
and sub-contractors) must work closely both at the commercial and operational level. 
This trend in turn impacts the overall structure of a project, an important part of which 
is the legal and contractual architecture. Since collaboration is closely linked and can 
be seen as a prerequisite for integrated project delivery, legal practitioners will soon 
be confronted with the challenge of understanding and applying collaborative 
contracting models.  
 
The third factor is the strong regulatory preference for collaboration in the UKCS. 
The cornerstone role of collaboration in the Wood Review and the MER Strategy 
renders the understanding of the legal and contractual ramifications of collaborative 
models a necessity. It may also be said that if the MER Strategy proves to be 
successful, it could provide impetus for industry collaboration in other common law 
countries with offshore production, which means that the subject matter of the thesis 
might not be necessarily confined in the UK context in the future.  
 
                                                 






In light of the above factors, the research argues that collaborative contracting models 
are the optimal mid- to long-term strategy for the offshore oil and gas industry. This 
observation is even timelier for the UKCS and needs to be considered also as a short-
term strategy due to the regulatory requirements. The thesis does not regard 
collaboration as a panacea and does not dismiss the accumulated knowledge and 
experience of the traditional adversarial approach. The main reason for the chosen 
approach is that the trend at the operational and project management level is towards 
integrated project delivery. Experience has shown that legal services follow – or 
should follow – the needs of commercial and business realities. The commercial 
realities consequently raise academic and doctrinal questions, e.g. what is the nature 
and how can collaboration be applied in a contractual context; therefore, this issue 
needs to be dealt from an academic viewpoint as well.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION AND EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
Given the context and approach of the research, the research questions/aims may now 
be delineated:  
1. To explain the meaning of ‘collaboration’ within and beyond the context 
of the MER Strategy.  
2. To explain the notion of ‘modern contracting’ and ‘contract and 
commercial management’ and argue that offshore oil and gas contracting 
in the UK should follow this contracting paradigm, which is also aligned 
with the MER Strategy. 
3. To ascertain the meaning of ‘collaboration’ in the English law of contract and 
explain its relevance to UK offshore oil and gas contracting. 
 
This section sets out the evaluative framework of the research, i.e. the criteria used to 
assess ‘success’. The traditional legal approach is that the main role of the contract is 
to offer ‘certainty and predictability’ in order uphold the intention of the parties. The 
thesis argues that in order for a contract to successfully achieve this aim, ‘clear 
wording’ and ‘good drafting’, which are the main tools in the arsenal of the traditional 
approach, are insufficient. Without opposing the self-evident importance of the 
aforementioned factors, every clause may eventually be subject to judicial 
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interpretation during litigation. One elucidating example from the offshore contracting 
context is the notoriously difficult demarcation of the scope of exclusion clauses for 
consequential loss. Even after thorough analysis of case law and contract doctrine by 
experienced practitioners, the conclusion is often that ‘clearer wording’ or ‘better 
drafting’ is required.46 However, it is submitted that this is a futile quest due to the 
inherent doctrinal difficulties of abstract legal terms, especially when combined with 
an adversarial business relationship.  
 
This futility informs the thesis’ emphasis on the potential application of commercial 
and contract management to offshore contracting. In complex, project-based 
industries, the contractual process and underlying business relationship can be equally 
important to, if not more important than, the content of the clauses themselves. In 
addition to the difficulty of drafting clear contracts, authors have pointed out that the 
notion of legal certainty is elusive or even unnecessary.
47
 However, even if it is 
supposed that an offshore contract can offer an acceptable degree of certainty and 
predictability to the parties regarding their rights and obligations, the problem of risk 
transfer still exists. Therefore, it is submitted that a proactive contractual process that 
focuses on project success is more fit for purpose than a defensive contract strategy 
designed to address the ramifications after a project failure.
48
 In this case, the 
immediate question that arises is what constitutes ‘project success’. The thesis adopts 
the traditional criteria in the literature of project management: cost, time, and 
performance.
49
 It should be noted that there is academic debate in the project 
                                                 
46Chris Kidd, ‘Consequential Loss Exclusion Clauses in Offshore Contracts’ in Baris Soyer and 
Andrew Tettenborn (eds), Offshore Contracts and Liabilities (1st edn, Informa Law 2015) 130; 
‘Clearer standard form wordings would certainly help, and it is hoped that in considering any further 
revisions to their standard forms, particularly the widely used SUPPLYTIME, BIMCO will be able to 
set the offshore oil industry on the right course even if it does reduce the future fees of lawyers who 
have been grappling with such issues for so long. More judicial guidance from the higher courts would 
also help resolve the confusion.’ 
47 For a more theoretical discussion on this matter, see Ofer Raban, ‘The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: 
Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better For Capitalism and Liberalism’ (2009-2010) 9 B.U. Pub. 
Int. L.J. 175. 
48 For example, PwC pointed out in a 2014 report that large capital projects in the oil and gas sector 
have demonstrated poor capital efficiency and project performance. The report proposes three ‘activity 
segments’: resourcing and capabilities, planning and organizing, and managing for success and risks, as 
shown in the table below. Notably, almost all of the actions depend more or less on the functions of the 
contractual architecture. See Brian J. Campbell, Douwe Tideman, Hinne Temminck Tuinstra, ‘Large 
capital projects in the oil and gas sector: Keys to successful project delivery’ (2 October 2014) 10 
<http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Large-capital-projects-in-the-oil-and-gas-sector.pdf>.  
49 Lavagnon A. Ika, ‘Project Success as a Topic in Project Management Journals’(2009) Project 
Management Journal Vol. 40, 6–19. The author has conducted a literature review on the topic of 
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management discipline about what these criteria are/should be, which however lies 




1.5 METHODOLOGY AND DELIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH  
 
1.5.1 Explanation of the selected methodology and research methods 
 
The starting point for research methodology is the explanation of the terms 
‘methodology’ and ‘method’ in the context of the thesis, as their precise meaning can 
be ambiguous.
51
 The term ‘methodology’ is properly perceived as broader in meaning 
than the term ‘method’. The definition of ‘method’ in the Oxford Dictionaries is ‘a 
particular way of doing something’,
52
 whereas a ‘methodology’ is ‘a set of methods 
and principles used to perform a particular activity’.
53
 Therefore, the thesis attributes 
to ‘methodology’ the role of the overall strategy in examining the subject matter, 
whereas the term ‘research method’ signifies the specific tactics serving that strategy.  
 
It is also submitted that ‘methodology’ is conceptually closer to the theoretical 
framework, i.e. the background assumptions and hypothesis of the research, than 
‘method’. The methodological approach of the thesis is a combination of a doctrinal 
analysis of English contract law, with an interdisciplinary angle from management 
disciplines related to the study of contracts and contracting
54
 - specifically contract 
management and project management.
55
 The research utilises this interdisciplinary 
angle not with the aim to replace the legal standpoint, but rather to ‘inform’ the legal 
perspective through the lenses of contract and project management. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
project success and its criteria using articles published between 1986 and 2004 in the Project 
Management Journal (PMJ) and the International Journal of Project Management (IJPM). The analysis 
provides an overview of the literature on the concepts of project management success, project success, 
success criteria and success factors.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (1st edn, Routledge 2013) 2 
52 Method <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/method>.  
53 Methodology <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/methodology>.  
54 J. Collis and R. Hussey, Business research: a practical guide for undergraduate & postgraduate 
students (4th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
55For further information on legal research methodologies, see Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies 
of Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2011); Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law 
(Hart Publishing 2011). 
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The research focuses on English law as the subject matter is offshore contracting in 
the UKCS in light of the MER UK Strategy. Notably, English law is a popular 
governing law of choice within the offshore oil and gas industry, even for parties with 
no direct relation to the UK. English law is commonly perceived to be commercially 
sophisticated as it is ‘flexible, pragmatic and commercially minded, and seeks to 
uphold the freedom of the parties to contract and to behave as they see fit (…)’. 56 The 





1.5.2 Methods and sources 
 
The research method is primarily library-based. It is beyond the thesis’ scope to 
conduct empirical or primary, interview-based research. Such a task would be beyond 
the capacity of a single researcher, and additionally, the offshore oil and gas industry 
is ‘secretive’ with sensitive issues such as internal contracts or contracting processes. 
To compensate for the lack of empirical insight, the thesis includes a wide spectrum 
of sources, such as reports and studies regarding the offshore industry conducted by 
competent entities such as major consultancies, industry and trade associations, and 
academic institutions. The main research sources are publications from the industry, 
government, regulators and international (energy) institutions, and naturally, legal and 
academic sources: 
 
(a) Industry sources: the research considers publications from energy consultancies, 
law firms, trade associations, research institutions, oil companies, and services 
providers. Conclusions are drawn primarily from the publications produced by the 
most influential consultancies – the so-called ‘Big Four’ auditors,
58
 as well as the ‘Big 
                                                 
56 Peter Roberts, Petroleum Contracts: English Law and Practice (1st edn, OUP 2013) 3; Although the 
first part of the quote is indisputable, the statement ‘without implication of legal notions of good faith 
or conscience’ is not as straightforward since these issues have been often arisen in awards.  
57 OSCOLA (4th edn, Hart Publishers 2012) 
<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/oscola_4th_edn_hart_2012.pdf>.; In the present thesis the 
last access date for all sources is 20th July 2017.  
58The ‘Big Four’ auditing consultancies are generally thought to be Deloitte, PwC, EY, and KPMG 
(ordered according to their revenues in fiscal year 2014). Although their core business is auditing, there 
is a strong trend in the last years to expand into consulting services as well, therefore their reports can 
provide further insights to the oil and gas industry that are not confined to only accounting or tax 





 Publications from other market players are also 
factored in.
60
 Inclusion of so many industry sources in a legal thesis may be 
unconventional; however, this is not only an original, but also necessary, angle. 
Understanding and analysing the evolving commercial trends in the industry is crucial 
because the trends ultimately impact the contracting practice. Ascertaining these 
trends cannot become possible by citing the viewpoint of only a few market players. 
Yet, if the majority of the industry players supposedly share the same views, then this 
could offer a strong indication to rely on.  
 
Another source is the publications of law firms specialised in the energy sector, with a 
preference towards the firms that have a dedicated oil and gas and/or construction 
practice. Furthermore, there are various trade associations active in the offshore oil 
and gas industry that publish authoritative reports, standard form contracts, and 
industry best practice guides.
61
 Finally, publications from research institutions that 
conduct independent research and produce reports about the energy industry, are 
taken into account. The International Contract and Commercial Management 
Association (IACCM) is a leading example of a body that fertilises the industry with 




(b) Governments and International (Energy) Institutions: The thesis includes 
extensive publications from the UK Government on the offshore sector, such as the 
Wood Review and the MER Strategy and its accompanying documents. The 
publications from the UK Government in the field of contract management are used 
                                                                                                                                            
March 2015) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0614433e-c586-11e4-bd6b-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3lAdIxHQT>.  
59 The ‘Big Three’ strategy consultancies are: McKinsey & Company, The Boston Consulting Group 
and Bain & Company (ordered according to their revenues in fiscal year 2013). 
60 These consultancies include: Douglas Westwood, which specialises in the offshore energy industry 
and provides proprietary reports on market forecasts, trends, and supply and demand in various 
offshore sectors such as well services, drilling services, offshore support vessels (OSV’s), etc.; Wood 
MacKenzie; and Booz Allen Hamilton. It should be noted that Douglas Westwood publishes many 
proprietary reports that are not publicly available. 
61 The most important trade associations are: Oil and Gas UK (OGUK) <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk>.; 
International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) <http://www.imca-int.com>.; International 
Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI) <http://www.iumi.com>.; International Association of Drilling 
Contractors (IADC) <http://www.iadc.org>.; Association of International Petroleum Negotiators 
(AIPN) < https://www.aipn.org>.; International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) 
<http://www.iogp.org>.; A more detailed presentation about the scope and functions of each of these 
organisations follows in the respective parts of the main analysis. 
62The publications of IACCM will be explained in detail in chapter 3. 
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extensively. ‘International Energy Institutions’ refers to institutions that influence the 




(c) Academic and legal sources: the core literature on contract law and the offshore 
industry in a UK context have already been referred to. Aside from books, the 
research also incorporates articles from eminent UK and international journals on oil 
and gas law and contract law.64 The existing literature mainly provides a doctrinal 
analysis of contract law regarding the peculiarities encountered in offshore 
contracting practice. Although this ‘black letter law’ analysis is necessary and forms 
the starting point for every academic and professional studying this field, there are 
under-researched, yet necessary angles, which are not covered by current literature.  
 
1.5.3 Delimitation of the research scope 
 
Since the subject matter of the research is complex and multi-dimensional, it is 
important to delimit the scope in relation with the disciplines of law, management and 
economics. In respect of the legal dimension, it is important to highlight that the 
research focuses on private rather than public law. This fact is stressed because the 
recent literature regarding the offshore oil and gas industry focuses on the regulatory 
developments following the Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico. After 
the incident, the regulatory models have been thoroughly scrutinised not only in the 
US, but in almost every other developed country with offshore production, including 
the UK.65 The research also does not include examination of regulatory and statutory 
                                                 
63 OECD, ‘Shipbuilding and the Offshore Industry’ (Working Party on Shipbuilding, June 2015) 
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/Shipbuilding-and-offshore-industry.pdf>.; OECD, ‘Offshore Vessel, 
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit & Floating Production Unit Market Review’ (Working Party on 
Shipbuilding, 17 December 2014) 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=c/wp6(2014)13/final&docla
nguage=en>. 
64International Energy Law Review (I.E.L.R.); Journal of World Energy Law & Business (JWELB); 
Oil, Gas & Energy Law (OGEL); Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation (JSCAN); 
Construction Law Journal (Const. L.J.); International Business Law Journal (I.B.L.J.); Journal of 
Business Law (J.B.L.); European Review of Contract Law (E.R.C.L.); European Business Organization 
Law Review (E.B.O.R.). 
65 For a complete overview of the various models and philosophies (prescriptive model, goal-oriented 
or performance-based model) which includes the regulatory changes and the experts’ opinions 
following the Deepwater Horizon blowout, see Preben Hempel Lindøe, Michael Baram and Ortwin 
Renn, Risk Governance of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (Cambridge University Press 2015); The 
UK follows the so-called ‘safety case’ model based on the recommendations of the report by Lord 
Cullen after the Piper Alpha disaster; see Cullen, The Hon. Lord W. Douglas, The public inquiry into 
the Piper Alpha disaster (H.M. Stationery Office 1990). For the history and current state of the 
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instruments on licensing, health and safety, environmental law, and technical 
requirements of the offshore industry. In regard to management literature, the thesis 
does not overextend to include specialised management sub-disciplines such as 
enterprise project management or inter-organisational theory. Similarly, it also does 
not include specific literature on supply chain management and logistics of the 
offshore industry. Finally, within the economics dimension, the thesis does not 
employ a law and economics analysis, which is a popular approach when examining 
contracts in a commercial context. It is submitted that this approach has a limiting 
structure unsuited to the needs of this research.66 Furthermore, the research does not 
follow a ‘contract economics’ analysis, which is essentially an economic discipline 
using mathematical and statistical models to choose the appropriate contract 
mechanisms in order to maximise profits or cost reduction for a company.67 
 
A further necessary clarification is the scope of what is included under the term 
‘offshore oil and gas contracts’. This term often refers to government-to-business 
contracts, which can take various forms.
68
 The research however focuses on business-
to-business contracts signed between the industry players of the offshore industry: oil 
companies, service contractors, and sub-contractors. Contracts concluded between 
license holders and their co-venturers for the exploitation of a field (joint venture 
agreements) are not covered, although they are included in the spectrum of business-
                                                                                                                                            
regulatory regime in the UK see J. Paterson, ‘Health and Safety at Work Offshore’ in G. Gordon, J. 
Paterson, E. Usenmez (eds), Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends (Dundee 
University Press 2011); See also J. Paterson, ‘The Significance of Regulatory Orientation in 
Occupational Health and Safety Offshore’ (2011) 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 369; J. Paterson, ‘Health, 
safety and the environment’ in E.G. Pereira (ed), The Encyclopaedia of Oil and Gas Law: 
Upstream (Globe Law and Business 2014) 219. For a critique of the UK ‘safety case’ model see Rena 
Steinzor, ‘Lessons from the North Sea: Should ‘Safety Cases’ Come to America?’ (2011) 38 B.C. 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 417 <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol38/iss2/10>. 
66 For an overview of contract law regarding this approach, see Robert B. Cooter and Thomas Ullen, 
‘An Economic Theory of Contract Law’ in Robert B. Cooter and Thomas Ullen (eds), Law and 
Economics (6th edn, Pearson 2013). 
67 See for example, Kenneth S. Corts and Jasjit Singh, ‘The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract 
Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling’ (2004) 20 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization.  
68 There are many legal forms that these types of agreements can take: concessions (license for 
exploration and production to a company under certain terms), productions sharing agreements or 
contracts (PSA’s or PSC’s), service contracts (the company is hired as contractor by the host 
government) and joint ventures (between company and host government). For further information 
about company-host government contracts, see Frank C. Alexander, ‘Production Sharing Contracts and 
Other Host Government, Contracts’ (March 2005) 3 OGEL; King & Spalding, 
‘An Introduction to Upstream Government Petroleum Contracts: Their Evolution and Current Use’, 
(2005) OGEL <http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=1730>.  
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to-business agreements.69 This is because joint venture agreements are negotiated 
between companies with - in principle - aligned interests, despite the fact that each 
venturer tries to promote its interests in internal contractual relations. On the contrary, 
a contract between a company and a contractor is essentially a contract between two 
entities with prima facie opposing interests, which creates the tensions described thus 
far in the thesis.  
 
The scope of the research includes contracts from the engineering, construction, and 
marine services sector because they share common characteristics with regard to their 
general structure and risk allocation clauses. Other types of contracts commonly used 
in the offshore industry are unitisation agreements, tie-in agreements, farm-in/out 
agreements, and confidentiality agreements; these contracts also fall within the scope 
of ‘offshore oil and gas contracts’, however they do not share common characteristics 
with the services contracts described above. Finally, the thesis will not include the 
issue of decommissioning; despite its importance and current momentum, it is a 
‘niche’ contract subcategory with each own peculiarities, within the already perceived 
as ‘niche’ area of offshore oil and gas contracts. This subject is important and could 





1.6 ORIGINALITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
 
1.6.1 The academic dimension 
 
Collaboration has always been a neboulous area in the English law of contract. 
Traditionally, it has been associated with other legal terms such as good faith (a rather 
complex term as well), relational contracts, and other forms of partnering. Therefore, 
the aim of ascertaining the meaning of collaboration could potentially be the subject 
of a separate legal research. However, the thesis does not analyse this issue in 
abstract, but in the specific context of offshore oil and gas contracting. This is an 
interesting approach, not only for the purposes of the the offshore oil and gas industry, 
                                                 
69For further information see Peter Roberts and Andrews Kurth, Joint Operating Agreements: A 
Practical Guide (3rd edn, Globe Law and Business 2015). 
70 See section 5.3 on ‘areas for further research’ for the potential research directions on this subject.  
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but for the wider academic literature, because it is necessary to examine this question 
against the backdrop of a specific business context.  
 
A further observation with regard to the originality of the research is that oil and gas 
law is a relatively under-researched subject from an academic and legal perspective. 
This can be attributed to various factors, e.g. oil and gas law is perceived as a 
practical field with no ‘academic’ value. A more practical reason is that academics 
specialised in this field often work in-house for companies, and they have limited time 
and restrictions on the information they can share.  
 
However, the thesis submits that the field of offshore oil and gas law poses interesting 
challenges from an academic point of view and can contribute significantly to the 
legal discipline. For example, the practical meaning of collaboration in English 
contract law, its interconnection to the notion of relational contracts and good faith, 
and the clarification of the concepts of partnering and alliancing are important legal 
issues to which the thesis aspires to make modest contributions. Furthermore, the 
thesis also introduces an interdisciplinary element that should inform how contract 
law functions; namely, that due account should be given to the potential of contracts 
as (project) management tools in project-based industries. Offshore oil and gas 
contracting is an appropriate field for such a practical application. In this way, 
offshore contracts could – in addition to their traditional role of offering certainty and 
predictability – contribute proactively to the overall success of complex projects. 
 
1.6.2 The business dimension 
 
The potential for fallout in the offshore oil and gas sector is enormous, as the 
Deepwater Horizon accident vividly illustrates. A decision issued by the US district 
court in New Orleans confirms a settlement of BP with the US authorities for civil 
penalties and damages for over $20 billion.
71
 The company had already paid $4.5 
billion in 2012 to resolve criminal charges. However, there are still outstanding 
amounts to be paid for damages suffered by businesses and individuals, which still 
casts uncertainty on the final costs. It is submitted that one significant contribution of 
                                                 




the research is that it can contribute, to a certain extent, to the overall risk 
management of the sector, as far as contracting procedure is concerned. Risk 
management is a widely-used term with different uses; what is meant in this case is 
that a well-designed contracting architecture can achieve joint risk management, 
which can reduce the overall risk level and offer value to all stakeholders of an 
offshore project.  
 
A further contribution of the research is the examination of how a collaborative 
business philosophy can work in practice. There is no doubt that the strategy of any 
oil and gas company depends on the business culture and decisions of its top-tier 
managers. Proponents of ‘zero-sum’ business strategies
72
 always account for a 
substantial percentage in the industry and this is a fact that no academic research can 
change. However, the recent trend of the MER UK Strategy towards the efficient 
exploitation of the remaining North Sea resources through collaboration generates the 
need for a comprehensive examination of the new business environment. Companies 
must adapt to this regulatory and statutory obligation. As mentioned above, the 
literature in the field analyses the doctrinal aspects of English contract law pertaining 
to offshore contracts, but the ramifications of a paradigm shift towards collaboration 
have not yet been explored. The analysis of the thesis ought to be considered by both 
the proponents and sceptics of a collaborative contracting model. Finally, it is 
submitted that the research may be of interest to the government and regulators. 
Regulators must also understand the practicalities of offshore contracting in order to 
facilitate the adaptation of the industry to a collaborative model of exploration and 
production in the North Sea. 
 
1.7 STRUCTURE OVERVIEW 
 
The introductory chapter has explained the background and rationale of the research. 
It has demonstrated how the maturity of the UKCS led to a comprehensive redesign of 
UK’s offshore oil and gas strategy, which begun with the commissioning of the Wood 
Review, and culminated in the establishment of the Oil and Gas Authority and the 
introduction of the MER Strategy. The current offshore oil and gas contracting 
                                                 
72 ‘Zero-sum is a situation in game theory in which one person’s gain is equivalent to another’s loss’, 
see Investopedia <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/z/zero-sumgame.asp>. 
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paradigm is explained and the section concludes that it has a mainly adversarial 
nature, both at the commercial and legal level. It is demonstrated that the current 
paradigm has strengths and weakenesses; however, the MER Strategy changed the 
landscape dramatically and offshore contracting needs to be approached under this 
prism. This chapter also lays down the methodological tools and rationale of the 
research. It stresses the interdisciplinary element of contract and commercial 
management, which the thesis argues can have theoretical and practical value for the 
discipline of contract law. The chapter sets out the priorities of the thesis and explains 
why certain areas of the law are excluded, e.g. why the focus is on the private law, 
rather than public law, dimension of oil and gas contracting.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the MER Strategy. It aims to explain the meaning of 
‘collaboration’ within and beyond the context of the Strategy. It is explained that the 
word is not a term of art, neither for the purposes of the Strategy, nor from a legal 
standpoint. Therefore, the chapter seeks to ascertain the meaning of ‘collaboration’ in 
both contexts. Chapter 3 examines the notions of ‘modern contracting’ and ‘contract 
and commercial management’. The chapter explains the evolution of these notions in 
the context of the UK construction industry. Next, the way in which these notions 
influence offshore oil and gas contracting is also considered. Finally, the chapter 
argues that the publications and directions of the Oil and Gas Authority can be said to 
have already established a body of contract and commercial management, which is 
sector-specific for the offshore oil and gas industry. It is also argued that the BS 
Standard 11000-1 should be the main document around which the rest of the relevant 
guides should revolve. Chapter 4 examines the meaning of ‘collaboration’ in the 
English law of contract. The chapter approaches narrowly the question within the 
delimited framework of the research, in light of the MER Strategy. Chapter 5 provides 
the final conclusions, identifies certain unavoidable limitations of the thesis, and 











‘COLLABORATION’ AND ITS MEANING WITHIN AND BEYOND THE 
CONTEXT OF THE MER STRATEGY 
 
2.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter examines the meaning of collaboration within and beyond the context of 
the MER Strategy. The chapter first provides an outline of the MER Strategy and the 
role of the Oil and Gas Authority in order to set the framework and context of the 
subsequent analysis. Naturally, the MER Strategy is a comprehensive framework and 
therefore the thesis only focuses on the elements that are relevant. Collaboration has 
different status - in terms of its meaning and legal nature - within the MER Strategy. 
Its primary status is that of one – out of four – ‘required actions and behaviours’. The 
second main status is that of a separate obligation under the ‘Asset Stewardship 
Strategy’. However, collaboration is also encountered with miscellaneous meanings in 
other documents published by the Oil and Gas Authority. This chapter explains the 
various meanings and legal concepts within the MER Strategy and points out certain 
inconsistencies alleged by the author. 
 
What is of equal – if not more – importance, is the meaning of collaboration in the 
wider matrix beyond the MER Strategy context. Considering ‘collaboration’ in a 
broader sense is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a comprehensive 
context for the meaning of collaboration. Secondly, it helps distinguish the project 
scope/commercial
1
 and legal dimensions of the meaning of the term, which is a 
crucial dimension that the Oil and Gas Authority seems to miss.  
 
The chapter also explains terms such as contract ‘model’, ‘type’ and ‘strategy’. The 
terms are frequently used interchangeably in Oil and Gas Authority publications. 
                                                 
1 The term ‘project scope/commercial’ signifies the business characteristics of a project, e.g. the overall 
business strategy, the pricing strategy, marketing strategy etc. The way in which the ‘project 




However, similarly to the point made above, the lack of a distinction between the 
project scope/commercial and legal dimension of the terms leads to confusion, which 
this chapter attempts to tackle.  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that throughout this chapter, the focus is on the 
meaning of collaboration between operators and contractors, i.e. the industry and the 
supply chain. It is vital to clarify this point at this initial stage, which is elaborated on 
in the conclusion: the term collaboration in the MER Strategy refers, and is designed 
to refer, to collaboration between operators. However, the thesis points out that first, 
the wording of the Strategy about this matter is not abundantly clear and it could be 
argued that the supply chain can be included in the MER scope as well in certain 
instances; second, the focus of the thesis, as stated in the first chapter is the 
contracting relationship between operators and contractors. The reason is that in 
project-based industries at least two parties are necessary for the materialisation of a 
project, the client/operator and the contractor. Moreover, it is the dynamic in this 
relationship that raises the relevant legal questions regarding the meaning 
collaboration in the English law of contract, for which much ink is spent on judicial 
awards each year.  
 
2.2 THE MER STRATEGY AND THE OIL AND GAS AUTHORITY 
 
2.2.1 The MER Strategy  
 
The introductory chapter explained the rationale of the Wood Review and the MER 
Strategy. Before embarking on an explanation of the details of the Strategy, its overall 
importance must be first highlighted. The MER Strategy is not merely another policy 
document to increase productivity or efficiency in the UKCS; its ‘lifecycle’ mirrors 
the fate of the lifecycle of the UKCS itself. It is the final legislative platform that will 
be used until the depletion of the UKCS oil and gas reserves – or, more precisely, 
until the profit margin for oil and gas operations in the UKCS still exceeds the 
extraction and decommissioning costs when factored into the final cost. Therefore, the 
provisions, rationale and peculiarities of the MER Strategy must be understood in 
depth as it will be the reference point for the next few decades of offshore oil and gas 
operations in the UKCS. Following consultation and extensive feedback from the 
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stakeholders, the MER Strategy was brought into force on 18 March 2016.
2
 The oil 
and gas industry has been particularly receptive to the Strategy, as is evident from the 
comment of the chief executive of Oil & Gas UK: ‘The Maximising Economic 
Recovery (MER) UK strategy will form the cornerstone of the tripartite approach 
being taken by the new Oil and Gas Authority, HM Treasury and the industry to 




The Strategy consists of two main documents, the Strategy
4
 and its accompanying 
Impact Assessment.
5
 It is founded on several statutory provisions
6
. The MER Strategy 
spells out the Central Obligation of ‘maximising economic recovery’, which provides 
that ‘relevant persons must, in the exercise of their relevant functions, take the steps 
necessary to secure that the maximum value of economically recoverable petroleum is 
recovered from the strata beneath relevant UK waters’.
7
 The idea of ‘maximum value’ 
is linked to the ‘the expected net value of economically recoverable petroleum from 
relevant UK waters, not the volume expected to be produced’.
8
 To achieve this central 
aim, the Strategy sets out ‘Supporting Obligations’ that include exploration, (regional) 
development, asset stewardship, technology and decommissioning.
9
 Both the Central 
and Supporting Obligations should be read in conjunction with ‘Safeguards’, which 
seek to strike a balance between ‘business as usual’ and the expectation of profit on 
                                                 
2 Department of Energy & Climate Change, ‘Maximising Economic Recovery of Offshore UK 
Petroleum: Draft Strategy for Consultation’,  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/498128/MER_UK_Str
ategy_government_response_FINALdocx.pdf>. 
3Oil & Gas UK, Comment of chief executive Deirdre Michie on 18 November 2015, 
<http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/oil-gas-uk-welcomes-energy-secretarys-launch-of-mer-uk-strategy-
consultation-as-consistent-with-progressive-decarbonisation/>. 
4 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘The Maximising Economic Recovery Strategy for the UK’ (18 March 2016) 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/1022/mer_uk_strategy.pdf>.. 
5Oil and Gas Authority, ‘The Maximising Economic Recovery Strategy for the UK: Impact 
Assessment’ (18 March 2016) <https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/1043/20160308_-
_mer_uk__strategy_-_impact_assessment_-_signed_by_minister.pdf>. 
6Infrastructure Act 2015 (c. 7) Part 6 s. 41  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/7/pdfs/ukpga_20150007_en.pdf>.; Energy Act 2011 c. 16 
Part 2 Chapter 3  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/16/pdfs/ukpga_20110016_en.pdf>.; Energy Act 2016 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/20/pdfs/ukpga_20160020_en.pdf>.; Petroleum Act 1998  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/17/pdfs/ukpga_19980017_en.pdf>. 
7Oil and Gas Authority, ‘The Maximising Economic Recovery Strategy for the UK’ para 7 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/1022/mer_uk_strategy.pdf>. 
8 MER Strategy, 5 
9 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘The Maximising Economic Recovery Strategy for the UK’ paras 10-22. 
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the one hand, and the public interest of ensuring the maximisation of the UKCS 




Furthermore, certain ‘Required Actions and Behaviours’ are introduced, which should 
also inform the realisation of the Central Obligation. These actions and behaviours 
include timing, collaboration, cost reduction and actions where relevant parties decide 
not to ensure maximum economic recovery.
11
 Collaboration is only one of the four 
required actions and behaviours, which in turn is only one parameter to be taken into 
account. In terms of ‘hierarchy’, collaboration is certainly less important than the 
Supporting and Central Obligation. If this is the case, then why is the issue of 
collaboration so heavily emphasised in this thesis? In a sentence, collaboration might 
be a relatively minor issue within the context of the MER Strategy, but it has a wider 
significance for contracting between operators and the supply chain. If two parties opt 
for a collaborative business relationship, then the legal meaning of collaboration must 
be ascertained. Therefore, although collaboration is not the main parameter within the 
MER Strategy, it has a more far-reaching impact on contracting beyond the Strategy.  
 
The MER Strategy also provides for the development of ‘Regional Plans’ and ‘Sector 
Strategies’. The ‘Asset Stewardship Strategy’ is of particular interest as it envisions a 
separate duty of collaboration. The Asset Stewardship Strategy and the Supply Chain 
Strategy are relevant to the thesis and are detailed in the following sections.  
 
2.2.2 The role of the Oil and Gas Authority  
 
The Oil and Gas Authority is a government company mainly funded by an industry 
levy, 
12
 per one of the key recommendations of the Wood Review. The Oil and Gas 
Authority is independent from the UK Ministry dealing with energy matters – 
formerly the Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC), and now Department 
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). Oil and Gas Authority considers 
                                                 
10 Ibid. paras 2-6. 
11 Ibid. paras 27-29. 
12 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘About Us’ <https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/about-us/what-we-do/>. 
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its primary aim to be to ‘regulate, influence and promote’ the MER Strategy.
13
 The 
main philosophy of the Oil and Gas Authority, which supervises the application of the 
MER Strategy, is to be a ‘light touch’ regulator and work closely with the industry to 
understand its needs. This approach aligns with the Wood Review recommendation 
for a ‘tripartite co-operation’ among industry, government and the Oil and Gas 
Authority.  
 
The fact that the stated intention of the Oil and Gas Authority is to be a ‘light touch’ 
Regulator should not be confused with the role of a ‘paper tiger’ regulator. The Oil 
and Gas Authority has explicit authority to proceed with sanctions, which may vary 
significantly in their scope. The Energy Act 2016 specifies the rationale behind the 
Oil and Gas Authority’s mandate to take action.
14
 The sanction arsenal of the Oil and 
Gas Authority includes: enforcement notice, financial penalty notice, revocation 
notice, and, the most extreme of the measures, an operator removal notice. The 
justification for the sanctions procedure and the calculation of the financial penalties 




2.3 THE NOTION OF ‘COLLABORATION’ WITHIN THE MER STRATEGY 
CONTEXT 
 
2.3.1 Collaboration as a ‘required action and behaviour’ 
 
Collaboration was identified as a ‘key issue’ already in the Wood Review. The 
Review suggested that one of the six ‘key issues’ which the new model should take 
into account was ‘the need for far greater constructive collaboration between 
                                                 
13Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Oil and Gas Authority Overview 2016’ (20 October 2016) 5 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/2825/Oil and Gas Authority-overview-october-
2016.pdf>. 
14 Energy Act 2016, sections 42 to 60: (a) a duty imposed under section 9C of the 1998 Act to act in 
accordance with the Strategy for enabling the Principal Objective to be met; (b) a term or condition of 
an offshore licence; and (c) a requirement imposed on a person by or under the 2016 Act which is 
sanctionable in accordance with Chapter 5 of the 2016 Act,  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/20/contents/enacted>. 
15 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Sanction Procedure’ 
<https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/media/2985/oga_sanction_procedure_r.pdf>.; Oil and Gas Authority, 






 It is therefore interesting to note how this recommendation was 
expressed in the final MER Strategy. The relevant provision on collaboration reads: 
 
‘Collaboration – When considering how to comply with obligations arising 
from or under this Strategy relevant persons must: 
 a. where relevant, consider whether collaboration or co-operation with other 
relevant persons and those providing services relating to relevant functions in 
the region could reduce costs, increase recovery of economically recoverable 
petroleum or otherwise affect their compliance with the obligation in 
question;  
b. where it is considered possible that such collaboration or co-operation 
might improve recovery, reduce costs or otherwise affect their compliance 
with obligations arising from or under this Strategy, relevant persons must 
give due consideration to such possibilities; and  




Before analysing this provision, it should be noted that the changes to the Petroleum 
Act 1998 made by the Infrastructure Act 2015 impose an obligation on relevant 
persons to comply with the principal objective. The principal objective expressly 
includes a reference to collaboration. In other words, the obligation to collaborate 
appears not only in the MER Strategy but, after the Infrastructure Act amendments, 




In order to understand the meaning of this provision, it is necessary to identify the 
various elements. The first issue relates to ‘relevant persons’ and what is expected of 
them. These relevant persons then ‘consider whether collaboration or co-operation 
with other relevant persons and those providing services relating to relevant functions 
in the ‘region’ could assist in the application of the Strategy. The definition of the 
relevant persons is not as straightforward as suggested by the reference in the MER 
                                                 
16 Wood Review Final Report, 5. 
17 Ibid. 6-7. 
18 This clause has not been yet introduced in the text of the Petroleum Act 1998 in the official 
Legislation archive, see <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/17/section/9>.; However, it does 
appear in the ‘View outstanding changes’ option in the previous website and it is the amendment ‘Pt. 
1A inserted by 2015 c. 7 s. 41’ due to be inserted in the main body of the text. 
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Strategy annex: ‘relevant persons means the Oil and Gas Authority and the persons 
listed in section 9C of the Petroleum Act 1998 at the date this Strategy is laid in 
Parliament’. This issue is covered in detail in section 2.3.5.2, in conjunction with the 
issue of the potential for contractors to fall within the MER scope in certain instances. 
Turning to the definition of ‘relevant functions’, the MER Strategy annex defines 
them as: ‘the functions which relevant persons are obliged by the Petroleum Act 1998 
to exercise in accordance with the Strategy, but only insofar as those functions can 
affect the fulfilment of the principal objective. These do not include any functions in 
relation to any infrastructure or activities which are downstream of an oil or gas 
terminal’. In the author’s opinion, the relevant functions are essentially included in the 
same article that defined the relevant persons, i.e. section 9C of the Petroleum Act 
1998, which refers to these activities. The only further qualification it provides is the 
exclusion of downstream activities and the closer relevance to the objectives of the 
MER Strategy.  
 
The next element of paragraph (b) involves the expectation of relevant persons if the 
above criteria are met. The expectation is that ‘relevant persons must give due 
consideration to such possibilities’. This requirement leaves room for a wide variety 
of interpretations. It does not seem to oblige the relevant persons to collaborate, but 
rather provides that they should grant ‘due consideration’ to this possibility. The 
obvious question that arises is what is the threshold and delimitation of the due 
consideration. Furthermore, it is unclear what the sanctions or consequences are for 
choosing to collaborate or not. These two issues should be read in light of the 
‘Competition and Collaboration’ in section 2.3.3. Furthermore, paragraph (b) refers to 
the content of collaboration. The instances where collaboration should be taken into 
account are when ‘such collaboration or co-operation might’: (1) improve recovery 
(2) reduce costs (3) otherwise affect their compliance with obligations arising from or 
under this Strategy. The third requirement appears to be a generic ‘statement’ that 
could include various types of actions and appears more as a kind of a continuous 




2.3.2 Collaboration as an obligation under the ‘Asset Stewardship Strategy’ 
 
The MER Strategy introduced, as mentioned above, separate sector strategies. One 
significant sector related to the scope of the thesis is the ‘Asset Stewardship Strategy’: 
it involves issues regarding collaboration, contracting and the supply chain.
19
 The 
objective of this Strategy is ‘to clearly define what good asset stewardship is and how 
the Oil and Gas Authority’s enhanced asset stewardship process will work’. The Asset 
Stewardship Strategy is based upon four other ‘complementary strategic elements’.
20
 
The relevant element for the thesis is the provision for a document setting out the 




The Asset Stewardship Strategy has certain aims,
22
 one of which is to ‘maximise 
recovery’ through ‘optimising delivery efficiency and pace, using technology, the 
supply chain and collaboration’. The supply chain is again included as part of the 
Asset Stewardship Strategy. The Asset Stewardship Strategy revolves around ten 
‘Stewardship Expectations’,
23
 which are further elaborated in a separate document 
analysed below. The relevant expectations for the purposes of the thesis are the ‘joint 
venture hub strategy’, ‘robust project delivery’ and ‘collaboration’. The Asset 
Stewardship Expectations are set out in a separate document that was published at the 
same time as the Asset Stewardship Strategy
24
, and its elements are updated 
periodically with more specific guidance – as is the case with the elements under 
consideration. A first important comment is the legal nature of the Asset Stewardship 
Expectations. It is made clear that ‘they are not intended to have binding legal effect 
                                                 
19Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Asset Stewardship Strategy’ (25 October 2016) 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/2836/asset_stewardship_strategy_2016.pdf> 
[hereinafter ‘Asset Stewardship Strategy’]. 
20 These elements are ‘Stewardship Expectations; Rationalised Industry Survey; Benchmarking; 
Stewardship Reviews’; see Asset Stewardship Strategy 4. 
21Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Asset Stewardship Expectations’ (25 October 2016) 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/2849/asset_stewardship_expectations.pdf>. 
22 The aims are to: ‘Ensure asset licensees fully identify opportunities and the means to realise them; 
Increase the resource base; Maximise recovery; Extend infrastructure life; Identify both 
underperformance and best practice’; see Asset Stewardship Strategy 5. 
23 The ten ‘Stewardship Expectations’ are: ‘Joint venture hub strategy; Exploration and appraisal 
subsurface work programmes; Optimum use of subsurface data; Licence activity, decision points and 
milestones; Robust project delivery; Production optimisation; Information management; Technology 
plans; Collaboration; Planning for decommissioning’; see Asset Stewardship Strategy 11. 
24 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Asset Steward Expectations’ (25 October 2016) 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/news-publications/publications/2016/asset-stewardship-
expectations/> [hereinafter ‘Asset Stewardship Expectations’]. 
44 
 
but rather set out (…) expectations which, if followed, will help to facilitate delivery 
of the MER UK Strategy’.
25
This is an important point to be stressed as a major 
difference from the notion of collaboration as a ‘required action and behaviour’ which 
is legally binding as explained above. However, the document does seem to leave 
some room for a potentially stricter approach by the Oil and Gas Authority, if the 




The first relevant element of the Asset Stewardship Expectations is the ‘Joint Venture 
Hub Strategy’. An implementation guide has been published recently on this 
element.
27
 The Hub Strategy spells out the definition of a hub and several of the 
actions that must be taken in order to develop a comprehensive plan. Collaboration is 
mentioned
28
, but the focus of the Hub Strategy is clearly on collaboration among 
operators, joint venturers, and third party operators; it does not seem to include the 
supply chain in its scope. Regarding the issue of risk management, the Hub Strategy 
envisages the use of a ‘hub “risk and opportunity” register and matrix’.
29
 This feature 
is highlighted for the purposes of the thesis as it is mentioned in the context of modern 
contracts and the ‘tools’ they use, a key tool of which is the risk register. This point 
can also serve as an example that the Oil and Gas Authority is supporting the use of 
risk registers for specific tasks. 
 
A second interesting point is the planning for the ‘Robust Project Delivery’.
30
 The 
goals of this project delivery are vested to operators and set out the actions that are 
required by them.
31
The reason to cite the expectations of project delivery is to stress 
                                                 
25 Asset Stewardship Expectations 4. 
26‘If, following discussions with the operator/ licensees, the Oil and Gas Authority concludes that a 
Stewardship Expectation has not been followed, this may lead the Oil and Gas Authority to consider 
whether the approach taken by the operator/licensees complies with their obligations under the MER 
UK Strategy.’ This seems to suggest that the Oil and Gas Authority may link the non-compliance of the 
stewardship expectations to the obligations under the MER Strategy, which are legally binding, if 
‘discussions’ do not rectify the omission; see Asset Stewardship Expectations 4. 
27 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Joint Venture Hub Strategy Implementation Guide’ (31 March 2017) 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/3538/se-01-jv-hub-strategy-implementation-
guide.pdf> [ hereinafter ‘Hub Strategy’]. 
28 See for example Hub Strategy section 2.4. 
29The aim of the hub risk register is to: ‘Identify the key risks and opportunities with their potential 
negative or positive impact on the hub strategy and associated activity plan; Set out an action plan for 
mitigating the risks and securing the opportunities identified in the register’; see Hub Strategy section 
2.5. 
30 Asset Stewardship Expectations 10. 
31 These include: ‘to encourage sufficient front end preparation prior to any significant project 
approval; to improve the predictability of project delivery – assessed against previous project 
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that these objectives are very similar to what the thesis will define in chapter 3 as a 
‘contract and commercial management’ framework.  
  
The final and most interesting part is the element of ‘Collaboration’. The main 
expectation is that ‘licensees should build effective business relationships which aim 
to create more value than is possible alone, by embracing a culture of collaboration 
and utilising collaborative tools and processes. In particular, licensees should be able 
to demonstrate that collaboration forms a core part of their organisational culture, and 
that they are making use of appropriate collaborative behaviour tools’.
32
This section 
seems again to refer to collaboration between operators and does not seem to include 
the supply chain within its scope.  
 
The more detailed ‘Collaboration Implementation Guide’ on collaboration in the 
context of Asset Stewardship has been published recently.
33
 In the introduction, the 
document spells out that the ‘the UK oil and gas industry has been undertaking 
collaboration for over 40 years (for example, in the form of joint venture partnerships 
and areas of mutual interest)’.
34
 In the context of the thesis this is a use of the word 
collaboration in an ‘operational sense’ and at a commercial level; this is pointed out in 
order to be juxtaposed to the legal and contractual meaning, as explained below. The 
‘Collaboration Implementation Guide’ mentions that ‘the obligations arising from the 
MER UK Strategy are relatively new. Collaboration by participants in the industry is 
required under Section 9A of the Petroleum Act 1998 (as amended)’. It continues by 
providing three dimensions: (a) Collaboration is a required action and behaviour in 
the MER UK Strategy (b) subject always to the safeguards in the Strategy (c) in 
particular regarding competition law (‘Competition and Collaboration’ publication).
35
 
These could be said to be in a nutshell the elements of collaboration in the eyes of the 
Oil and Gas Authority. The ‘Collaboration Implementation Guide’ refers clearly only 
                                                                                                                                            
performance and delivery; to drive efficiency in project delivery and reduce unit development costs in 
the UKCS’. 
32 Asset Stewardship Expectations 14. 
33 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘SE09 – Collaboration Implementation Guide’ (31 March 2017) 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/news-publications/publications/2017/implementation-guides-
for-joint-venture-hub-strategy-and-collaboration/>. [hereinafter ‘Collaboration Implementation 
Guide’]; See also Judith Aldersey Williams, Valerie Allan, Norman Wisely, ‘Collaboration – how 
(OGA intends) to make it happen’ (CMS Law-Now e-alert 16.05.2017) < http://www.cms-
lawnow.com/ealerts/2017/05/collaboration--how-oga-intends-to-make-it-happen?cc_lang=en>.. 
34 Collaboration Implementation Guide 2. 
35 This publication is covered in the next section. 
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to licensees and joint venturers.
36
 It also stresses the point that there should be 
‘collaborative engagement beyond the immediate joint venture to recognise common 
interest’.  
 
The second main objective is to promote the use of specific tools and specifically the 
use of the Oil and Gas Authority Collaborative Behaviour Quantification Tool 
[hereinafter ‘CBQT’].
37
 The document also promotes the aims of ‘collaboration 
within a joint venture’ and ‘commercial collaboration’ and suggests again the use of 
industry documents such as the Commercial Code of Practice [hereinafter ‘CCoP’], 
and the Code of Practice on Access to Upstream Oil & Gas Infrastructure [hereinafter 
‘ICoP’], as well as the reference guides mentioned in the context of ‘Project Delivery’ 
in the Asset Stewardship Expectations.
38
Again, this reinforces the argument of the 
thesis about the importance of understanding the concept and utility of a contract and 
commercial management framework.  
 
2.3.3 Competition and collaboration 
 
The Oil and Gas Authority has published a document dealing specifically with the 
issue of competition and collaboration, as there might be some conflict between these 
two notions.
39
 In the introduction the Oil and Gas Authority uses again a generic 
‘definition’ of collaboration in a similar way as in the ‘Collaboration Implementation 
Guide’. The report states that ‘for the United Kingdom’s oil and gas industry, 
collaboration (in its meaning of working together for a common purpose) is not a new 
                                                 
36 The first main objective is to ‘encourage licensees to develop a culture of collaboration within their 
organisation and to promote greater collaboration within existing joint venture partnerships’. 
Collaboration Implementation Guide 2. 
37 The first main objective is to ‘ensure existing commercial collaboration tools and processes 
developed by the industry are used more positively and proactively in daily business, and to identify 
areas for improved collaboration through the use of a simple recognised collaborative behaviour 
assessment tool, such as the Oil and Gas Authority ‘Collaborative Behaviour Quantification Tool’. 
38 Collaboration Implementation Guide 3,4; see also Oil and Gas Authority Press Release (20 April 
2017) <https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/news-publications/news/2017/the-Oil and Gas 
Authority-emphasises-collaboration-as-key-to-success>.  
39 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Competition and Collaboration’ (10 November 2016) 3 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/2952/OilandGas 




concept (…) – it is a matter of custom and practice, bringing shared knowledge, 




The phrase is worthy of further analysis. It is stated that collaboration can have the 
meaning ‘of working together for a common purpose’. Indeed, as discussed in the 
section below, that is close to the generic meaning of ‘collaboration’ that could be 
found in a dictionary. The report further states that collaboration ‘is a matter of 
custom and practice’ in the UKCS. These views are very helpful in order to put 
collaboration in context with regard to its perception by the Oil and Gas Authority. 
According to the thesis, the use of the term here is what is described – in the next 
section – as ‘collaboration at the project scope/commercial level’. This means that the 
mere forming of a joint venture to bid for or operate an offshore oil and gas project 
can be seen as a form of ‘collaboration’. The mere act of operators and the supply 
chain working on a project, can also be seen as a form of ‘collaboration’, if the sole 
criterion is the requirement of ‘working together for a common purpose’.  
 
However, the dimension that the thesis wants to distinguish and stress is the one that 
is termed ‘collaboration at the project and contract management level’. This means 
the way that a project is actually carried out, from the phase of procurement until the 
completion of the project [hereinafter ‘project lifecycle’]. This includes issues such as 
the intended relationship between operators and the supply chain, the types and 
standard forms of contracts used, the negotiation process and the clauses that allocate 
risk, the bargaining power of the parties and the degree to which each party leveraged 
that to its advantage; in other words, the practical, tangible ways in which a project is 
executed. In that sense, collaboration is far away from ‘a matter of custom and 
practice’ in the UKCS, when it comes to the relationship between operators and the 
supply chain. As already discussed in the introduction, the prevailing ethos at the 
project and management level has been traditionally adversarial in the UKCS.  
 
The Report provides also a further description which could be a good example of 
‘collaboration at the project scope/commercial level’. It mentions that the Wood 
Review placed emphasis ‘on the need for Industry’s existing collaborative approach 
                                                 
40 Competition and Collaboration Report 3 
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to be extended right across all activities – whether in areas such as production 
efficiency, rig sharing, more effective deployment of new technology, improved 
shutdown co-ordination, sharing access to key spares or decommissioning’.
41
 On 
another note, it is important to mention for the purposes of this Report the fact that 
collaboration as a required action and behaviour is a legally binding obligation – or in 
the phrasing of the Report ‘collaboration was elevated from being a matter of general 




For the purposes of the thesis, we shall not go into further analysis of the Competition 
and Collaboration Report, as its requirements and provisions rely heavily on EU 
competition law, which might be a parameter that will soon be considered and is 




2.3.4 Collaboration in the context of the ‘Enhanced Oil Recovery’ Strategy 
 
Another document where the notion of collaboration is encountered in the MER 
Strategy context is the ‘Enhanced Oil Recovery Strategy’ [hereinafter ‘EOR 
Strategy’].
44
 The EOR Strategy explains that Enhanced Oil Recovery – which is the 
extraction of oil and gas with advanced, non-conventional techniques- could ‘extend 
field life by as much as 10 years’, but has not been used up to date extensively due to 
its higher costs.
 45 
The EOR Strategy is another example where collaboration among 
operators and the supply chain is seen as a necessary step in order for the EOR 
Strategy to be efficient. The EOR Strategy mentions that the Oil and Gas Authority’s 
ambition is ‘working with operators and supply chain to support existing polymer 
EOR projects and ensuring readiness for future projects’.
46
 With regard to the supply 
chain, it is perceived as a factor of cost reduction, whereby ‘the creation of a 
                                                 
41 Competition and Collaboration Report 4. 
42 Competition and Collaboration Report 4. 
43 For further information on this subject see Christopher Jones, Marc van der Woude, Nicolas Charbit 
and Kryiakos Fountoukakos (eds), EU Competition Law Handbook 2017 (27th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2016); Rosalind Kellaway, Rhodri Thompson, and Christopher Brown, UK competition law: the new 
framework (OUP 2015) 
44Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Enhanced Oil Recovery Strategy’ (22 July 2016) 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/1143/eor_strategy_final-2016.pdf>  [hereinafter ‘EOR 
Strategy’]. 
45 The EOR strategy mentions ‘polymer and low salinity water flood techniques as well as other EOR 
opportunities’ as examples, see EOR Strategy 4. 
46 EOR Strategy 4. 
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competitive, robust supply chain is required to improve polymer EOR economics and 
reduce risk’.
47
 The perspective on collaboration is that ‘where possible, share 
learnings to build EOR knowledge and competency in the UKCS and reduce barriers 




Regarding the operators, the Strategy promotes an agenda ‘proactively (to) drive 
operator collaboration and partnerships via EOR workgroups’ and ‘actively support 
industry partnerships and collaboration’.
49
 The latter point is quite broad and it could 
theoretically include the supply chain as well. The heading of the Programme does not 
provide much help as it titled ‘Programme 3: Workgroups and industry 
partnerships’
50
, which again could include the supply chain. This observation serves 
in adding up to the conclusion of this chapter, where it is argued that more precise and 
harmonised wording in Oil and Gas Authority documents could help in identifying 
exactly who is supposed to be bound by its policies. 
 
The EOR Strategy is further explained by the ‘EOR Delivery Programme’.
51
 The 





, which are used in a specific context for this Strategy. As we may see 
the supply chain is again seen as an important element in this process, in the context 
of cost reduction. An interesting point of the EOR Delivery Programme is the element 
of ‘workgroups and industry partnerships’. 
54
 In this section, the elements of 
collaboration
55
 and risk reduction
56
 are two of the key deliverables. As these two 
definitions demonstrate in this context, the supply chain is again included as a factor 
                                                 
47 EOR Strategy 7. 
48 EOR Strategy 7. 
49 Ibid. 
50 EOR Strategy 8. 
51 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘EOR Delivery Programme’ (14 December 2016) 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/3171/eor_delivery_ver11.pdf>. 
52 ‘Cost reduction: the creation of a competitive, robust supply chain to improve polymer EOR 
economics and reduce risk’; EOR Delivery Programme 4. 
53 ‘Collaboration: share lessons learned to build EOR knowledge and competency in the UKCS and 
reduce barriers to EOR development at both producing and future fields; collective approaches will be 
developed to manage the risk profile of EOR developments and mitigate common risks’; EOR Delivery 
Programme 4. 
54 ‘Element 3: Workgroups and industry partnerships’; EOR Delivery Programme 10. 
55EOR Delivery Programme, ‘Collaboration: where possible, share lessons learned to build EOR 
knowledge and competency in the UKCS and reduce barriers to EOR development at both producing 
and future fields; this will involve operators, supply chain, the Oil and Gas Authority, academia etc.’  
56EOR Delivery Programme, ‘Risk reduction: collective approaches will be developed to manage the 
risk profile of EOR developments and mitigate common risks’. 
50 
 
within the element of collaboration. Moreover, it would be interesting to have more 
concrete comments about what the Oil and Gas Authority perceives the ‘risk profile 
of EOR’ and ‘mitigate common risks’ actually entails.
57
The same comments hold true 




2.3.5 Collaboration and the supply chain 
 
The Wood Review stressed that there is a ‘need for far greater constructive 
collaboration between operators’.
59
 While the statement is abundantly clear with 
regard to collaboration between operators, the Review did not offer any guidance on 
whether collaboration should extend to the supply chain as well. The Review 
acknowledged the importance of the issue, but excluded it from its scope and referred 
to the relevant provisions of the UK Oil and Gas Industrial Strategy.
60
 In turn, the 
Industrial Strategy did mention that it included efforts to ‘sustain and promote the 
growth of the UK industry’s supply chain, in both domestic and international markets’ 
and ‘promote purposeful collaboration across industry and between industry and 
Government’, but despite the inclusion of supply chain matters, it did not clarify the 




2.3.5.1 The ‘Supply Chain Strategy’ and ‘Supply Chain Delivery Programme’ 
 
At this point we shall first analyse the recent Supply Chain Strategy.
62
 The Oil and 
Gas Authority regards the supply chain in a wider nexus and describes it as the 
‘Supply Chain, Exports and Skills Strategy’ [hereinafter ‘SCES Strategy’]. One of the 
main goals is to promote the UK supply chain as a whole and increase its 
competitiveness and reach at an international level. The SCES Strategy also sets out a 
                                                 
57 EOR Delivery Programme 10. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Wood Review Final Report 5. 
60 Sir Ian Wood, ‘UKCS Maximising Recovery Review’ (Final Report, 24 February 2014) 63. 
61 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills and Department of Energy & Climate Change, ‘UK oil 
and gas: business and government action plan’ (28 March 2013) 2 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/175480/bis-13-748-uk-
oil-and-gas-industrial-strategy.pdf>.. 





vision for the supply chain to 2035 to grow the UK service sector’s share of both the 
domestic and global market.  
 
Regarding the relationship between operators and contractors, the SCES Strategy 
indentifies as a goal that in order to achieve MER there is a need to ‘create new 
business conditions between operators and the service sector where risk and reward 
are appropriately balanced’.
63
 What is of particular interest is the plan of the Oil and 
Gas Authority to produce, as part of the Asset Stewardship process, Supply Chain 
Action Plans with operators. These plans ‘will summarise contract strategies, key 
activities and accountabilities enabling consideration of the best overall value in terms 
of the MER UK, along with ensuring there has been a level playing field for the UK 
service sector’.
64
 Crucially, the plans will include ‘contract strategies’, which hints 
that there might be discussion of preferences for certain contractual models. It will 
also show in practice the degree to which collaborative contractual models at the 
project level are included as part of the MER Strategy.  
 
The ‘Supply Chain Strategy Delivery Programme’ further explains the deliverables of 
the Strategy and the time plan for their completion.
 65
 It includes five main elements.
66
 
What is of particular interest with regard to the contractual models discussed above is 
the element to ‘encourage innovation in business models’.
67
 The Delivery Programme 
mentions as an aim that ‘operators communicat[e] demand needs and [are] open to 
new contracting models’. It is therefore interesting to see what these proposed ‘new 
contracting models’ will look like, and whether they will have collaborative elements. 
Furthermore, in the section for required ‘activities’, the Delivery Programme includes 
‘identify[ing] potential value-add contract models from other sectors including 
aerospace and nuclear which could be implemented in the oil and gas sector’ and 
‘creat[ing] an environment to bring operators and contractors together to 
                                                 
63 Supply Chain Strategy, 4 
64 Supply Chain Strategy, 9 
65Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Supply Chain Delivery Programme’ (24 Oct 2016) [hereinafter ‘Supply 
Chain Delivery Programme’] 
<https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/media/2833/supply_chain_delivery_master.pdf> 
66 Supply Chain Delivery Programme, 5: ‘1. Communicate supply chain capability and opportunities to 
a wide range of stakeholders 2. Encourage innovation in business models 3. Establish and promote 
mechanisms which reduce industry costs 4. Promote awareness of supply chain opportunities both 
internationally and domestically 5. Promote a compelling and prosperous supply chain and highlight 
attractive career paths’. 
67 Supply Chain Delivery Programme 7. 
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communicate demand opportunities, share learnings and test contract models, 
including decommissioning’.
68
 It also remains to be seen what is meant by the aim to 
‘test contract models’ and which types of contracts it might include.  
 
A further sector where contracting strategies are mentioned is in the context of cost 
efficiency. It is mentioned that ‘information on innovative cost-saving contracting 
models from individual companies, trade associations and government departments’.
69
 
This feature is stressed again in the section of the activities that must be undertaken, 
when it says that the Delivery Programme should ‘promote the benefit of 
standardisation and collaboration and the benefits of adopting new contracting models 
across all activities’.
70
 The Programme links the adoption of new contracting models 
as a tool to achieve cost efficiency which is an interesting link indeed. Furthermore, in 
the same element it is mentioned that there is a responsibility to ‘revisit existing 
efficiency initiatives e.g. LOGIC and update as appropriate’.
71
 This could mean that 
the terms of the LOGIC contracts might come under closer scrutiny. However, this 
thesis suggests that it is not the terms per se, but rather the whole contracting process 
that needs to be assessed.  
 
2.3.5.2 Is the supply chain included indirectly within the MER Strategy scope? 
 
This section examines whether the supply chain falls within the scope of the MER 
Strategy in an indirect – and probably unintended – way. The thesis only seeks to 
elucidate the provisions of the MER Strategy and the relevant legislation in order to 
determine whether the current wording leaves room for confusion. More specifically, 
it is submitted that there is room for an interpretation that at least some contractors in 
specific activities could be defined as relevant persons for the purposes of the MER 
Strategy. As is explained in the next section, this matter does not alter the 
fundamental focal point of the research, which is how to treat collaborative 
contractual relationships between operators and the supply chain, regardless of 
whether that is covered by the MER Strategy or not.  
                                                 
68 Ibid. 7. 






The starting point in this examination is evident in that the Oil and Gas Authority and 
the MER Strategy do not intend to include and regulate the supply chain. For 
example, the Supply Chain Strategy states that the ‘the Oil and Gas Authority does 
not directly regulate the service sector’.
72
 Many parts of the Supply Chain Strategy 
and the Delivery Programme stress that the Oil and Gas Authority sees the supply 
chain as a very important sector for the UK offshore sector and lends significant 
weight to its potential, but it does not intend to regulate the supply chain directly.  
 
It is useful to refer back to section 2.3.1, where it was mentioned that the meaning of 
‘relevant persons’ and ‘relevant functions’ would be dealt with in conjunction with 
the question about the supply chain. Both definitions can be found in the annex of the 
MER Strategy. The definition of relevant persons encompasses ‘the Oil and Gas 
Authority and the persons listed in section 9C of the Petroleum Act 1998 at the date 
this Strategy is laid in Parliament’. This section was added to the Petroleum Act by 
virtue of section 41 of the Infrastructure Act 2015, which laid down a set of 
provisions entitled ‘maximising economic recovery of UK petroleum’.
73
As a result, 
section 9C of the Petroleum Act 1998 as amended reads: 
 
‘Carrying out of certain petroleum industry activities 
 (1) A person who is the holder of a petroleum licence must act in 
accordance with the current strategy or strategies when planning and 
carrying out activities as the licence holder. 
(2) A person who is an operator under a petroleum licence must act in 
accordance with the current strategy or strategies when planning and 
carrying out activities as the operator under the licence. 
 (3) A person who is the owner of upstream petroleum infrastructure must act 
in accordance with the current strategy or strategies when planning and 
                                                 
72 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Supply Chain Strategy’ (25 October 2016) 3 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/2834/supply_chain_strategy_1016.pdf>.  





carrying out the person’s activities as the owner of upstream petroleum 
infrastructure (including the development, construction, deployment and use 
of the infrastructure).  
(4) A person must act in accordance with the current strategy or strategies 
when planning and carrying out the commissioning of upstream petroleum 
infrastructure’. 
 
Paragraphs (1) and (2) are transparent about their scope; they refer to the ‘holder of a 
petroleum license’ and ‘operator under a petroleum license’, which means that only 
operators and other co-licensees or co-venturers of a joint venture could fall within 
this provision. However, the scope of paragraphs (3) and (4) is more complex.  
 
In paragraph (3), the ‘relevant person’ is ‘a person who is the owner of upstream 
petroleum infrastructure’. Prima facie, one might assume that upstream petroleum 
infrastructure would probably include an offshore installation, such as an exploration 
or production platform. In that case, it is very probable that the owner of such 
upstream infrastructure could very well be a contractor, as operators commonly hire 
offshore platforms that belong to contractors. The most obvious example, due to the 
press it received, is the case of the Deepwater Horizon, where BP (operator) hired the 
offshore rig, Deepwater Horizon, from the owner of the rig Transocean (contractor). 
In that case, according to the definition in paragraph (3), one could assume that this 
contractor would fall within the scope of a ‘relevant person’ under the MER Strategy.  
 
However, ‘upstream petroleum infrastructure’ must still be defined, and its definition 
is not as straightforward as it seems. In section 9H of the Petroleum Act 1998, as 
amended by the Infrastructure Act 2015, ‘upstream petroleum infrastructure’ is 
defined as: 
 
‘Upstream petroleum infrastructure’ and its owners: (1) In this Part 
‘upstream petroleum infrastructure’ means – (a) a gas processing facility, (b) 
55 
 
an oil processing facility, or (c) an upstream petroleum pipeline, if and in so 




In turn, paragraph (5) of section 9H refers, for the definition of these terms, to Energy 
Act 2011.
75
 To complete the picture, the thesis cites the definitions of ‘gas processing 
facility’
76
, ‘oil processing facility’
77
 and ‘upstream petroleum pipeline’
78
 according to 
section 90 of the Energy Act 2011. Furthermore, paragraph 6 of section 9H of the 





It is interesting to juxtapose the definition of ‘upstream petroleum infrastructure’ that 
derives from the provisions that the MER Strategy points to, with the definition of 
‘infrastructure’ that the MER Strategy spells out. The definition of ‘infrastructure’ in 
the annex of the MER Strategy is: ‘terminals and, upstream of a terminal, equipment, 
pipelines, platforms, production installations and subsea and subsurface facilities’.
80
 
In our view, this is a much more logical and natural definition in the context of the 
offshore oil and gas industry, as it includes all upstream infrastructure. It is also worth 
considering what the result would be if the MER Strategy’s definition of 
‘infrastructure’ was substituted with the term ‘upstream petroleum infrastructure’, 
                                                 
74 Infrastructure Act 2015, 9H.; The rest of the section describes what is meant under ‘pipelines’ in 
terms of jurisdiction with regard to the UK and Norwegian pipeline systems, which is not relevant for 
the purposes of the argument.  
75 ‘(5) In this section, the following expressions have the same meanings as in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of 
the Energy Act 2011 (see section 90 of that Act): (a) “gas processing facility”; (b) “oil processing 
facility”; (c) “upstream petroleum pipeline”’. 
76Energy Act 2011s.90: ‘ “gas processing facility” means any facility which – (a) carries out gas 
processing operations in relation to piped gas; (b) is operated otherwise than by a gas transporter; and 
(c) is not an LNG import or export facility (within the meaning of section 12 of the Gas Act 1995)’ 
77 Energy Act 2011s.90: ‘ “oil processing facility” means any facility which carries out oil processing 
operations’. 
78Energy Act 2011s.90: ‘ “upstream petroleum pipeline” means a pipeline or one of a network of 
pipelines – (a) which is operated or constructed as part of a petroleum production project and is not a 
carbon dioxide pipeline; (b) which is used to convey petroleum from the site of one or more such 
projects – (i) directly to premises, in order for that petroleum to be used at those premises for power 
generation or for an industrial process; (ii) directly to a place outside Great Britain; (iii) directly to a 
terminal; or (iv) indirectly to a terminal by way of one or more other terminals, whether or not such 
intermediate terminals are of the same kind as the final terminal; or (c) which is used to convey gas 
directly from a terminal to a pipeline system operated by a gas transporter or to any premises.’  
79Infrastructure act 2015, 9H (6): ‘In this Part, “owner”, in relation to upstream petroleum 
infrastructure, means – (a) a person in whom the pipeline or facility is vested; (b) a lessee and any 
person occupying or controlling the pipeline or facility; and (c) a person who has the right to have 
things conveyed by the pipeline or processed by the facility’. 
80 MER Strategy, Annex 14. 
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which the MER Strategy references. It may then become apparent that a contractor 
who is the owner of ‘infrastructure’, e.g. an owner of an offshore platform that is 
leased to an operator, would fall within the scope of a ‘relevant person’. 
 
Returning to the original line of thought: can contractors be regarded as ‘relevant 
persons’ for the purposes of the MER Strategy, in light of section 9H para (3) of the 
Petroleum Act 1998, as amended? To answer this, three separate questions must be 
considered: whether a contractor can be the ‘owner’ of a ‘gas processing facility’; 
whether a contractor can be the ‘owner’ of an ‘upstream petroleum pipeline’; and 
finally, whether a contractor can be the ‘owner’ of an ‘oil processing facility’.  
 
In the first case, it is clear that subparagraph (c) of the Energy Act 2011 excludes 
LNG operations.
81
 However, it could be possible for a contractor to ‘carry out gas 
processing operations in relation to piped gas’.
82
 The second possibility, i.e. whether a 
contractor could potentially fulfil one of the services described in the definition of an 




However, what is of interest and not far from the reality of offshore oil and gas 
operations – quite the opposite – is the third possibility: a contractor being the ‘owner’ 
of an ‘oil processing facility’. In this case, it is tempting to consider the outcome if an 
operator hired a Floating Production Storage and Offloading [hereinafter ‘FPSO’] or 
similar unit from a contractor. As is well established, FPSO’s can be highly complex 
and can carry out quite a diversified spectrum of services, including drilling, 
production, petroleum processing, loading and unloading of petroleum to oil 
tankers.
84
 In that case, it could be argued that the potential ‘oil processing services’ 
that can be offered by an FPSO do fall within the definition of an ‘oil processing 
facility’, as the definition of the Energy Act 2011 section 90 is that ‘oil processing 




                                                 
81 See supra n. 74 
82 Ibid. subparagraph (a). 
83 See supra n. 76 
84 Bluewater, ‘What is an FPSO?’ < http://www.bluewater.com/fleet-operations/what-is-an-fpso/>.; see 
also Lucia Lombardo, ‘Overview of Floating Production, Storage and Offtake (FPSO) Services 
Agreements’ (2003) 22 ARELJ. 
85 Energy Act 2011, s.90 (emphasis added). 
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Along the same line of thought, the same rationale could be applied in the case of 
Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU’s).
 86
 The oil and gas industry would not 
refer to an exploration ‘platform’; the term platform is generally being used to refer to 
a permanently fixed structure.
87
 In practice, it would be unusual for a contractor to 
lease a platform to an operator, but it is very common for contractors to lease 
MODU’s or floating production vessels to operators. For example, in the case of 
Macondo, the mobile drilling rig ‘Deepwater Horizon’ was leased by Transocean to 
BP in order to conduct the activities of exploration, appraisal and drill production 
wells. Such a MODU could not be described as an ‘oil processing facility’ for the 
purposes of the Energy Act 2011. However, this thesis highlights the possibility of the 
following scenarios: first, it is common in practice that the MODU which completed 
the production well will produce a limited amount of oil and run a well test which 
usually lasts for several days (and potentially weeks) before its substitution by the 
production facility that will take its place. In the period of these days, it could be 
argued that the MODU – in the case that it is leased by a contractor – performs the 
activities of an ‘oil processing facility’. Second, although it is not the norm, there 
have been cases evincing the fact that MODU’s have been used for production as 
well.
88
 In this case this could fall as well under the scope of an ‘oil processing 
facility’.  
 
In paragraph (4) of section 9C of the Petroleum Act 1998, a ‘relevant person’ ‘must 
act in accordance with the current strategy or strategies when planning and carrying 
out the commissioning of upstream petroleum infrastructure’. Applying the same line 
of thoughts mutatis mutandis, it could be argued that contractors again potentially fall 
within this scope. This could be the case with regard to an ‘oil processing facility’ if, 
for example, a contractor was required to ‘plan and carry out the commissioning’ of 
an FPSO as a service to an operator. The same could be said for the commissioning of 
an ‘upstream petroleum pipeline’. This argument is further enhanced by the 
                                                 
86 This is the most common term used to describe this type of equipment. However, other terms are also 
used, such as ‘mobile offshore units’ or ‘mobile drilling rigs’ depending on the exact function of the 
equipment; See Petrowiki, ‘MODU types’ <http://petrowiki.org/MODU_types>.. 
87 Hossein Esmaeili, The Legal Regime of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law (Routledge 2017); 
Michael White QC, ‘Offshore Craft and Structures: A Proposed International Convention’ (1999) 18 
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Infrastructure Act’s explanatory notes on this section.
89
 Unfortunately, The Hansard 
References on the discussion of the Act do not shed more light on this particular 
issue.
90
 Rather, the fact that the relevant clauses on the MER Strategy were not 




2.4 THE NOTION OF ‘COLLABORATION’ BEYOND THE MER 
STRATEGY CONTEXT  
 
2.4.1 Generic use of the word ‘collaboration’ 
 
The previous section thoroughly examined the various instances where the term 
‘collaboration’ is encountered in the MER Strategy. However, the term does have a 
generic meaning – and potentially a technical meaning – outside the scope of the 
MER Strategy. Starting with the generic meaning of the word, the first reference point 
                                                 
89 Infrastructure Act 2015, Explanatory notes, s.41 para [247] ‘New section 9C places duties on licence 
holders, operators appointed under those licences and owners of upstream petroleum infrastructure to 
carry out certain identified activities in accordance with the strategy. Subsection (4) places a duty on a 
person planning and carrying out the commissioning of upstream petroleum infrastructure. This is 
necessary because that person may not be the owner of such infrastructure and would not fall 
within subsection (3).’ [emphasis added]  
< http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/7/notes/division/4/6/3/1>.  
90 The Hansard References indicate that the relevant provisions of the MER Strategy were not debated 
in detail – that was the case in both Houses. The clauses were directly introduced into the Bill without 
further debate: ‘Clauses 40 to 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill’, see Committee Debate, 9th sitting, 
House of Commons (13 January 2015) [Column number 320]. There are two other instances where the 
MER Strategy is discussed: the first is in the House of Lords, see Report, 3rd sitting, House of 
Lords (10 November 2014) [columns 34-38]. In that instance, Baroness Verma reiterated the 
importance of commercial arrangements for the MER Strategy: ‘Amendments 113C to 113F seek to 
remove from Clause 30 all references to commercial arrangements. This issue is clearly of the utmost 
importance, since a great deal of what industry does in its efforts to maximise the recovery of offshore 
oil and gas is affected through oil and gas’s commercial arrangements with one another. Never in the 
history of the UKCS has this been more true than today. As set out in the Wood review, collaboration 
between licence holders, operators and infrastructure owners will be a key requirement to meet the 
challenge of maximising economic recovery from the UKCS. Clause 30 provides for this and makes 
collaboration a central part of the principle of maximising the economic recovery of UK petroleum. 
However, the Government recognise the legitimate concerns that industry has raised about the way in 
which commercial arrangements are dealt with in the clause. The industry is concerned that it may have 
an adverse impact on investment in the UK continental shelf, and we take those concerns seriously. It is 
not in anyone’s interests to undermine investment in the UKCS at such an important time.’ The second 
instance where the MER Strategy is debated is in the House of Commons, see Committee Debate, 7th 
sitting, House of Commons (8 January 2015) [Column number 249- 257]. In this case, an amendment 
was put forth to both ‘extend the ‘maximising economic recovery’ principal objective to include co-
ordination of the transport and storage of carbon dioxide’ and to elect that the Oil and Gas Authority 
should also undertake the responsibility of ‘the co-ordination of the transportation and storage of CO2’. 
The amendments were rejected. All aforementioned sources are available at 
<http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/infrastructure/stages.html>..  
91 Supra, ‘Clauses 40 to 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill’, see Committee Debate, 9th sitting, House 
of Commons (13 January 2015) [Column number 320]. 
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would be to look up the dictionary definition of collaboration. The definition 
according to the Oxford dictionary is ‘the action of working with someone to produce 
something’.
92
 Indeed, ‘collaboration’ is used so often in everyday life with this 
meaning that there is no doubt that the average person would have a separate 
conception about the word. This dictionary definition is also not far from the phrasing 
by the Oil and Gas Authority when referring to the generic meaning of collaboration – 
‘working together for a common purpose’.
93
 In an industry context, there have been 
other definitions, e.g. the report by Ernst and Young about the Australian oil and gas 
sector defined collaboration as ‘the ability of the various players in the industry to 
design “healthy, dynamic and resilient interconnected networks”, capable of 
mobilising the right resources, at the right time, to execute and innovate as barriers 
emerge’.
94
 Apart from the generic meaning of the word, what is more crucial to the 
thesis is the analysis of collaboration’s technical meaning. The thesis suggests that the 
technical meaning could be classified into two categories for the purposes of this 
research: the project scope/commercial dimension and the legal dimension.  
 
2.4.2 Disentangling the different dimensions of the notion of collaboration 
 
2.4.2.1 Contract ‘model’, ‘type’, ‘strategy’ and the relevance to the MER 
Strategy 
 
An observation from reading the publications of the Oil and Gas Authority is that 
there is a plethora of similar terms regarding contracts and contracting, which are used 
interchangeably. The thesis suggests that the most common terms used are contract 
‘model’, ‘type’ and strategy’. Some examples could elucidate this observation.  
 
In the Supply Chain Delivery Programme, one of the five elements is to ‘encourage 
innovation in business models’. This requirement includes requirements such as: 
‘operators communicating demand needs and being open to new contracting models’; 
‘identify potential value-add contract models from other sectors including aerospace 
                                                 
92 Oxford dictionaries < https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/collaboration>.  
93 Competition and Collaboration Report 3. 
94 EY, ‘Delivering a step change in organisational productivity: Findings from the Australian Oil & 






and nuclear which could be implemented in the oil and gas sector’; ‘create an 
environment to bring operators and contractors together to communicate demand 
opportunities, share learnings and test contract models, including decommissioning’.
 
95 
Furthermore, the element to ‘improve cost efficiencies’ spells out the following 
recommendations: ‘information on innovative cost-saving contracting models from 
individual companies, trade associations and government departments’; ‘[p]romote 
the benefit of standardisation and collaboration and the benefits of adopting new 
contracting models across all activities’.
96
 Moreover, the MER UK SCES Board and 
the Efficiency Task Force shall ‘revisit existing efficiency initiatives e.g. LOGIC and 
update as appropriate’ and that the ETF must ‘develop good practice and 




In sum, only in the aforementioned documents, the following terms can be found: 
‘tendering and contracting behaviours and the relationships between market players, 
in particular between operators and different tiers of the supply chain’; ‘innovative 
business models’; ‘new contracting models’; ‘value-add contract models’; ‘innovative 
cost-saving contracting models’; ‘benefits of adopting new contracting models’. 
 
 The obvious question that arises is as to what the specific meaning is of all these 
terms. The Oil and Gas Authority does not clarify their meaning. Moreover, there is a 
lack of congruency in the use of these terms, which makes the ascertainment of the 
meaning even more difficult. The second point, which veers into the territory of 
speculation, is that the Oil and Gas Authority probably uses these terms in what the 
thesis describes in the following section as the ‘project scope/commercial’ meaning. 
Given the technical background of the majority of the Oil and Gas Authority staff, 
and also the relatively scarce legal comments in its publications, one may assume that 
this is the dimension they refer to. Perhaps in future publications – as many projects 
are currently in development – the features of the ‘innovative business models’, ‘new 
contracting models’ and ‘value-add contract models’ that the Oil and Gas Authority 
favours will be specified.  
 
                                                 
95 Supply Chain Delivery Programme 7 
96 Supply Chain Delivery Programme 8. 
97 Supply Chain Delivery Programme 8. 
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2.4.2.2 The project scope/commercial dimension of collaboration 
 
The first dimension of the technical meaning is, in the thesis’ terminology, the 
‘project scope/commercial’ dimension of collaboration. In every enterprise, decisions 
are made every day regarding myriad matters: strategy, planning, coping with 
competition and finance, to name a few. In the offshore oil and gas industry, a 
company and its decision makers do as well make similar decisions: going forward 
with a project or not, how to finance projects, investing in a new technology, the 
prospects of the market and competition and the company’s strategy – to indicate a 
few. In this context, ‘collaboration’ could be one more of the items in the list. For 
example, issues such as choosing partners in order to form a joint venture, ‘farming in 
or out’ of a project, and choosing the suppliers are some examples of what might be 
included in the concept of ‘commercial decisions’. In a similar fashion, the ‘project 
scope’ dimension signifies which route to take at the practical level; what kind of 
project to undertake and how to proceed from an engineering, technological and 
practical way of view. 
 
It might be helpful to mention some specific examples from the UK offshore oil and 
gas industry and the context of the MER Strategy. The UK offshore industry has been 
collaborating in this generic sense for many decades. Recent examples would include 
the project pathfinder set up by the Oil and Gas Authority and OGUK,
98
 the 
‘Hackathon’ events where operators and contractors brainstorm to generate innovative 
ideas,
99
 the dissemination by the Oil and Gas Authority of ‘Case Studies of MER UK 
in action’
100
 and the Oil and Gas Authority ‘Open Data’ platform,
101
 to name a few 
important initiatives. 
                                                 
98Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Project pathfinder’ <https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/supply-
chain/project-pathfinder/>.; The Project pathfinder lists the active projects in the UKCS in order to 
facilitate industry intelligence on the current state of the market and promote potential room for 
cooperation between the companies. 
99 See for example the results of recent ‘Hackathons’ organised by the Oil and Gas Authority; Oil and 
Gas Authority, ‘Collective Thinking-SNS Hackathon Report’ (9 January 2017) 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/news-publications/publications/2017/collective-thinking-sns-
hackathon-report/>.; Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Well Construction Cost Reduction Hackathon Output 
Report’ (31 January 2017) <https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/media/3254/tlb-workgroup-
hackathon-output-report.pdf >. 
100 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Case Studies of MER UK in action’ 
<https://www.OilandGasAuthority.co.uk/about-us/performance/case-studies-of-mer-uk-in-action/>.  




The common thread among these initiatives is that they are all business decisions, and 
in this way, collaboration is used in a generic manner. The reason for explaining this 
distinction is that it is necessary in order to juxtapose the generic definition with the 
legal dimension, which is analysed in the section below. Briefly, it is possible for an 
operator and contractor to ‘collaborate’ – in the commercial meaning of the word – in 
many different ways, e.g. to work together in a ‘Hackathon’ in order to develop an 
innovative technology, but at the same time have an adversarial contractual 
relationship in the project that they are working on together.  
 
This point also highlights the issue of the relationship between the project 
scope/commercial and legal dimension of contracts and contract law, which is crucial 
to the research. Contracts and contracting may be studied from many perspectives and 
academic disciplines, e.g. project management, economic theory, organisational and 
enterprise management, among others. Some examples are useful to illustrate this 
point. Project management relates to the ‘project scope’ and the contract type used. In 
the construction (and offshore construction) industry, contract types could include 
‘Engineering, Procurement and Construction’ [hereinafter ‘EPC’], ‘Engineering, 
Procurement and Construction with Long Lead Items [hereinafter EPC with ‘LLIs’]’, 
‘Engineering, Procurement and Construction Management’ [hereinafter ‘EPCM’] and 
‘Progressive Lump Sum’ [hereinafter ‘PLS’].
102
 In other niche activities of the 
offshore oil and gas industry, such as decommissioning, there may be further 









 management-orientated procurement systems, 
                                                 
102Carolin Schramm, Alexander Meissner, Gerhard Weldinger, ‘Contracting strategies in the oil and 
gas industry’ (2010) Pipeline Technology Journal. 
103For example, the types of ‘operator led reimbursable contract’ and ‘lump sum Engineer, Procure, 
Remove, Dispose (EPRD) contract’ that are often used in the decommissioning industry, see Oil and 
Gas UK, ‘Decommissioning Contract Risk Allocation Report 2015’ 5 <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Decommissioning-Contract-Risk-Allocation-2015-Secure.pdf>. 
104 D. Lowe (ed), Commercial Management: Theory and Practice (Wiley-Blackwell 2013) 302 
105 Ibid. 302, ‘Design-build; Package deal; Turnkey; Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) – The 
BOOT system can be further categorised in Build-Own-Operate (BOO) and Design-Fund-Build-




collaborative arrangements, term contracting and e-Procurement. Interface 
management includes the use of specific software tools that assist project 




The pricing mechanisms is another way to classify, and in the offshore industry it 
usually takes the form of fixed-price, cost-reimbursable and unit rate/charters 
contracts.
107
 Finally, another extensive area researched in economic theory and 
management is the issue of contract incentives and the optimal way that they should 
be structured. 
108





All aforementioned dimensions tend to receive rather different taxonomy and 
terminology influenced by the discipline and prism under which they originate. The 
thesis suggests that this is one of the main reasons of confusion among terms such as 
contract ‘model’, ‘type’ and ‘strategy’, which may have a function distinct from the 
legal dimension of contracting; these two issues are examined below.  
 
2.4.2.3 The legal dimension of collaboration 
 
The legal dimension of collaboration has a distinct meaning. Its main meaning is 
about the intended business relationship that the parties wish to develop throughout 
the contract lifecycle. The two extremes of the pendulum would be a completely 
arm’s length, discrete and separate position – which tends to be termed an 
‘adversarial’ business practice – and close co-operation that tends to be described as a 
                                                 
106 Ibid. 
107 John van der Puil and Arjan van Weele, International Contracting: Contract Management in 
Complex Construction Projects (Imperial College Press 2014) 
108 Petter Osmundsen, Terje Sorenes, Anders Toft, ‘Drilling contracts and incentives’ (2008) 36 Energy 
Policy 3138; Petter Osmundsen, Anders Toft, Kjell Agnar Dragvikb, ‘Design of drilling contracts – 
Economic incentives and safety issues’ (2006) 34 Energy Policy 2324; K.S. Corts, J. Singh, ‘The effect 
of relationships on contract choice: evidence from offshore drilling’ (2003) Working Paper, Harvard 
University. 
109 Kostas Selviaridis Andreas Norman, ‘Performance-based contracting in service supply chains: a 
service provider risk perspective’ (2014) 19 [2] Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 
153. 
For more information about the management literature that focuses on the type of the selected contract, 
see Kostas Selviaridis, Finn Wynstra, ‘Performance-based contracting: a literature review and future 




‘collaborative’ business practice. Furthermore, the intended business relationship in 
turn influences the contract form and content. In terms of the contract form, it could 
mean insisting on using the company’s in-house drafted standard agreement, which is 
a common practice used by the oil majors, or agreeing on another standard form 
agreement perceived to be in favour of the operator or the contractor (which usually 
depends on the body that has published the form). On the other hand, in a 
collaborative relationship, the contract form could mean choosing a standard model 
that is designed to be collaborative (these contracts are analysed in chapter 3). In 
regard to the contract terms, the differences are reflected in the drafting and the 
clauses that are used, which are completely different in the case of an adversarial and 
a collaborative business model. In turn, the drafting, language and terms that are used 
ultimately raise legal questions in litigation – with different challenges in each case.  
 
For example, the challenging legal questions in the adversarial archetype were, as 
explained in chapter 1, questions about the exclusion of liability, limitation of 
liability, consequential loss, force majeure, and other ‘risk allocation’ clauses. In a 
collaborative archetype, the legal questions that emerge regard the extent and meaning 
of collaboration, the rights and responsibilities of the parties and the limits of the self-
interest of each party, among others. In terms of contract doctrine, this could mean 
issues of the meaning of good faith, ‘quasi good faith’ clauses, and relational 
contracts. A series of these cases have arisen in recent years, and this topic is 
addressed in chapter 4.  
 
2.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the MER Strategy and the Oil and Gas 
Authority and their general aims and scope. The main aim of the chapter was to 
ascertain the meaning of collaboration both within and beyond the MER Strategy.  
 
The first conclusion regards the meaning of collaboration within the MER Strategy 
context, as well as the Oil and Gas Authority’s perception of this term. The chapter 
demonstrates that the term has two main meanings within the MER Strategy 
framework: (a) ‘required action and behaviour’ under the MER Strategy, and (b) a 





 It should be stressed that the ‘required action and behaviour’ is a 
legally binding obligation. The Collaboration and Competition Report is a necessary 
accompanying document that helps delimit the boundaries of this legally binding 
obligation. As regards the second main aspect, collaboration is one of the ten Asset 
Stewardship Expectations. It does not have a legally binding effect in the context of 
the Asset Stewardship Strategy. Apart from these two main meanings, however, the 
word ‘collaboration’ is encountered in miscellaneous uses – sometimes in an 
inconsistent manner – in various other Oil and Gas Authority publications. As 
demonstrated, one example is its use for the purposes of the Enhanced Oil Recovery 
Strategy. A second example is the generic definition expressed in the Competition and 
Collaboration Report, where the word has the means ‘working together for a common 
purpose’. Similarly, there seems to be a plethora of synonyms used by the Oil and Gas 
Authority regarding the terms ‘contract type’, ‘contract model’ and ‘contract 
strategy’, without a clear explanation of the meaning of these terms.  
 
The second conclusion is about the relevance of the MER Strategy to the supply 
chain. As mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, the MER Strategy is clearly 
intended to be applicable to one side of the offshore oil and gas industry – the 
operators’ side
111
. However, the chapter argues that the current wording used could 
leave room for interpretation that certain contractors undertaking certain projects (i.e. 
leasing of and providing services on FPSO’s and MODU’s) could fall within the 
scope of the MER Strategy. The thesis’ argument is that current wording leaves room 
for confusion and this could be remedied by the Oil and Gas Authority in the future. 
In any case, the chapter stressed that the intention of the Oil and Gas Authority is not 
to include the supply chain within the MER Strategy. The core question however 
remains: what is the preferred method of contracting between operators and 
contractors in the offshore oil and gas industry? If a collaborative contracting model is 
seen as a preferred solution, then the question of the meaning of collaboration in 
English contract law remains relevant and unanswered; the only part of the question 
that is answered is that the MER Strategy, its concepts and its definitions, are not 
                                                 
110 The conclusion refers to the main aspects of collaboration. Other dimensions include the use in the 
context of the ‘Enhanced Oil Recovery’ Strategy, as discussed in section 2.3.4 
111 In the interest of preciseness, ‘the operators’ may include many different legal entities and does not 




relevant and should not be taken into account. Therefore, the answer to this question 
is addressed in chapter 4.  
 
The third conclusion argues that the term collaboration has two discrete dimensions, a 
project scope/commercial and a legal. The thesis does not suggest that there is a 
strong polarisation between these elements – there are certainly commercial elements 
in the legal dimension and vice-versa. The thesis argues rather that failing to 
understand the characteristics and differences between these two dimensions is the 
main cause for the inconsistency in the use of terms such as contract ‘model’, ‘type’ 
and ‘strategy’, which have been used interchangeably, but with no specified meaning, 
in various Oil and Gas Authority publications. It is submitted that it is also important 
for the Oil and Gas Authority to express its position on the legal dimension of 
contracting. In this matter, the stance of the Oil and Gas Authority is open to 
speculation. Given the fact that the Oil and Gas Authority views itself as a ‘light 
touch’ regulator, it would most probably leave it up to the industry to choose the type 
of contracting and relationship they see fit. The Oil and Gas Authority would 
probably not introduce an ‘obligation’ for collaborative contracting between operators 
and contractors. Yet, the Oil and Gas Authority taking a bolder stance and endorsing 
collaborative contracting is an idea worth considering, in the author’s opinion. The 
rationale in this case is that the Oil and Gas Authority acknowledges in many 
instances that collaboration is a key element for the effectiveness of the MER 
Strategy. Also, the Supply Chain Strategy makes abundantly clear in many instances 
the need for operator-contractor collaboration. Therefore, the next logical step in this 
direction would be for the Oil and Gas Authority to ‘influence’ the use of this type of 
contracting. After all, one of the three main roles of the Oil and Gas Authority, set out 
in its initial strategy, is to ‘influence’
112
 ‘(…) the UK oil and gas industry to achieve 
its statutory principal objective of maximising the economic recovery of UK offshore 
oil and gas resources’.
113
  
                                                 
112 The exact description of the role of ‘influence’ is even more indicative of this argument: ‘the Oil 
and Gas Authority has a critical role to influence and encourage a culture of greater cooperation and 
collaboration on the UKCS, improved commercial behaviours, and the creation of a lower cost, more 
efficient industry’; see note infra 








‘MODERN CONTRACTING’ AND ‘CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL 
MANAGEMENT’ IN THE CONTEXT OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS 
CONTRACTING 
  
3.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter focuses first on the difference between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
contracting. These terms are not legal terms of art and require an explanation about 
their legal context. Even at this introductory stage, it should be stressed that these 
terms do not imply a simplistic ‘traditional is bad’ and ‘modern is good’ approach. 
Rather, they signify a difference in school of thought, whereby the ‘traditional’ 
approach adopts a ‘static’ role for a contract, and the ‘modern’ approach advocates a 
more ‘dynamic’ role and provides tools expected to be used throughout the contract 
lifecycle. The chapter explains the development of modern contracts by examining 
their evolution in the context of the construction industry, as this is the industry within 
which these concepts were first conceived and later evolved; furthermore, the chapter 
provides examples of ‘modern contracts’ and explains their characteristics. This 
discussion is necessary to reach the ultimate aim of evaluating the relevance of 
traditional and modern contracts to offshore oil and gas contracting in the UK and if, 
or the extent to which, they should be adopted in light of the MER Strategy.  
 
The second section, which is closely connected to the notion of modern contracting, 
explains the potential and importance of ‘contract and commercial management’ 
[hereinafter ‘CCM’]. The academic taxonomy of CCM is explained in this section; 
the chapter also considers that CCM is closer, from an academic taxonomy 
perspective, to the discipline of management (or project management) rather than law. 
However, the thesis argues that the legal discipline should also give due account to its 





Finally, the chapter applies conclusions about CCM to the specific context of offshore 
oil and gas contracting and the MER Strategy. The thesis argues that the instruments 
that have already been developed and published by the Oil and Gas Authority and 
other industry bodies, can be said to have created – or taken concrete steps towards 
creating – a sector-specific body of norms tailored for the offshore oil and gas 
industry. The thesis stresses the importance of this realisation, and analyses the most 
influential documents that form the skeleton of this sector-specific body of 
documents.  
 
3.2 THE NOTIONS OF ‘TRADITIONAL’ AND ‘MODERN’ CONTRACTING 
 
As already mentioned, the terms ‘contract’ and ‘contracting’ have separate meanings 
for the purposes of the thesis.
1
 A contract is ‘an agreement giving rise to obligations 
which are enforced or recognised by law’, whereas ‘contracting’ is used to signify the 
process of negotiating, signing and administering a contract from the beginning to the 
end of its lifecycle (‘contract lifecycle’).
2
 The offshore industry may be characterised 
as a ‘project-based industry’, including the construction, manufacturing, IT and 
pharmaceutical industries among others. From an academic viewpoint, these 
industries are frequently examined together, as they share common characteristics, 
such as complex supply chains and interdependence between the stakeholders of a 
project. In the following sections the thesis draws examples and insight from the 
contracting practice of the UK construction industry, to cross-fertilise the contracting 
paradigm in the offshore oil and gas industry. 
 
3.2.1 The evolution of the ‘modern contract’ in the UK construction industry 
 
The classic definition of a contract as ‘an agreement giving rise to obligations which 
are enforced or recognised by law’ summarises succinctly what is perceived to be the 
‘traditional’ role of a contract. Within this definition, the contract has a more ‘static’ 
role, i.e. it works mainly as a documentation of the rights and responsibilities of the 
parties. In traditional contracting the phases of the contract lifecycle, the negotiations 
                                                 
1 See supra section 1.2.4 
2 For a detailed explanation of the notion of ‘contract lifecycle’ see John van der Puil, Arjan van 
Weele, International Contracting: Contract Management in Complex Construction Projects (Imperial 
College Press 2014) 65.  
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to reach an agreement and the execution of the project/contract are non-standardised; 
this means that they follow no particular best practice guide or method. The factors 
prevalent in a traditional contracting environment are the risk appetite of each party, 
its overall business strategy, the company culture and the bargaining power. 
Traditional contracts are drafted ‘defensively’ to maximise the benefits and avoidance 
of liability of each party.
3
 The result of traditional contracting is that contract clauses 
prove advantageous if litigation occurs, rather than focusing on the optimal execution 
of the contract – and the project. 
 
The weaknesses and limitations of traditional contracting became apparent and the 
first attempt to be tackled took place in the UK was in the construction industry. The 
notion of ‘modern’ contracts is not as recent as one might presume, since it is was 
introduced in UK literature and practice after the influential construction reports in the 
nineties: the Latham Report in 1994
4
 and Egan Report in 1998.
5
 The Latham Report 
aimed to address the concern of the UK construction industry that procurement 
methods were outdated and that post completion claims were lengthy and expensive. 
One of the key recommendations of the Latham Report was that ‘endlessly refining 
existing conditions of contract will not solve adversarial problems. A set of basic 
principles is required on which modern contracts can be based. A complete family of 
interlocking documents is also required’.
6
 In this way, the concept of a ‘modern’ 
contract, which departed from the ‘traditional’ function of a contract as a set of 
general terms and conditions, was introduced. The Latham Report also drew attention 
to the importance of the underlying business relationship, and suggested that 
adversarial business relationships would inescapably engender tension between the 
                                                 
3 See the thesis introduction for the description of the general contracting practice in the UK offshore 
oil and gas industry.  
4 Michael Latham, ‘Constructing the Team: Joint Review of Procurement and Contractual 
Arrangements in the United Kingdom Construction Industry’ (Final Report July 1994). [hereinafter 
‘Latham Report’] 
5 John Egan, ‘Rethinking Construction’ (Department of Trade and Industry 1998) 
<http://constructingexcellence.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/rethinking_construction_report.pdf>. [hereinafter ‘Egan Report’] 
6 Michael Latham, ‘Constructing the Team: Joint Review of Procurement and Contractual 





parties. The Latham Report spells out what it considers to be the main characteristics 
of a modern contract
7
, which will be further analysed below. 
 
3.2.2 Characteristics and examples of ‘modern’ contracts 
 
Having explained the evolution and the influence of the Latham Report, it is 
necessary to draw conclusions about the most important characteristics of modern 
contracts. First, the role of a modern contract is to function as a ‘roadmap’ for the 
execution of the project. It also emphasises embedded project management tools, such 
as risk register, early warning system, joint teams and regular communication among 
the parties and others. The risk register is an example of a contractual management 
tool perceived to assist in the ‘joint risk management’ of the project, and to address 
the problems associated with the ‘risk transfer culture’ described in the introductory 
chapter. The use of risk registers was also recommended in a specialised report on the 
management of the Government’s services contracts published by the National Audit 
Office [hereinafter ‘NAO’],
8




                                                 
7 Latham Report  37, para 5.18 ‘A modern contract: the most effective form of contract in modern 
conditions should include: 1. A specific duty for all parties to deal fairly with each other, and with their 
subcontractors, specialists and suppliers, in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation. 2. Firm duties of 
teamwork, with shared financial motivation to pursue those objectives. These should involve a general 
presumption to achieve ‘win-win’ solutions to problems which may arise during the course of the 
project. 3. A wholly interrelated package of documents which clearly defines the roles and duties of all 
involved, and which is suitable for all types of project and for any procurement route. 4. Easily 
comprehensible language and with Guidance Notes attached. 5. Separation of the roles of contract 
administrator, project or lead manager and adjudicator. The Project or lead Manager should be clearly 
defined as client's representative. 6. A choice of allocation of risks, to be decided as appropriate to each 
project but then allocated to the party best able to manage, estimate and carry the risk. 7. Taking all 
reasonable steps to avoid changes to pre-planned works information. But, where variations do occur, 
they should be priced in advance, with provision for independent adjudication if agreement cannot be 
reached. 8. Express provision for assessing interim payments by methods other than monthly valuation 
i.e. mile stones, activity schedules or payment schedules. Such arrangements must also be reflected in 
the related subcontract documentation. The eventual aim should be to phase out the traditional system 
of monthly measurement or remeasurement but meanwhile provision should still be made for it. 9. 
Clearly setting out the period within which interim payments must be made to all participants in the 
process, failing which they will have an automatic right to compensation, involving payment of interest 
at a sufficiently heavy rate to deter slow payment. 10. Providing for secure trust fund routes of 
payment. 11. While taking all possible steps to avoid conflict on site, providing for speedy dispute 
resolution if any conflict arises, by a pre-determined impartial adjudicator/referee/expert. 12. Providing 
for incentives for exceptional performance. 13. Making provision where appropriate for advance 
mobilisation payments (if necessary, bonded) to contractors and subcontractors, including in respect of 
offsite prefabricated materials provided by part of the construction team.’ 
8 National Audit Office, ‘Central government’s management of service contracts’ (19 December 2008) 
24 <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/080965.pdf>.; the section on risk 
management reads: ‘Area 7: Risk (…) There was a variety of risk management arrangements on the 
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Second, modern contracts stress the importance of the underlying business 
relationship and suggest that a non-adversarial, ‘good working relationship’ is the key 
to avoiding disputes that could eventually lead to litigation. The modern contracting 
paradigm can be said to be a hybrid of commercial management on the one side, and 
the legal element as manifested in the contractual documents that underpin the 
agreement, on the other. An important element is that the commercial process of 
contract negotiation and administration is not performed randomly, but there is an 
effort to standardise and streamline this process. This process, however, can take 
many different forms, from looser to more concrete, step-by-step flowchart 







Having summarised the main characteristics, the thesis now provides examples of 
modern contracts. The UK government has launched the ‘Government Construction 
Strategy’ in 2011. The final Report
12
 introduced three main methods for testing: the 
‘Two Stage Open Book’, ‘Cost Led Procurement’ and ‘Integrated Project 
Insurance’.
13
 The Government Construction Strategy chose three models of 




                                                                                                                                            
contracts we assessed, including examples of excellent processes. The Department for Work and 
Pensions, for example, has a network of risk registers for its contract with BT, with registers at the 
operational level feeding up to an IT strategic risk register for the Department as a whole. ( .) Each risk 
has a clearly defined owner and the risk registers also include planned mitigation and a summary of the 
actions taken. Risks are also regularly discussed with BT.’ 
9BSI, ‘Collaborative business relationships – Part 1: A framework specification’ (October 2010) 17 
<http://shop.bsigroup.com/en/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030212011>. ‘Risk mitigation shall 
include identification of risks that need to be raised with collaborative partners to ensure the most 
effective mitigation approach is adopted. A risk register should be established, documented and 
available to every member of the programme team. This can be carried forward to become part of the 
joint risk management programme with the collaborative partner’. 
10 PRINCE2, ‘Projects in Controlled Environments’ <https://www.prince2.com/eur/what-is-prince2>.  
11 Project Management Institute <https://www.pmi.org/pmbok-guide-standards>. 
12 Cabinet Office and Efficiency and Reform Group,’ Government Construction Strategy: Final Report 
to Government by the Procurement/Lean Client Task Group’ (July 2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61157/Procurement-
and-Lean-Client-Group-Final-Report-v2.pdf>. [hereinafter ‘Government Construction Strategy’]. 
13 Cabinet Office, ‘New models of construction procurement’ (2 July 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325011/New_Models_
of_Construction_Procurement_-_Introduction_to_the_Guidance_-_2_July_2014.pdf>. 
14 Government Construction Strategy 5; ‘Trials should apply collaborative forms of contract. Cost-led 
procurement trials should use NEC 3 option C, Integrated Project Insurance should use PPC 2000, and 
Two Stage Open Book should use JCT Constructing Excellence’. 
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Another Report commissioned for the government compared modern contracts for the 
purposes of the construction industry. The report was commissioned by the Office of 
Government Commerce and compared the following types of ‘partnering contracts’: 
NEC3 Engineering and Construction Contract, ACA Project Partnering Contract 
(2000, amended 2003) (with the associated Specialist Contract for Project Partnering) 
and JCT Constructing Excellence Contract (2006).
15
The thesis summarises these 
selected contracts and stresses their core characteristics and their main differences to 
traditional contracts. The point is not to go into detail for each type, nor to argue 
which is ‘better’, but rather to assess whether and to what extent they can or should be 
used in offshore contracting – if at all. 
 
The first contract endorsed and chosen to be trialled by the ‘Government Construction 
Strategy’ is the New Engineering Contract [hereinafter ‘NEC’]. NEC was the contract 
endorsed by the Latham Report.
16
 Its developers contend that its unique 
characteristics are flexibility, clarity, simplicity and stimulus to good management. In 
terms of use, NEC proponents stress its use in complex projects such as the BAA 
Heathrow Terminal, the Olympic Delivery and the construction of Crossrail. As 
mentioned above, the first element is the emphasis on the project management 
dimension in contrast with the more static approach of traditional contracts, which has 
been criticised as the ‘putting the contract in a drawer’ approach.
17
 Second, there is a 
preference for a collaborative business relationship as a driving force behind the 
contract clauses, which has been described as a ‘cultural transition’ from an 
adversarial to a collaborative paradigm.
18
  
                                                 
15 Arup Project Management and OGC, ‘Partnering Contract Review: Report of 25 September 2008’ 
<http://www.ppc2000.co.uk/pdfs/arup_partnering_contract_review.pdf>.; Lowe provides an analytical 
table with a comparison of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of these three types of 
contracts, see D. Lowe, Commercial Management: Theory and Practice (Wiley-Blackwell 2013) 204-
215. 
16History of NEC3 <https://www.neccontract.com/About-NEC/History>. 
17 Brian Eggleston, The NEC 3 Engineering and Construction Contract: A Commentary (2nd edn, 
Blackwell Science 2006) 2 ‘For users of the contract the difference is of very significant practical 
effect. It used to be said that a good contract was never taken out of the drawer until it was needed. For 
the New Engineering Contract that rule does not apply. It is as much a manual of project management 
as a set of contractual conditions – and it should never be taken off the desk and put in the drawer.’ 
18 Procurement and Strategies Guide (NEC Panel, 2005b); ‘NEC is a modern-day family of contracts 
that facilitates the implementation of sound project-management principles and practices as well as 
defining legal relationships. Key to the successful use of NEC is users adopting the desired cultural 
transition. The main aspect of this transition is moving away from a reactive and hindsight-based 
decision-making and management approach to one that is foresight based, encouraging a creative 
environment with pro-active and collaborative relationships’. 
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A second widely-used modern contract is the standard form of a Project Partnering 
Contract, PPC2000. It has been developed by the Association of Consultants 
Architects [hereinafter ‘ACA’] and consists of a suite of partnering contracts under 
the name of ‘PPC Suite’. Sir Michael Latham reviewed PPC2000 at the time of its 
original publication, and confirmed that it embodies all his recommended principles 
for a modern construction contract. He described PPC2000 as ‘the full monty of 
partnering and modern best practice’. It is a direct response to the recommendations 
of the Construction Task Force's 1998 report ‘Rethinking Construction’ (often called 
'the Egan report'), and incorporates ideas set out in the Construction Industry 
Council's Guide to Project Team Partnering. PPC2000 was developed through 
prototypes tested on many pilot projects. 
 
Finally, the Joint Contract Tribunal [hereinafter ‘JCT’] contracts is another suite that 
contains collaborative contracts among others. The Joint Contract Tribunal has 
produced standard forms of construction contracts, guidance notes and other standard 
forms of documentation for use by the construction industry. JCT contracts include 





3.2.3 Should the UK offshore oil and gas industry use ‘modern’ contracts? 
 
As already explained in the introductory chapter, contracting in the UKCS has 
historically had an adversarial ethos. It is not an easy task to explain why this might 
have happened. An indicative – and largely speculative – list of the factors that played 
a role in this could include: the fact that the risks of offshore working are such that the 
parties are always eager to have these allocated clearly; the particular features of the 
oil industry, such as the fact that many contractors may be engaged by an operator for 
a single project rather than having a prime contractor as with civil engineering 
projects; a certain industry ‘arrogance’ and leverage of bargaining power over the 
contractors; the boom/bust cycle and a lack of investment in contract managers who 
could operate more sophisticated contract management systems. 
 
                                                 




Whatever the case might be, it is necessary to examine the practicalities of offshore 
contracting. The prevalent standard forms are the LOGIC contracts, which evolved 
from the ‘CRINE’ initiative in the nineties.
20
 The LOGIC forms are close to the 
notion of ‘traditional’ contracts; for example, the contents of the latest edition of the 
standard form for offshore services contains in its first part the ‘General Conditions of 




Does this mean that ‘traditional’ contracts are outdated and that the industry should 
move to using ‘modern’ contracts, such as e.g. the NEC? The answer is not 
straightforward; the thesis does not suggest that a ‘traditional’ contract is 
axiomatically outdated and that a ‘modern’ contract is fitter for purpose. The terms 
are only intended to signify the traditional function of a contract as a static 
documentation of the parties’ rights and responsibilities, in contrast with the more 
proactive and collaborative philosophy of modern contracts. It is not ‘labels’ that 
make a type of contract fit for purpose, but rather the results and how it addresses the 
needs of the particular industry that it is designed to serve.  
 
For example, it has been suggested that the NEC contract might not be well suited to 
the offshore oil and gas industry. Although the developers of the NEC contract assert 
that it could be used in a wide range of industries, among them the oil and gas 
industry,
22
 some have suggested that its structure and ‘plain English’ writing style 
might create more problems than it solves.
23
 Proponents of the contract acknowledge 
                                                 
20 Oil and Gas UK, ‘LOGIC Contracts’ <http://www.logic-oil.com/standard-contracts>. 
21 ‘Services (On- and Offshore) Edition 3 March 2014’ <https://www.logic-oil.com/content/standard-
contracts-0>. The General Part consists of 33 clauses, with many referring to the ‘risk allocation’ 
clauses, such as: ‘11. Variations 12. Force Majeure 19. Indemnities 20. Insurance by Contractor 21. 
Consequential loss 24. Termination’; this list is indicative and the contract will be included in the 
appendix of the thesis. 
22‘Works encompasses purchases such as the construction, refurbishment and decommissioning of 
buildings, structures, process plants and infrastructure – including everything from houses, schools, 
hospitals and leisure facilities to infrastructure for water, energy, transport, industry and waste.’ 
<https://www.neccontract.com/About-NEC/How-NEC3-Works>. 
23 A more detailed example of the wording and structure of NEC contracts: ‘(they) are written in a plain 
English style, avoiding jargon; Are written in the present tense; Are designed to be used to manage a 
project, rather than rule who is at fault only when a dispute arises; Do not cross-reference between 
clauses: each clause stands alone; Seek to use consistent numbering and language throughout, for 
example each main option under the Engineering and Construction Contract (ECC) uses different 
numbering, so that each clause number is only used once. A user does not have to remember which 
version of a particular clause to use for each main option: each clause is uniquely identified; the 
different forms in the suite use similar numbering and operative terms, wherever possible; The suite 
shares a common overall layout and design; and the suite aims to use the same defined terms 
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that the danger of novel wording, which has not been the subject of litigation, can 
hamper legal certainty about the meaning of certain terms and bears the risk of 
‘throwing the baby out with the bath water’.
24
 This fear is exacerbated by the scarcity 
of case law on NEC contracts; however, contract proponents view this lack of 
litigation as proof of success of the NEC non-adversarial and non-litigious 
philosophy. 
 
The thesis does not seek to conclude whether the NEC, or any other specific contract, 
is the preferred solution for the industry. The important element is drawing attention 
to the fact that the industry should give due consideration to the philosophy of modern 
contracts in general, as they are better aligned with the principles of the MER 
Strategy. The two main characteristics of modern contracts, i.e. their project 
management orientation and preference for collaborative relationships, fit well within 
the wider MER Strategy philosophy. This is because the Strategy requires closer co-
ordination between the industry players at the operational level, and therefore project 
management is even more important to how industry players coordinate their actions. 
Also, the ‘required action and behaviour’ of collaboration of the Strategy can be better 
implemented through contracts which have been designed with this very philosophy 
as their cornerstone.  
 
3.3 THE POTENTIAL OF CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL 
MANAGEMENT (CCM) 
 
The thesis submits that CCM is a discipline that can significantly improve offshore 
contracting. From an academic point of view, CCM is defined as ‘the management of 
contractual and commercial issues relating to projects, from project inception to 
                                                                                                                                            
throughout.’ See Andrew James and Martin Collingwood, 'NEC contracts' (Westlaw Update, 14 March 
2016) para 40. 
24 Brian Eggleston, The NEC 3 Engineering and Construction Contract: A Commentary (2nd edn, 
Blackwell Science 2006) 4; ‘Legal interpretation of the contracts is not so easily solved. Neither the 
guidance notes nor the flow charts are intended to be used for legal interpretation and the application of 
legal precedents from traditional forms of contract written in conventional drafting style can only be 
surmised. Which raises the question, have NEC contracts sacrificed legal certainty in pursuit of a new 
order? There are certainly some who feel that discarding conventional drafting amounts to discarding 
the accumulated contractual wisdom of generations. Throwing the baby out with the bath water is how 
one eminent construction lawyer put it. But others are far more optimistic and they suggest that to 
focus on the words of NEC contracts is to miss the point of the message; and that the courts, if called 





 Contract management and commercial management are often used 
interchangeably. For the purposes of the research, however, commercial management 
is perceived as broader in meaning, as it can encompass many commercial functions 
of a company (e.g. business strategy, pricing policy, sales targets etc). Contract 
management has a narrower scope and focuses on the contractual procedures from the 
beginning to the end of a contract lifecycle, and can thus be regarded as a subcategory 
of commercial management. The thesis therefore refers mostly to contract 
management, but its close relationship to commercial management should be 
considered. 
 
From an academic taxonomy viewpoint, contract management is closer to the 
discipline of management rather than law, but it can drastically influence the outcome 
of a contract and the potential legal ramifications. In business practice, contract 
management plays an important role in modern companies and a dedicated role for 
contract managers is very common in corporate organisational structures. Lowe points 
out that ‘(…) commercial managers can now be found across a spectrum of industries, 
especially those that are predominantly project-based’.
26
 This is the case in the 
offshore oil and gas industry as well. The job description of a contract manager for an 
oil and gas company clearly demonstrates the pivotal tasks that are expected of this 
role.
27
 It is not an exaggeration to say that contract managers, who often have a non-
legal background, are more actively involved in the procurement and contract 
administration than the legal experts of the company. It is a common phenomenon 
that contract managers – usually from an in-house company department or external 
contractors – negotiate and draft the contracts, with advice sought from the 
company’s legal department or external consultants only for the more complex issues.  
 
                                                 
25 David Lowe and Roine Leiringer (eds), Commercial Management of Projects: Defining the 
Discipline (Blackwell Publishing 2006) vii. 
26David Lowe and Roine Leiringer (eds), Commercial Management of Projects: Defining the 
Discipline (Blackwell Publishing 2006) vii; As an example of project-based industries Lowe mentions 
‘Aerospace, Construction, IT, Pharmaceutical and Telecommunications’. 
27 ‘Contract Manager’ job description advertised in Oilandgaspeople.com, 
<http://www.oilandgaspeople.com/jobs/446923925/contract-manager-facilities-operations-and-
mainten/>.; The job description includes tasks such as to ‘manage and coordinate all activities involved 
in the administration of the contract, subcontracts, and purchase orders’; ‘manage and assist in the 
administration of the contract’; ‘meeting the KPI`s according to the contract agreed targets’; ‘meeting 
with clients, stakeholders and the public, represent in order to enhance reputation and foster a 
partnership approach to the relationships’; ‘perform contract/subcontract review, negotiations and 
interface with customer/vendor contracting personnel’. 
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A further issue with regard to CCM is to dispel the confusion that exists about the 
term as it may refer to different concepts. As already explained, the first dimension of 
the word is its reference to the academic and practical discipline, with features of 
management, project management and organisational (enterprise) theory. The second 
dimension is the process of CCM at a project level: the process(es) that take place in 
the lifecycle of a project, from the beginning till the end of its lifecycle. Those two 
meanings are the ones that the thesis refers to. A third dimension that often leads to 
confusion is referring to the term as an IT, electronic software tool used in order to, 
literally, ‘manage contracts’ of companies or other organisations. ‘Contract 
management’ systems may include: online repositories of documents; central archive 
of the contracts that the company has signed with its supply chain; model contracts 
used for the companies’ contracting activities; remote access to documents or sharing 
of documents between employees, outsourced personnel hired by the company so that 
managers or staff can remotely access these archives and monitor the status of a 
contract. In the offshore oil and gas sector, it is common for operators and contractors 
to run ‘contract management’ systems within their organisation, which is an internal, 
inter-organisational tool for better monitoring and planning of an organisation’s 
activities.  
 
3.3.1. Academic definitions of CCM 
 
The first attempt to academically define contract management was carried out by 
Lowe and other authors in the first book in the field.
28
 Commercial management is 
defined as: ‘The management of contractual and commercial issues relating to 
projects, from project inception to completion’. Lowe points out that ‘the term 
commercial management has been used for some time, not least in construction, while 
the job title commercial manager can be found across a spectrum of industries, 
especially those that are predominantly project-based, for example, Aerospace, 
                                                 
28 David Lowe and Roine Leiringer (eds), Commercial Management of Projects: Defining the 
Discipline (Blackwell Publishing 2006); For more recent work see D. Lowe (ed), Commercial 
Management: Theory and Practice (Wiley-Blackwell 2013); For other influential academic sources on 
contract and commercial management see Gregory A. Garrett, World Class Contracting (6th edn, 
Wolters Kluwer 2015); Anuj Saxena, Enterprise Contract Management (J Ross Publishing 2008); 
Georg Berkel, ‘Contract Management’ in Michael Kleinaltenkamp, Wulff Plinke and Ingmar Geiger 
(eds), Business Project Management and Marketing (Springer 2016); Stewart R Clegg, Martin 
Kornberger and Tyrone S. Pitsis, Managing and Organizations: An Introduction to Theory and 
Practice (4th edn, SAGE Publications 2015). 
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Construction, IT, Pharmaceutical and Telecommunications’.
29
 One point that should 
be stressed here is the term ‘project-based industry’. Project-based industries, such as 
the ones mentioned above, share many common characteristics regarding the 
relationship between the client and the contractors and potentially sub-contractors.
30
 
The offshore oil and gas industry, whether with construction, drilling or offshore 
services, belongs in the spectrum of ‘project-based industries’.  
 
Another influential definition on the subject is provided by the academics John van 
der Puil and Arjan van Weele. They define contract management as ‘the process that 
ensures that all parties to a contract fully meet their obligations, in order to satisfy the 
operational objectives of the contract and the strategic business goals of the 
customer’.31 The authors identify three elements in this definition: (a) contract 
management as a process, ‘which is aimed at successful and profitable project 
delivery’; (b) the obligations from both parties, which should be fully met; and (c) the 
strategic business goals of the final customer.
32
 The authors suggest that the process 
described in point (a) may include different stages, such as the pre-contractual stage, 
contract-negotiation stage and the post-contractual stage. These stages together can be 
said to form the ‘contracting cycle’ or ‘contract lifecycle’.  
 
The authors provide an example to illustrate point (c) of their definition. If a dredging 
project occurs for a port, the ‘final customer’ might not be the contractor’s employer, 
but the Port Authority. Therefore, they argue, ‘the employer and the contractor may 
have one common interest: to jointly serve the interests of the city’s council’.
33
 
Although the authors’ example could be common in practice, the thesis argues that the 
third element of their definition might significantly expand the scope of contract 
management. It is difficult to ascertain which criteria should be followed in order not 
to include every entity that could benefit from completing a project in the potential list 
of the ‘final customer’. The thesis argues that this final element is not a core element 
                                                 
29 David Lowe and Roine Leiringer (eds), Commercial Management of Projects: Defining the 
Discipline (Blackwell Publishing 2006) 8-9. 
30 For example, the International Association for Contract and Commercial Management (IACCM) has 
also dedicated groups on Aerospace and Defence, Construction & Engineering, Pharmaceutical, Oil & 
Gas, Telecommunications and Technology, see <www.iaccm.com>.  
31John van der Puil, Arjan van Weele, International Contracting: Contract Management in Complex 
Construction Projects (Imperial College Press 2014) 35. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 36. 
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of CCM and the discipline should focus on parties with contractual relationships with 
each other and not extend to any parties beyond that.  
 
3.3.2. Industry and knowledge bodies definitions of CCM 
 
The International Association for Contract and Commercial Management [hereinafter 
‘IACCM’] is an active institution in the field with a global reach. IAACM published 
the ‘IACCM Operational Guide’ with the aspiration of providing a holistic overview 
to the discipline of CCM.
34
 According to this book, the definition of commercial 
management is ‘broader than the role or activities implied by the term ‘contract 
management’. However, we find that gap is narrowing’.
35
 The IAACCM Guide 
argues that ‘contract management has historically been viewed as a more 
administrative – and therefore much narrower and more reactive – activity than 
commercial management. It has often been a role that safeguards the rules or practices 
of others, rather than changing or questioning those rules. However, this book 
challenges that narrow definition and positions contract management as an activity 
equivalent to commercial management’.
36
 The IACCM Operational Guide features 
five stages: Initiation, Bid, Development, Negotiation, Management. Despite its title, 
this book does not actually offer a coherent guide with specific steps and procedures 
that can be followed. The second influential definition is that of the UK-based 
‘Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply’ [hereinafter ‘CIPS’].
37
 CIPS has 
produced several guides on contract management. The definition of CIPS is: ‘the 
process of systematically and efficiently managing contract creation, execution and 
analysis for maximising operational and financial performance and minimizing risk’.38 
The guide clarifies that its scope is generic and its principles are intended to be 
applicable to all contracts from a simple order through framework contracts, to 
complex construction or service contracts. It is equally applicable to contracts in the 
private and the public sector. The guide points out that there are several other 
                                                 
34 Tim Cummins, Mark David and Katherine Kawamoto, Contract and Commercial Management: The 
Operational Guide (Van Haren Publishing 2011) 6-7. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 CIPS is originally based in the UK, but has recently expanded its reach to a more global audience 
<https://www.cips.org/>. The equivalent US-based institution is the ‘National Contract Management 
Association’ (NCMA) <http://www.ncmahq.org/>. 
38 R. D. Elsey, ‘The Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply: Contract Management Guide’ 
(October 2007) 3 [hereinafter ‘CIPS Guide’]. 
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definitions of contract management, the majority of which refer to post-award 
activities. Successful contract management, however, is most effective if upstream or 
pre-award activities are properly carried out. This remark stresses that there are 
several stages in the contractual process, known as the pre-contractual stage, the 
contract-negotiation stage and the post-contractual stage, which can better illustrate 
the different stages of a contract life cycle. The guide sets out certain criteria to 
measure success,
39
 and many criteria benefit both parties. The guide further suggests 
that a contract strategy should be further developed, to consider matters such as the 
style and type of management to be adopted for the subsequent service delivery, 
relationship management and contract administration. Possible supplier relationship 
types range from spot buy through call-off contracts, fixed contracts and strategic 
alliances, to long-term partnerships. Issues of relationship style such as adversarial, 
partnership, hands-on or proactive should also be considered. A further consideration 
is risk management. Having assessed the risks and identified those requiring action, 
responsibility for managing and mitigating them should be allocated. This allocation 
should depend on the assessment of the likelihood and consequence of the risk.  
 
3.3.3 UK Government contracting definitions of CCM 
 
One might presume that the industry would have developed contract management 
guides to facilitate the contracting procedure. However, although best practice guides 
exist for many sectors, contract management is a notable exception.
40
 In the UK, it is 
actually the public and not the private sector that has produced noteworthy documents 
in the field of contract management. Various governmental bodies have published 
several interesting frameworks and guides.
41
 Although the guides refer to a 
government-to-business context and are written to help public officials improve the 
effectiveness of contracting with private companies, they relate to a business-to-
                                                 
39 CIPS Guide, 3 ‘It is worthwhile noting that contract management is successful if: 
the arrangements for service delivery continue to be satisfactory to both parties, and the expected 
business benefits and value for money are being realised; the expected business benefits and value for 
money are being achieved; the supplier is co-operative and responsive; the organisation understands its 
obligations under the contract; there are no disputes; there are no surprises; a professional and objective 
debate over changes and issues arising can be had; efficiencies are being realised.’ 
40 The International Best Practice Institute (IBPI) has a wide collection of all the main non-proprietary 
frameworks and standards with associated templates and white papers, see <http://ibpi.org/>. 
41 The Office of Government Commerce (OGC) was substituted by the National Audit Office (NAO), 




business context as well. The clearest definition of contract management comes from 
a report published by the Office of Government Commerce in 2002 [hereinafter 
‘OGC’].
42
 The successor of OGC, the Crown Commercial Service [hereinafter 
‘CCS’], seems to have now crystallised the concepts of commercial and contract 
management for the purposes of government contracting. In 2014, CCS published a 
suite of documents on contract management consisting of: (a) contract management 
principles (b) contract management framework summary (c) contract management 
operating model overview.
 43
 The CCS contract management standards are partly 
based on the framework published by the National Audit Office [hereinafter ‘NAO’] 
in 2008.
 44
 All of the above frameworks share the view that collaborative relationships 
are preferable and can produce better outcomes. There is no need to reinvent the 
wheel, and these authoritative frameworks that have evolved through time from well-
appointed government bodies, could offer valuable assistance in understanding and 
developing a CCM framework for offshore oil and gas contracting.  
 
3.4 CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE OFFSHORE 
OIL AND GAS CONTRACTING CONTEXT  
 
This part of the thesis provides a connection between the academic discipline of CCM 
and its application in the context of offshore oil and gas contracting. It is submitted 
that this is an original approach that does not exist in the current literature. The first 
step in this process is the actual realisation that CCM principles may be applied in 
many different business contexts and can help develop sophisticated and sector-
specific industry norms. This statement holds true for the offshore oil and gas 
                                                 
42 Office of Government Commerce (OGC), ‘Contract Management Guidelines - Principles for service 
contracts’ (2002): ‘Contract management is the process that enables both parties to a contract to meet 
their obligations in order to deliver the objectives required from the contract. It also involves building a 
good working relationship between customer and provider. It continues throughout the life of a contract 
and involves managing proactively to anticipate future needs as well as reacting to situations that arise. 
The central aim of contract management is to obtain the services as agreed in the contract and achieve 
value for money. This means optimising the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the service or 
relationship described by the contract, balancing costs against risks and actively managing the 
customer–provider relationship. Contract management may also involve aiming for continuous 
improvement in performance over the life of the contract’. 
 <https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/f8d49768-e1e0-4dba-aac9-9a2b3c407d2b>.  
43Crown Commercial Service, ‘Commercial capability: Contract Management Standards’  
 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/commercial-capability-contract-management-
standards>.  
44 This framework summary is based on NAO, ‘Good practice contract management framework’ 
(2008), <https://www.nao.org.uk/report/good-practice-contract-management-framework-2-2/>.  
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industry. The thesis stresses that the recent publications of the Oil and Gas Authority, 
and certain older documents which are now under the process of reconsideration,
45
 
shape what could be described as a sector-specific contract and commercial 
framework for the offshore oil and gas industry. Although the documents exist, what 
is missing is the mere realisation of their interconnection to the wider academic 
discipline of CCM. The thesis highlights the fact that it is important for the Oil and 
Gas Authority and the industry to recognise that these documents are not standalone 
or unique, but rather that the existing academic framework of CCM can provide 
assistance and insight for a better understanding, application and further development 
of these principles in the context of offshore oil and gas contracting.  
3.4.1 British Standards Institute: ‘BS 11000-1’ and ‘BS 11000-2:2011’ 
 
The Oil and Gas Authority has mentioned in several of its publications that it 
considers the British Standard 11000-1 ‘Collaborative business relationships – Part 1: 
A framework specification’ [hereinafter the ‘Standard’]
 46
 to be one of the cornerstone 
documents of the guides that are used as reference.
47
 The Standard has been 
developed in co-operation between the British Standard Institute [hereinafter ‘BSI’]
48
 
and the Institute for Collaborative Working [hereinafter ‘ICW’].
49
 The Standard is 
accompanied by the Guide for its implementation, ‘BS 11000-2:2011 Collaborative 
business relationships: Guide to implementing BS 11000-1’ [hereinafter ‘Standard 
                                                 
45 For example, new versions of the Commercial Code of Practice (CCoP) and the Infrastructure Code 
of Practice (ICoP) have been – or are in the process of bring – drafted in order to incorporate the 
provisions of the MER Strategy. 
46BSI, ‘Collaborative business relationships – Part 1: A framework specification’ (October 2010) 
<http://shop.bsigroup.com/en/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030212011>. In the interest of 
preciseness, it should be mentioned that this Standard has been recently been replaced by ‘BS ISO 
44001; see BSI, ‘BS ISO 44001 Collaborative business relationship management systems: 
Requirements and framework’ (March 2017). However, it is submitted that the withdrawal and 
substitution of the Standard does not change the analysis for the purpose of the thesis. The reason is 
that the Oil and Gas Authority has already announced the former version of the Standard as their 
reference point. This means that switching to the new standard will take time, as it was introduced 
recently. Further, the new Standard mentions that it contains certain improvements, but maintains its 
core characteristics: ‘although the structure has changed, the founding principles and key requirements 
have been retained’. 
47 See for example the ‘References’ which are mentioned in the Asset Stewardship Strategy 
Expectations where the BS Standard is mentioned, Asset Stewardship Strategy Expectations 14. 
48 BSI is the UK's National Standards Body and represents UK economic and social interests across all 
European and international standards organizations and in the development of business information 
solutions for British organizations of all sizes and sectors, see BSI, ‘About Us’ 
<http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/about-bsi/ >. 
49 The Institute for Collaborative Working has also been the driving force behind the new BS 44001, 






 The thesis submits that the Standard and the Standard Guide have the 
potential to become reference points for offshore oil and gas contracting and the MER 
Strategy.
51
 It is beyond the scope of the research to analyse the Standard in all of its 
dimensions, so the thesis shall focus on the aspects that relate to contracting. As a 
second focus, it shall refer to the provisions about joint risk management, and the idea 
of a risk register, that is proposed in the Standard and is common characteristic of 
most ‘modern contracts’. As a general outline, the BS standard follows a three-phase 
approach: strategic, engagement and management. These phases are then divided into 
stages, and each of the stages has its own processes and steps. The stages also 
correspond to the clauses of the standard. All stages are underpinned by a 
‘Relationship Management Plan’ [hereinafter ‘RMP’], with the dual goal to function 
internally as a ‘corporate model’, and also externally as a ‘working platform for 
relationship management through the life of the collaboration, ensuring that 
relationship management is effectively communicated at all levels and integrated into 
execution and delivery for all stakeholders’.
52
 The definition that the standard gives to 
the term ‘collaborative business relationships’ defines it as ‘formal and/or informal 
business arrangements where two or more discrete organizations collaborate to create 
mutual value’.
53





                                                 
50 BSI, ‘Collaborative business relationships – Part 2: Guide to implementing BS 11000-1’ (December 
2011) <http://shop.bsigroup.com/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030235626>.  
51See also io, ‘Continuing the collaborative conversation’ (io oil & gas consulting, 20 August 2015), ‘A 
British Standards Institution (BSI) report from 2010 entitled ‘Collaborative business relationships’ was 
the catalyst for current conversations. It addressed the requirements for collaborative relationships to 
ensure they are effective, optimised and deliver enhanced benefits to stakeholders. Though it was 
written five years ago, long before the oil price crash and without any specific industry in mind, the 
report’s insights hold true today and should be applied to the oil and gas sector and beyond.’ 
52 Ibid. 5. 
53 Standard 8  










The stages that are most relevant for the research are stage 7 ‘Working together’ and 
stage 9 ‘Staying together’. Clause (stage) 7 explains in its introductory note that ‘each 
organization accepts the collective responsibility for managing an integrated process, 
with mutually agreed objectives’.
55
 It mentions the contractual steps to be taken, 
saying that ‘the organizations establish and agree a formal foundation for working 





The first important element is the work of the ‘joint management committee’, which 
shall be established from the ‘initiating organisation’ and its ‘collaborative partner’.
57
 
In the offshore context, this means that in a case of the operator-contractor 
relationship, they should set up a joint management committee. To equip this structure 
with adequate power, the clause provides that this responsibility should be 
incorporated in the contract: ‘this shall be consistent with the contractual 
responsibilities and incorporated into contractual agreements under which the 
collaborative relationship is to be formally recognized’.
58
 This joint management 





 and joint risk management
61
. The ‘joint risk 
management’ process includes important aspects, one of which is the inclusion of a 
risk register.  
 
The clause that deals primarily with the contracting features is clause 7.7, entitled 
‘Contracting Arrangements’. The first point is whether ‘the collaborative relationship 
is to be covered by a formal or informal agreement’. This was an issue first raised by 
the Latham Report, i.e. that formal agreements might hinder the relationship and 
could be eliminated over time. But this suggestion never materialised, as practitioners 
proved sceptical and preferred formal written agreements. The joint management 
team also has an important role to play at the contracting procedure, as it is provided 
                                                 
55 Standard, 21 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. clause 7.2.1 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. clause 7.3 
60 Ibid. clause 7.4 
61 Ibid. clause 7.5 
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that ‘when developing a contractual agreement, the joint management team shall 




‘Contract terms’, which are also linked to the terms of LOGIC contracts, are to be 
reviewed as well. The standard provides that ‘contract terms shall be reviewed to 
determine clarity of purpose, encourage appropriate behaviours and identify the 
potential impacts on or conflict with the aims of collaborative working’.
63
 This returns 
to the question whether the widely-used contracts, such as LOGIC, should change 
their wording in order to take into account ‘the aims of collaborative working’, as 
suggested by the Standard. This is unnecessary. By inserting specific clauses, and 
using documents such as the Standard, a more collaborative process could be applied 
in practice. The Standard also notes that ‘risk and reward models, issue management, 
exit strategy, knowledge transfer and sustainability should be considered when 
developing a contractual agreement’.
64
 Risk and reward models can also be linked to 
‘contract models’ and its meaning, as discussed above. The Oil and Gas Authority has 
announced that it wants to review ‘contract models’ that ‘add value’, where the risk 
and reward fits in the same scope. 
 
 Notably, the provision includes an RMP as a guide in the contract. The Standard 
provides that ‘a joint RMP may be established and annexed to formal contracts to 
formalize the overall management of the collaborative relationship and encompass the 
principles of collaborative behaviours’.
65
 The suggestion is that the RMP will be 
annexed, and in that way incorporated into the contract. This suggestion is also 
similar to the proposal of including a ‘partnering charter’ – the wording may vary, but 
the essence remains the same, which is to include a ‘relationship guide’ that will be 
used to as aid for the relationship of the parties. This was also a proposal in several 
NAO reports. For example, in a major review of the performance of the governments 
contractors, it was found as best practice to: ‘outlining explicitly in a document the 
expected behaviours of both customer and supplier throughout the duration of the 
contract’ and also that ‘each party was clear about the roles and responsibilities of the 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. clause 7.7 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. clause 7.10 
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other, and there was a “Partnership Charter” outlining the behaviour expected of each 




The other clause that is more relevant in the Standard is clause 9 ‘Staying together’. 
The main purpose of the clause is to ‘ensure that the relationship is maintained at its 
most effective level. Mutually agreed measures to monitor the relationship are put in 
place so that appropriate action is taken to maximize effectiveness. Continual 
improvement is addressed as well as the development of a dispute resolution 
process’.
67
The joint management team is again vested with critical tasks for this 
purpose: monitoring and measuring the relationship, ongoing management, continual 
innovation, maintaining behaviours and trust and delivering performance.
68
 In the 
offshore context, this would require a leap towards the relationship between operators 
and contractors and the current prevalent contracting paradigm. However, it is clear 
that collaborative working requires the integration of the teams of stakeholders, as it 
becomes evident from the tasks of the joint management team. If the Standard is 
applied, then the creation and function of the joint management team in practice 
would be a substantial challenge for the industry. However, the thesis submits that, 
both the current Standard – as well as its updated version, and all versions of modern 
contracts – include the feature of a joint management team. That the Oil and Gas 
Authority has endorsed the Standard means that operators and contractors should 
work towards a closer integration of their teams and activities, as the Standard 
suggests.  
 
Moving on to the Standard Guide, it has the same structure as the Standard and 
elaborates on its clauses following the same structure. Clause 7.5 provides a useful 
explanation on joint risk register and what it should include.
69
 In addition, the 
elaboration on the Guide on Contracting in clause 7.7 is of particular interest. The first 
suggestion is that ‘the appropriate contracting arrangements which should support the 
                                                 
66 NAO, ‘Central government’s management of service contracts’ (19 December 2008).  
67 Ibid. clause 9. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Standard Guide, clause 7.5.4 ‘The joint team should identify the profile of potential risks and create a 
joint risk register that enables all participants to ensure risk concerns have been recognized and, where 
possible, addressed. The joint risk register should be readily accessible to all team members and reflect 
the risk issues of the joint approach, in addition to those of the partners individually. The risk register 
should clearly define ownership for managing each identified risk and, where possible, the potential 
impact and mitigation approach to be taken’. 
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collaboration’ should be established and that ‘all elements of the contract are written 
with collaborative approaches in mind and support the appropriate collaborative 
behaviours’.
70
 Again, this raises questions about the extent to which the wording of 
existing contracts, such as LOGIC, might have to change. The thesis argues that 
‘appropriate collaborative behaviours’ can be introduced in practice and by virtue of 
closely following the steps of the Standard. A bolder step in this direction would be to 
formally incorporate the Standard into the contract between the parties.  
 
The Standard Guide again raises some issues of scepticism about the adequacy of 
formal contracts to ensure the execution of the project. The Standard Guide mentions 
that ‘formal contracts operated under a collaborative relationship can become areas of 
conflict, particularly if expectations are not realized. Few contracts provide a 
complete solution and the value of a robust collaborative relationship is the ability of 
the parties to address issues without resorting to contractual interpretation’.
71
 It is 
mentioned that ‘in principle, a collaborative relationship might require less formal 
contractual governance than one that is transactional because of the higher levels of 
trust’.
72
 These points echo the scepticisms of the Latham Report on formal contracts, 
as explained in the previous section. However, as explained, this is not an idea 
endorsed by the thesis and, contrary to the position expressed in the Standard Guide, it 
is impossible not to ‘resort to contractual interpretation’ if litigation occurs.  
 
3.4.2 Oil and Gas Authority 
 
Most publications of the Oil and Gas Authority are naturally important for the new 
landscape in the offshore oil and gas sector. This section focuses on the Oil and Gas 
Authority publications that could be said to contribute to the establishment of a 
sector-specific CCM framework. 
The first publication of the OGA relevant in this context is the ‘Collaboration 
Implementation Guide’ for the Asset Stewardship Strategy.
73
 The Collaboration 
                                                 
70 Standard Guide, 44 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 45 





 is based on two main aims: to ‘build a culture of 
collaboration’
75
 and ‘utilising collaborative processes’.
76
 To meet the criteria of the 
first aim, the OGA expects that the operators demonstrate the culture of collaboration 
within their companies, and the joint ventures they participate in. The expectations 
require the involvement of senior management in this process and lay down a set of 
criteria.
77
 The second branch is more prescriptive, in that the OGA expects that at 
least every two years, operators and their joint venturers conduct and document an 
assessment of collaborative behaviour using a recognised ‘collaborative behaviour 
assessment tool’.
78
 This tool, which was developed by the Oil and Gas Authority, is 
examined in the next paragraph. Notably, this requirement is extended not only to the 
operators but their joint venturers. Again, as the thesis is focused on the relationship 
with the supply chain, one wonders whether such a tool could be developed – or in 
fact the same tool could be used – to measure the collaboration performance among 
operators, joint venturers and their supply chain.  
 
The second tool of importance is the development of CBQT, which was developed in 
collaboration with the industry
79
 and its aim is to ‘introduce a number of methods to 
assess and improve collaboration’.
80
 The rationale of CBQT is that both the operator 
and the OGA set up a team of experts who assess the performance of the operator on 
the issue if collaboration. The criteria that demonstrate collaborative behaviour are set 
out by CBQT as: reasonableness; alignment; learning behaviours; strategic 
                                                 
74 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘SE09 - Collaboration Implementation Guide’ (31 March 2017) 
<https://www.Oil and Gas Authorityuthority.co.uk/news-
publications/publications/2017/implementation-guides-for-joint-venture-hub-strategy-and-
collaboration/>. 
75 Ibid. para 3.1. 
76 Ibid. para 3.2. 
77 Ibid, para 3.1 ‘(a) Evidence of senior leadership commitment to a culture of collaboration (b) 
Evidence of organisational engagement on the added value of collaboration (c) Recognition of 
importance of technical alignment as the basis for subsequent collaboration (d) Evidence of 
collaborative engagement beyond the immediate joint venture to recognise common interest (e) A 
regular assessment of opportunities to learn from and share with others, and a willingness to 
communicate these learnings f. A review and improve process to assess the impact of collaboration’. 
78 See also Judith Aldersey Williams, Valerie Allan, Norman Wisely, ‘Collaboration – how (OGA 
intends) to make it happen’ (CMS Law-Now e-alert 16.05.2017) <http://www.cms-
lawnow.com/ealerts/2017/05/collaboration--how-oga-intends-to-make-it-happen?cc_lang=en>.  
79 CBQT was developed in collaboration with Chevron in 2016. 
80 Oil and Gas Authority, ‘Collaborative Behaviour Quantification Tool: Assessment Guidance Note’ 




behaviours; appropriate attitude to change; demonstrating respect; being 




Regarding operators and the supply chain, most of the tools refer to inter-operator 
collaboration. However, since the Oil and Gas Authority has stressed the importance 
of the supply chain, as spelled out in the Supply Chain Strategy and Supply Chain 
Strategy Expectations, the thesis suggests that it would be interesting to entertain the 
idea of expanding the scope of the CBQT to include the supply chain. A further 
suggestion of the thesis is that there could be an initiative to align the criteria and 
processes laid down by the CBQT with the steps and processes of the BS 11000-1. In 
that way, similar criteria and a similar flowchart of steps and processes could facilitate 
the harmonisation of performance measurement (in this case collaborative 
performance) across the industry.  
 
A third interesting publication is a recent assessment published by the OGA entitled 
‘Lessons Learned from UKCS oil and gas projects 2011-2016’.
82
 The report tracks 
specific projects of different types over the last few years; the exact methodology and 
rationale of the projects chosen can be found in the report. The report identifies as a 
generic comment, before explaining the specific sectors of the lessons, that some 
general conclusions are that: ‘[o]ver and above these specific lessons, it was also clear 
that there is a common necessity for: More clearly defining the project scope prior to 
project sanction; Keeping the project as simple as possible; increasing the 
accountability of project delivery; Improving the co-operation between 
companies/stakeholders’. The most interesting of this point is the last one, i.e. 
‘improving the co-operation between companies/stakeholders’, which echoes the 
question already discussed in chapter 2 – whether and to what extent is the supply 
chain involved in this process. Again, as a matter of critique, perhaps terms such as 
‘stakeholders’ do not help in this case to identify the exact entities to which it refers. 
The report concludes with the ‘lessons learned’, which cover five areas: 
                                                 
81Oil and Gas Authority, ‘CBQT Appendix A: Scoring collaborative behaviours’ (20 April 2017) 
<https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/media/3594/420432-oga-cbqt-appendix-a-c-example-
behaviours_15.pdf>. 
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3.4.3 Oil and Gas UK 
 
The trade association of the UK offshore oil and gas industry has also published 
several guides that could be used to form a CCM framework. Several publications are 
now under reconsideration to reflect the changes from the MER Strategy. The thesis 
summarises the most important documents that could form a sector-specific CCM 
framework for the offshore oil and gas industry.  
3.4.3.1 Commercial Code of Practice (CCoP) 
 
The Commercial Code of Practice [hereinafter ‘CCoP’] was first published in 2002 by 
Oil and Gas UK. Its initial goal was to ‘produce a voluntary Commercial Code of 
Practice to aid negotiations such as asset transfers (…) and establish an agreed 
framework that would minimise (the often very considerable) resources spent on such 
negotiations and promote positive and co-operative commercial behaviour’.
84
 The 




The 2016 version of CCoP
86
 [hereinafter ‘CCoP 2016’] has been perceived as 
following in the tracks of the previous version, with wording changes shifting closer 
to the MER Strategy, but essentially maintaining the same meaning.
87
 However, the 
more important ramifications of the new version is that it embeds the principles and – 
potential consequences – of the MER Strategy. Comments suggest that it ‘includes 
                                                 
83 Ibid. at 11-15. 
84 Oil and Gas UK, ‘Commercial Code of Practice’ (2002) 
<http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/commercialcodeofpractice.cfm>. 
85 For the text of the CCoP 2002 see <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/oil-and-gas-codes-of-practice>; the 
link includes also other relevant oil and gas guides that were withdrawn. 
86 For the text of CCoP 2016 see <https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/media/3088/commercial-code-of-
practice-2016.pdf>. 
87 ‘For instance, ‘co-operative’ and ‘non-blocking approaches’ have been repackaged as 
‘collaboration’; see Judith Aldersey Williams, Valerie Allan, Norman Wisely, ‘CCoP revised in light 








The position of CCoP 2016 regarding the supply chain is also notable, yet addressed 
by neither academics nor practitioners. Although the text of the CCoP 2016 itself 
covers one page, the three pages of ‘supporting notes’ deserve closer scrutiny. The 
scope of the CCoP 2016 is defined in the supporting notes as ‘appl[ying] to licensees; 
infrastructure owners; potential licensees; potential infrastructure owners and advisors 
to these parties’.
89
 The issues that arise here are similar to the issues in the analysis of 
whether the supply chain can be said to fall within the scope of the MER Strategy in 
certain instances.
90
 The scope includes ‘infrastructure owners’ and ‘potential 
infrastructure owners’. The question that arises here is as to which definition 
‘infrastructure’ takes in this case: the definition provided by the MER Strategy in its 
annex,
91
 or the ‘ping-pong’ of referrals of definitions explained in chapter two.
92
 The 
answer is not straightforward, because with ‘relevant persons’ for the purposes of the 
MER Strategy, the Strategy itself made an express reference to the persons listed in 
Petroleum Act 1998 as amended,
93
 which in turn was the genesis of the ‘ping-pong’ 
mentioned above. With CCoP 2016 there is no such explicit reference. Either 
definition of ‘infrastructure’ could be argued, but what it is more important is that the 
outcome of the question would be applied in both contexts to at least ensure 
harmonisation and clear scope for both the MER Strategy and CCoP 2016.  
Another noteworthy aspect in the comments section is the repetition of other relevant 
stakeholders. These are referred to on multiple occasions as ‘JV partners, external 
advisors, current and potential counterparties’.
94
 The suggestion to discuss the course 
of action with the joint venturers and external advisors cannot come as a surprise; on 
the contrary, it is self-evident. However, one might indicate a ‘wide’ inclusion of 
stakeholders. Therefore, the reference to ‘current and potential counterparties’ would 
logically include the supply chain of the operators and their joint venturers. One might 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
89 CCoP 2016, 2. 
90 See supra section 2.3.5.2. 
91 MER Strategy, 14 ‘Infrastructure means terminals and, upstream of a terminal, equipment, pipelines, 
platforms, production installations and subsea and subsurface facilities’. 
92 See supra section 2.3.5.2. 
93 MER Strategy, 14 ‘Relevant persons means the OGA and the persons listed in section 9C of the 
Petroleum Act 1998 at the date this Strategy is laid in Parliament’. 
94 CCoP 2016, 2-4. 
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wonder who could be a closer ‘counterparty’ than the contractors working on the very 
same project. Again, it should be clarified that the arguments brought up in the thesis 
as to the supply chain do not intend to prove that it should be included within the 
scope of the Strategy and/or the SCCoP, but rather intend to raise awareness of the 
potential inconsistencies in the current wording of the existing framework.  
  
3.4.3.2 Infrastructure Code of Practice (ICoP) 
 
The Infrastructure Code of Practice [hereinafter ‘ICoP’] was initially published in 
1996 as the ‘Offshore Infrastructure Code of Practice’. It was reviewed in 2012 to 
reflect new legislation in the Energy Act 2011. The official name of the Code is the 
‘Code of Practice on Access to Upstream Oil and Gas Infrastructure on the UK 
Continental Shelf’,
95
 which reflects its purpose and is accompanied by Guidance 
Notes.
96
 The purpose of the Code is to ‘facilitate the utilisation of infrastructure for 
the development of remaining UKCS reserves through timely agreements for access 
on fair and reasonable terms, where risks taken are reflected by rewards’.
97
 The 
rationale behind the Code was to allow smaller players to operate in the UKCS by 
having access to third party infrastructure, such as pipelines and other equipment.
98
 
By agreeing to ICoP, the parties must agree to other relevant guidelines, or 
‘principles’, of the industry.
99
 ICoP is another piece of the puzzle with which CCoP 
influences industry players to commit to collaborative processes.  
 
                                                 
95 DECC and OGUK, ‘Code of Practice on Access to Upstream Oil and Gas Infrastructure on the UK 
Continental Shelf’ (November 2012) <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/ICoP-
revised-2013.pdf>. 
96 DECC and OGUK, ‘Code of Practice on Access to Upstream Oil and Gas Infrastructure on the UK 
Continental Shelf: Guidance Notes’ (November 2012) <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/OP080.pdf>. 
97 ICoP, para 1(2).  
98 Oil and Gas UK <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/infrastructurecodeofpractice.cfm>. 
99 Oil and Gas UK <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/infrastructurecodeofpractice.cfm>. ‘Parties uphold 
infrastructure safety and integrity and protect the environment; Parties follow the Commercial Code of 
Practice (CCoP); Parties provide meaningful information to each other prior to and during commercial 
negotiations; Parties support negotiated access in a timely manner; Parties undertake to ultimately settle 
disputes through the Automatic Referral Notice (ARN) process which involved the Secretary of State; 
Parties resolve conflicts of interest; Infrastructure owners provide transparent and non-discriminatory 
access; Infrastructure owners provide tariffs and terms for unbundled services, where requested and 
practicable; Parties seek to agree fair and reasonable tariffs and terms, where risks taken are reflected 
by rewards; Parties publish key, agreed commercial provisions’. 
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3.4.3.3 Supply Chain Code of Practice (SCCoP) 
 
The Supply Chain Code of Practice [hereinafter ‘SCCoP’ or ‘Code’] was published by 
OGUK and PILOT in 2012.
100
 In a recent Compliance Report
101
 – analysed below – it 
was announced that ‘there will be a full refresh of the SCCoP in 2017 to ensure that it 
remains fit for purpose and is aligned with the Industry Behaviours Charter’. An 




Since the new publication is still pending at the time of this thesis’ completion, the 
thesis shall analyse the 2012 publication. SCCoP mentions three main tasks as its 
goals: to improve performance, eliminate unnecessary costs, and add value and boost 
competitiveness. The mission statement states that ‘the code is designed to help its 
signatories achieve the highest attainable standards of business ethics, health, safety 
and environmental operations in accordance with all relevant statutory, local and 
national legislative requirements’. 
 
The Code provides for three stages: ‘Plan’, meaning ‘transparent planning of 
contracting activity by major purchasers to improve supply chain capability’; 
‘Contract’, meaning ‘streamline pre-qualification, tendering and negotiation processes 
to reduce bidding costs, eliminate waste, add value and increase competitiveness’; and 
finally, ‘Perform and Pay’, meaning ‘[i]ncrease feedback dialogue and shorten 
payment cycles to improve performance’. The most relevant phase – which is 
examined under the Compliance Report below – is ‘Contract’. The last parameter to 
‘perform and pay’ might be important from a practical and commercial point of view 
for the contractors, as it obliges the ‘purchasers’ to ‘pay all valid invoices (or the 
undisputed portion of a disputed invoice) within 30 days’.
103
 However, this 
commercial matter is beyond the focus of the thesis.  
                                                 
100OGUK and PILOT, ‘Supply Chain Code of Practice’ <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/SC021.pdf >. 
101 Oil and Gas UK, ‘SCCoP Compliance Report’ <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Supply-Chain-Code-of-Practice-2016.pdf >. 
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103 SCCoP 7. 
95 
 
The relationship among operators and contractors in the scope of SCCoP is pertinent 
in that the Code makes a peculiar distinction between the stakeholders and the 
signatories that it intends to attract. On the one hand are ‘purchasers’, which includes 
‘operators and major contractors’
104
 and on the other ‘suppliers’, which includes 
‘companies providing goods or services’.
105
 One might wonder what the rationale 
behind this division is; it might be a purposeful inclusion of operators and major 
contractors only on the one side, which implies that smaller contractors – who in 
many cases are hired as sub-contractors – are on the supply side. This does seem odd, 
as the reference to ‘companies providing goods or services’ could very well refer to 
major contractors as well.  
 
As to the benefits and advantages for the purchasers, SCCoP puts forward various 
elements.
106
 However what is the most noteworthy is the emphatic way in which the 
SCCoP declares that these elements ‘all combin[e] to make the UKCS a global leader 
in collaborative, efficient supply chain’.107 The thesis submits that SCCoP clearly 
states its preference for collaboration among operators and the supply chain. 
 
3.4.3.4 Industry Behaviours Charter 
 
Oil and Gas UK developed an ‘Industry Behaviours Charter’ that aims to become an 
industry norm. The vision of the Charter is to ‘promote the behaviours that will 
deliver a safe, competitive and sustainable industry capable of maximising economic 
recovery in the UK Continental Shelf and therefore best serving its stakeholders’.
108
 
Within OGUK, the Charter was developed to assist the ETF,
109
 and is also supported 
                                                 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 SCCoP 5, ‘Signing the oil and gas industry’s SCCoP demonstrates your commitment to work 
towards: Applying industry best practice; Aligning with corporate responsibility and good business 
principles and ethics; Improving performance, eliminating unnecessary costs and adding value across 
the UKCS oil and gas industry; Giving forward visibility to project work plans of contracting activity 
(e.g. ‘PILOT Share Fair’ business opportunity events and PILOT Forward Workplans); Helping 
standardisation by use of industry standard LOGIC ITTs and contract forms; Paying all valid invoices 
within 30 days; Increasing dialogue and two-way feedback on performance; Eliminating repetitive pre-
qualification; Driving performance improvement against your peers’. 
107 Ibid.  
108OGUK, ‘Industry Behaviours Charter’ (2016) <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Industry-Behaviours-Charter.pdf>. 
109 The Oil & Gas UK executive formally launched the Efficiency Task Force (ETF) in September 
2015 to drive a pan-industry improvement in efficiency; see <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/efficiency-task-
force.cfm> and <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/etf-toolkit.cfm>. 
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by the Oil and Gas Authority. The Charter has already attracted important players as 
signatories, and both important operators and contractors active in the North Sea are 
included in the list so far.
110
 The Charter consists of five ‘commitments’ that the 
signatories undertake to uphold. However, this is not a legally binding document. 
Moreover, it seems that the expressions are phrased in a generic manner and there are 
no more specific details provided on how these commitments should operate in 
practice. Therefore, there is room for improvement from the implementation 
perspective. The most noteworthy provisions are those that require the signatories to 
commit to ‘strengthen industry co-operation through continual improvement in and 
support for, industry codes of practice, forums and standards’ and ‘contribute to 
performance improvement by ensuring transparent and time-bound legal, commercial 
and contractual engagements’.
111
 The former commitment demonstrates the 
importance of industry codes and standards, which is what the thesis also highlights. 
The latter commitment emphasises the importance of the ‘legal, commercial and 
contractual’ dimension of offshore contracting as a parameter that can contribute to 
the main goal of the MER Strategy. As already mentioned, the Charter could benefit 
from more precise guidance about how these general principles can be applied and 
monitored in practice. 
 
3.4.3.5 Deloitte Collaboration Report 
 
The Deloitte Collaboration Report [hereinafter ‘Deloitte Report’], undertaken in co-
operation with Oil and Gas UK, is also on this list of potential CCM tools, as it 
appears to be an important tool for the Oil and Gas Authority.
 112
 In a recent event 
organised by the Oil and Gas Authority, it was mentioned that the Deloitte Report 
would become annual, and that it might ‘potentially extend the Deloitte supply chain 
study of leading indicators’ to other areas as well.
 113
 The Deloitte Report indicates 
                                                 
110 For example, the list includes most oil majors on the operators’ side (Chevron, Total, 
ConocoPhillips, BP, Shell, ExxonMobil) and many major contractors (e.g. Transocean, Halliburton, 
Amec, Technip among others) <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/industry-behaviours-signatories.cfm>. 
111 Industry Behaviours Charter, see ibid. 
112 Deloitte, ‘Making the most of the UKCS: Collaborating for success’ (February 2016) 6 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/energy-resources/deloitte-uk-making-
the-most-of-ukcs-2016.pdf>.  
113 Gunther Newcombe, Neil McCulloch, Russell Richardson, ‘MER UK in Practice, Collaboration, 
Competition Law & Area Plans’ <https://www.Oil and Gas Authorityuthority.co.uk/media/2867/mer-
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that almost all participants (98 percent) see collaboration as ‘crucial’ to their future 
success.
114
 Furthermore, one of the final recommendations of the Report is 
‘integration of the supply chain’. The Report suggests that ‘integrating supply 
chain…processes end-to-end and sharing the benefits realised with the supply chain 
has helped improve response times, lower the costs, reduce and optimise inventory, as 
well as reduce the number of unplanned shutdowns. (…) Supply chain integration can 




3.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
The first conclusion of this chapter regards the notion of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
contracting. As stated in the introduction, these notions do not suggest a simplistic 
division between ‘good or bad’ and ‘efficient or non-efficient’ approaches, 
respectively. The notion of modern contract was developed within the construction 
industry over the last few decades in the UK, and its main characteristics are the tools 
it uses at the project management and contract management level with the aim of a 
successful project outcome. This goal, i.e. the successful project outcome, is an issue 
that can also be said to have a certain importance from a legal perspective. As already 
mentioned, the traditional contract approach adopts ‘success criteria’ viewed solely 
from a narrow, legal standpoint. For this contracting philosophy, the aims of 
‘protecting one’s interests’ through ‘good drafting’ and favourable risk allocation are 
the end goals themselves. In case a project failure occurs – whatever the reason might 
be – the wording of a contract that mitigates the loss of the client, or entitles the client 
to compensation, is perceived as a ‘successful’ contract. A modern contract – which 
arguably evidences its engineering background – focuses on the success of the 
project. In this school of thought, the previous example would be an ‘unsuccessful’ 
contract, as ultimately it failed to maintain the relationship of the parties and lead to a 
successful project execution.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
uk-in-practice-collaboration-competition-law-and-area-plans.pdf>. (slide presentation in Oil and Gas 
Authority Aberdeen conference October 2016). 
114 Deloitte Collaboration Report 5 
115 Deloitte Collaboration Report 22. 
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The second conclusion regards the definition of the discipline of CCM. The thesis 
explains its relevance to the legal discipline, which is not immediately clear from an 
academic standpoint. CCM is essentially an academic sub-discipline of management 
in the broader sense and project management in a narrower sense. CCM is an alien 
concept to the traditional legal standpoint on contract law and contracting, whereas 
the areas of interest have been ‘certainty and predictability’, ‘clear drafting’, the 
peculiarities of the ‘wording’ and its potential interpretation. However, the evolution 
of the ‘modern’ contract in the UK construction industry described in this chapter 
demonstrates that a paradigm shift took place over time, and the role of the contract 
was enhanced by management elements aimed at the successful execution of the 
contract, and ultimately, of the project itself.  
 
The third conclusion is about the potential of CCM for offshore oil and gas 
contracting, specifically in light of the MER Strategy. The chapter argues that there is 
‘an elephant in the room’ in the sense that despite the existence of an adequate body 
of documents published by the Oil and Gas Authority which effectively form a tailor-
made, sector-specific body of CCM for the offshore oil and gas industry, this 
realisation seems to elude the Oil and Gas Authority and the industry. The thesis 
argues that the realisation of the value of CCM is critical, because CCM in the context 
of the offshore oil and gas industry can benefit from the more coherent and 
sophisticated theoretical background of CCM already developed in other industries, 
and even in government contracting. In this way, it becomes evident that project-
based industries can cross-fertilise each other, as the challenges are often essentially 
the same. The chapter stresses that the new MER Strategy should be built around BS 
Standard 11000-1.
116
 If the Standard is followed, it would drastically change the 
contracting paradigm between operators and contractors. As explained in the chapter, 
new mechanisms such as joint management teams would have to work jointly and 
develop joint risk registers and relationship management plans (among many other 
tools) to ensure the successful execution of a project.  
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way in practice, the previous BS Standard 11000-1 remains relevant, especially since the Oil and Gas 






THE NOTION OF ‘COLLABORATION’ IN THE ENGLISH LAW OF 
CONTRACT 
 
4.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 2 analysed the notion of collaboration within and beyond the MER Strategy. 
In Chapter 3, the notion of modern contracting and the potential of contract and 
commercial management for offshore oil and gas contracting was explained. Chapter 
4 places the final piece of the puzzle, which is examining the notion of collaboration 
and its practical consequences from a legal standpoint. An important aim of the 
chapter is to explain that collaboration is not a legal term of art, and thus it is 
‘reflected’ in other legal notions and must be examined in conjunction with them. The 
first section of the chapter provides an overview of the ‘ethos’ and ‘ideology’ of the 
English law of contract. This section does not intend to be an in-depth analysis of 
contract theory, which is a distinct branch of the legal discipline with unresolved 
questions that have been debated for a long time. The aim is rather to set the stage and 
introduce certain long-standing debates about contract law, e.g. the 
formalism/contextualism debate. Next, the relationship of ‘collaboration’ with 
contract law notions is examined in order to see how it can fit in this wider context. 
The methodological rationale for choosing and analysing specific cases and notions is 
explained in detail. As a final remark, it should be noted that the question posed in 
this chapter has a broad scope and may be applicable in many areas of contract law, 
especially in the context of project-based industries. However, the focus of the chapter 
is to link, where possible, the analysis on this doctrinal question with the MER 




4.2. THE ‘ETHOS’ AND ‘IDEOLOGIES’ OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF 
CONTRACT 
 
Commenting on the ethos and ideologies of the English law of contract is so 
theoretical that it seems irrelevant to a question which arises out of practical 
scenarios. The reason for the theoretical inquiry is that in order to ascertain the 
meaning of ‘collaboration’ in the English law of contract, one must at least understand 
the fundamental presumptions on which English law evolved. Scrutinising the 
substance of, and taking sides on, this theoretical debate lies outside of the research 
scope. However, without an understanding of the foundations and the different views, 
such as the fundamental difference in the school of thought of contract law formalism 
and contextualism, it is impossible to put in context the notion of collaboration.  
Before the main analysis begins, it is helpful to also provide historical context about 
the approach of the research. The thesis takes into account the context of the ‘modern 
contract law’ era; this term is juxtaposed with ‘classical contract law’ period, which is 
thought to have been developed and predominant during the nineteenth and the first 
part of the twentieth century.
 1
 
 The main characteristics of classical contract law were perceived to be the effort to 
‘develop a general body of contract law applicable to all types of contracts’ and ‘in 
the endeavour to attain the highest degree of stability and predictability so as to ensure 
the parties' ability to rely upon the binding effect of the contract’.
2
 The ‘modern law’ 
era of English law is calculated from the 1940s onwards.
3
 The characteristics of 
modern contract law are perceived to be ‘an increased control over the contractual 
regime (…) reflected both by general supervision over the process of contract 
formation and by intervention in the very contents of the contract’ and a ‘tendency of 




                                                 
1 Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedmann, ‘From 'Classical' to Modern Contract Law’ 7 in Jack Beatson 
and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (OUP 1995). 
2 Ibid. 10. 
3 Ibid. 12. 
4 Ibid. 15. 
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The next point of consideration is the underlying ‘ethos’ and ‘ideologies’ of the 
English law of contract.
5
 This inquiry may offer further insight into the underlying 
assumptions that exist in the dominant contract law doctrine.  
Brownsword recognises three main potential ‘underlying ethics’ in the English law of 
contract: the ethic of individualism
6
, the ethic of cooperativism
7
 and the ethic of 
altruism
8
. Leaving altruism aside,
9
 the question remains whether individualism or 
cooperativism is the main ethos of the English law of contract. This question has been 
a long-standing one, and the pendulum has swung many times, shifting according to 
case law. Nevertheless, the starting point of English contract law doctrine has been 
certainly closer to the ‘classical’ model of contract, with the main characteristics 
being an adversarial ethic, the primacy of the contractors' intentions, the centrality of 
exchange and the protection of the expectation interest.
10
  
A closely related issue to that is the so-called ‘ideologies’ of contract law. In 
understanding commercial contracts, Brownsword suggests that the prevailing 
ideology is ‘market-individualism’. This notion can be further divided into the ideas 
of ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ market-individualism. Static market-individualism sees the 
principal function of contract law as being to ‘establish a clear set of ground rules 
within which a market can operate’ and dynamic market-individualism ‘favour(s) a 
                                                 
5 For a theoretical discussion on contract theory see Stephen A. Smith, Contract Theory (1st edn, OUP 
2004); Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller, The Choice Theory of Contracts (Cambridge University 
Press 2017); Gregory Klass, George Letsas and Prince Saprai (eds), Philosophical Foundations of 
Contract Law (OUP 2014); Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP 2014); Peter Benson (ed), The 
Theory of Contract Law: New Essays (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2008); Jean Braucher (ed), 
Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay (Hart Publishing 2013); For a theoretical law 
and economics analysis see Eric Brousseau (ed), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and 
Applications (Cambridge University Press 2002). 
6‘The prioritization of self-interest - in which a contractor puts its own interests above the interests of a 
fellow contractor’, see Roger Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the twenty-first Century (2nd 
edn, OUP 2006) 28. 
7 Ibid., ‘The equality of interest - in which a contractor treats its own interests and the interests of a 
fellow contractor as of equal weight’. 
8 Ibid., ‘The prioritization of the interests of others- in which a contractor puts the 
interests of a fellow contractor above its own interests’. 
9 Ibid., Altruism is described as a ‘characteristic of fiduciary rather than contractual relationships’. 
10 Roger Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the twenty-first Century (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 47 
‘Spelling this out rather more fully,we can say that the doctrinal landmarks of the classical law are 
founded upon a handful of key ideas: in particular, an adversarial ethic (this being presupposed by 'the 
economic model of the free market transaction'); the primacy of the contractors' intentions; the 
centrality of exchange; and the protection of the expectation interest (the executory promise of future 
performance being treated, so to speak, as a matter of present entitlement).’ 
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more flexible approach, guided by the practices and expectations of the contracting 
community (particularly the commercial community)’.
11
 
The classical model and ethos of the English law have been challenged in the past few 
decades by the evolution of the ‘regulatory and relational contract law theory’. 
Morgan provides a succinct and elucidating description of the ‘modern’ contract law 
theory school of thought. The leading studies that laid the foundations in in this field 
are widely accepted to be the empirical work of Macaulay and other socio-legal 
scholars and economists.
12
 The original empirical study might have taken place as 
long as five decades ago, but the conclusions remain relevant today. The work of 
McNeil has also been highly influential in this field.
13
 
The essence of the ‘relational contract theory’ school of thought is that there is a stark 
difference between transactions as reflected in a contract and what actually happens 
between the businessmen who negotiate and draft the contracts. Macaulay referred to 
this difference agreements on paper and agreements in the real world, or in other 
words, the ‘real’ and the ‘paper’ deal.
14
 This argument is advocating a ‘contextualist’ 
approach, in which the text of a contract is not ‘sacred’, but what matters more is to 
ascertain and enforce the real intention of the parties, broadly defined. 
The initial breakthrough of the relational/contextualist school of thought did not go 
unanswered by the scholars and practitioners advocating that modern contract law 
should not depart too far from its classical roots. This school of thought termed as the 
‘formalist’ (also known as ‘neoformalist’) approach has conducted empirical studies 
that yielded contradictory conclusions, i.e. that businessmen in many instances – as in 
                                                 
11 Roger Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the twenty-first Century (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 139-
141; See also Roger Brownsword, ‘Contract Law, Co-operation, and Good Faith: The Movement from 
Static to Dynamic Market-Individualism’ in Simon Deakin and Jonathan Michie (eds), Contracts, Co-
operation, and Competition: Studies in economics, management and law (OUP 1997). 
12 For the leading studies on this field see, S. Macaulay, 'Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study' (1963) 28American Sociological Rev l; H. Beale and T. Dugdale, 'Contracts 
between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies' (I975) 2 BJL&S 45; R. Gordon, 
'Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law' [1985] Wisconsin LR 
565; H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, 1999); S. Macaulay, 'The Real and the 
Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple 
Rules' (2003) 66 MLR 44; O.E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contractíng (Free Press 1985). 
13 The work of Mcneil will be examined in more detail in section 4.3.3.  
14 For an elaboration of this notion see Catherine Mitchell, Contract Law and Contract Practice: 
Bridging the Gap between Legal Reasoning and Commercial Expectation (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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the case study of the US cotton industry – preferred strict rules that were perceived as 
providing a more predictable trading framework.
15
 
At this point, the thesis intends to propose an original angle; that is, where 
‘collaboration’ sits on the spectrum of the contextualist and the formalist approach 
and how does recent UK case law approach these matters. The thesis submits that a 
perception has been created – partly due to misunderstandings stemming from recent 
case law due to reasoning in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd – that 
collaboration can only take effect in a contextualist, ‘relational’ contracting 
framework. The thesis submits that this is an incorrect perception, and that a 
collaborative relationship can operate both within a contextualist and formalist 
contracting environment. The difference is not the contracting theory, but rather the 
intention of the parties and the wording they choose in order to apply their intention in 
a collaborative business relationship.  
 
4.3 ‘COLLABORATION’ AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ENGLISH 
CONTRACT LAW NOTIONS 
 
4.3.1. Case law on client-contractor ‘collaborative’ contracts 
 
In this section, it is necessary to first explain the methodology that is used in order to 
select the appropriate cases that can help build a theoretical framework with which to 
ascertain the meaning of collaboration in the English law of contract. The first step is 
to provide a general chronological context for this methodology. The thesis includes 
in its analysis the ‘modern’ contract law era, the characteristics of which were 
explained in the previous section.
16
 Furthermore, the research includes cases brought 
before the English courts and does not examine arbitration cases. The reason for the 
exclusion of arbitrated cases is that the focus of the analysis is to ascertain the current 
                                                 
15 J. Gava and J. Greene, 'Do We Need a Hybrid Law of Contract? Why Hugh Collins Is Wrong and 
Why It Matters' [2OO4] CLJ 605; J. Morgan, Contract Law Mínimalism: A Formalist Restatement of 
Commercial Contract Law (Cambridge University Press 2013); L. Bernstein 'Private Commercial Law 
in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions' (2001) 99 
Michigan LR 1724; A. Schwartz and R.E. Scott, 'Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law' 
(2003) 113 YaIe LJ 541. 
16 See supra section 4.2. 
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doctrine of English law on collaboration. Case law can offer a more authoritative 
picture of the current state of affairs than arbitral cases. 
The specific criteria used for case law selection is:  
(a) cases involving a client-contractor relationship. This is necessary as it 
reflects the nature of project-based industries in general and the offshore 
oil and gas industry in particular;  
(b) cases where the parties have chosen to have a ‘collaborative 
relationship’ and have used terms that are perceived to reflect a 
collaborative relationship; 
(c) cases where contracts that are self-defined as ‘collaborative’ (e.g. NEC, 
PPC2000) were brought before the courts. 
These cases are examined in chronological order in order to follow the evolution 
of the law. Before continuing to the main analysis, it is necessary to resolve a 
‘chicken and egg’ situation in this methodology selection. One the one hand, the 
aim of this section is to define collaboration; on the other, it is already ‘assumed’ 
that collaboration has a relevance to certain notions, such as good faith, ‘quasi-
good faith’ clauses (‘mutual trust and co-operation’ clauses), relational contracts 
and partnering and alliancing contracts. However, there must be a starting point, 
after which the research may then ‘reverse-engineer’ its findings to ascertain 
whether the original assumptions were correct. Finally, after the analysis of the 
selected case law, the research considers each of the notions separately, 
including in its analysis aspects of offshore oil and gas contracting where 
relevant.  
4.3.1.1 Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital 
Services NHS Trust  
 
In the case of Medirest v Mid Essex Hospital Services
17
 the contract between the Mid 
Essex Hospital NHS Trust [hereinafter ‘Trust’] Trust and the contractor (Medirest) 
                                                 
17 Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust [2012] 




was the offering of catering and cleaning services to the hospital. At first instance, Mr 
Justice Cranston stated that ‘at the heart of this claim is a clause in a long-term 
facilities contract which obliged the parties, inter alia, to cooperate in good faith’.
18
 
The contract imposed a duty to cooperate in good faith which read:  
‘3.5 The Trust and the Contractor will co-operate with each other in 
good faith and will take all reasonable action as is necessary for the 
efficient transmission of information and instructions and to enable 
the Trust or, as the case may be, any Beneficiary to derive the full 
benefit of the Contract’.
19
 
Mr Justice Cranston held that this clause imposed a ‘duty to co-operate in good faith’ 
which was breached by the Trust. Furthermore, the contract was utilising a so-called 
‘Service Failure Points’ [hereinafter ‘SFP’] system, whereby the Trust could impose 
payment deductions to the contractor in case of poor performance.
 20
 With regard to 
SFP’s, Mr Justice Cranston found that the Trust exercised this contractual provision in 
an ‘arbitrary, irrational or capricious manner’
21
 by appointing disproportional 
numbers of failure points to the contractor. 
The case was appealed and overturned in Medirest v Mid Essex Hospital Services 
(Court of Appeal)
 22
. The Court of Appeal overturned both elements of the decision. 
With regard to the clause 3.5, which provided for the ‘duty to co-operate in good 
faith’, the Court of Appeal took a rather literal interpretation of this duty and linked it 
with the rest of the provision, i.e. ‘the efficient transmission of information and 
instructions and to enable the Trust or, as the case may be, any Beneficiary to derive 
the full benefit of the Contract’.
23
 By narrowing the scope of the duty to co-operate 
only within the specific action of ‘efficient transmission of information and 
                                                 
18 Ibid. para [1]. 
19 Ibid. para [11]. 
20 Ibid. para [12], contract clause 5.8.  
21Paragon Finance Plc (formerly National Home Loans Corp) v Nash Paragon Finance Plc v Staunton 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1466; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 685; [2002] 2 All E.R. 248; [2001] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 
1025; [2002] 2 P. & C.R. 20; (2001) 98(44) L.S.G. 36; (2001) 145 S.J.L.B. 244; [2002] 1 P. & C.R. 
DG13; Times, October 25, 2001. 
22 Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust [2013] 
EWCA Civ 200; [2013] B.L.R. 265; [2013] C.I.L.L. 3342 [hereinafter ‘Medirest v Mid Essex Hospital 
Services (Court of Appeal)’. 
23 Medirest v Mid Essex Hospital Services, para [11]. 
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instructions to derive the full benefit of the contract’, the Court of Appeal held that the 
Trust did not fall short of this obligation.  
With regard to the duty to not act in an ‘arbitrary, irrational or capricious manner’ 
Lord Justice Jackson held that ‘there is no justification for implying into clause 5.8 a 
term that the Trust will not act in an arbitrary, irrational or capricious manner’.
24
 The 
rationale was that, in this case, the contract gave to the Trust the discretionary power 
of ‘whether or not to exercise a contractual right’.
25
 This right was further amplified 
by the characterisation of the Trust as a ‘public authority delivering a vital service’, 




A further issue deriving from this case is an insight about the content of the ‘duty to 
co-operate in good faith’. Lord Justice Jackson put forth two possible interpretations: 
first, a narrow interpretation where the duty was only confined to acting honestly;
27
 
and second, a broader and ‘stronger’ interpretation, whereby the duty should be 
construed as ‘to observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, and to be 
faithful to the agreed common purpose, and to act consistently with the justified 
expectations of the parties’.
28
 The Court of Appeal chose the narrow approach, 
choosing to attribute a literal meaning to the duty of co-operation only to what was 
expressly mentioned in clause 3.5 of the contract. 
The first relevant point for the purposes of the research is the narrow meaning that 
was attributed to the good faith clause. Another relevant observation is the utter 
ineffectiveness of the ‘Service Failure System’ or similar ‘carrot and stick’ 
performance measurement systems. A similar system was applied in the recent 
Portsmouth City Council v Ensign Highways Ltd, with equally poor results for the 
success of the project.
29
 It is not common to see such a system in offshore oil and gas 
                                                 
24 Medirest v Mid Essex Hospital Services (Court of Appeal), para [92]. 
25Ibid, para [83]. 
26 Ibid, para [91]. 
27 Ibid, para [109]; The paragraph references Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd 
[2001] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 AC 469, where Scott LJ held that ‘the duty of utmost good faith required no 
more than that the insured should act honestly and not in bad faith’. 
28 Ibid, para [111]; See reference to CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Co [2010] 
EWHC 1535 (Ch); [2010] C.I.L.L. 2908; [2010] N.P.C. 74, para [246]. 
29 See for example Portsmouth City Council v Ensign Highways Ltd [2015] EWHC 1969 (TCC); 
[2015] B.L.R. 675; 161 Con. L.R. 71; [2015] B.L.G.R. 791; [2015] C.I.L.L. 3717 [hereinafter 
‘Portsmouth City Council v Ensign Highways Ltd’]. 
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contracts per se, but the traditional adversarial contracting ethos did create similar 




4.3.1.2 TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd 
 
The case of TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd
31
 is a case of 
particular interest. The reason is that it is based on a contract which has been designed 
specifically as a ‘partnering contract’, TPC 2005,
32
 which belongs to the ‘PPC suite’ 
of contracts.
33
 The reason that this case is important is that, as it has been described, 
‘it goes to what many believe is the heart of partnering contracts, namely the spirit of 
trust, fairness and mutual co-operation’.
34
 Leaving aside the adjudication issues which 
arose in this case, the thesis shall focus directly on the issue of the ‘partnering’ or 
‘quasi good faith’ clause. 
 
‘[1] The Partnering Team members shall work together and individually in 
the spirit of trust, fairness and mutual co-operation for the benefit of the 
Term Programme, within the scope of their agreed roles, expertise and 
responsibilities as stated in the Partnering Documents, and [2] all their 
respective obligations under the Partnering Contract shall be construed 
within the scope of such roles, expertise and responsibilities, and [3] in all 




The scope of the contract was the offering by TSG of gas services and associated 
works programme to houses owned by South Anglia. One year after the contract 
signature, South Anglia sought to terminate the contract. The issue that arose was 
                                                 
30 See supra 1.2.4. 
31 TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd [2013] EWHC 1151 (TCC); [2013] B.L.R. 
484; 148 Con. L.R. 228 [hereinafter ‘TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd’] 
32 TPC2005, ‘The ACA Standard Form of contract for term partnering: Introduction and explanatory 
notes’ < http://ppc2000.wiserhosting.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/IntroductiontoTPC2005.pdf>. 
33 See supra 3.2.2. 
34 David Mosey, ‘Partnering’s tough side, Building Magazine’ (25 June 2013) available at < 
http://www.building.co.uk/partnerings-tough-side/5056796.article>. 
35 TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd [para 33]; It should be noted that the 
numbering in the paragraph is added by Mr Justice Akenhead himself, noting that ‘it is probably 
helpful if one breaks Clause 1.1 down into its arguably different parts (withparagraph numbers added)’ 
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whether South Anglia had the right to terminate the contract at convenience, since it 
had entered into a partnering agreement and had agreed to the aforementioned clause 
including the duty to ‘work together and individually in the spirit of trust, fairness and 
mutual co-operation’. Clause 13.3 of the contract provided for termination at 
convenience.
36
 TSG attacked the termination on two grounds, first on content of the 
partnering clause, and second on the grounds of an implied term of good faith. 
 
Mr Justice Akenhead rejected both arguments. With regard to the partnering clause, it 
was held that the duty to ‘work together and individually in the spirit of trust, fairness 
and mutual co-operation’ related only to the ‘Term Programme’, which in turn had 
only ‘as its object the efficient and good quality performance of the gas related works 
in some 5500 dwellings’.
37
 In other words, the Court again adopted an extremely 
narrow interpretation of this ‘quasi good faith’ clause and attached its meaning only to 
the specific tasks under the Term Programme. With regard to the argument of the 
implied term of good faith, Mr Justice Akenhead held that there was no such duty and 





This case serves to reiterate that the scope of ‘partnering’ or ‘quasi good faith’ clauses 
may be narrowed down significantly by a very literal interpretation of the content of 
the clause. It is clear that the Court did not intend to expand the scope of the 
partnering clause and limited the interpretation only to the scope of the ‘Term 
Programme’, following the rationale of Medirest v Mid Essex Hospital Services 
(Court of Appeal) which restricted the scope only to the issue of ‘efficient 
transmission of information and instructions’. The TSG Building decision was met 
with satisfaction from practitioners in the construction sector, as it was perceived as a 
                                                 
36 Ibid [para 42], ‘Clause 13.3 entitles either party to terminate for any or even no reason. Clause 13.1 
makes it clear that the four year term is subject to Clause 13. Clause 13 provides for automatic 
termination for bankruptcy, insolvency or the like (Clause 13.5), termination for breach (Clause 13.6) 
and an unqualified and unconditional right to terminate (Clause 13.3).’ 
37 Ibid para [33 (1)]. 
38 Ibid para [31], ‘I do not consider that there was as such an implied term of good faith in the Contract. 
The parties had gone as far as they wanted in expressing terms in Clause 1.1 about how they were to 
work together in a spirit of ‘trust fairness and mutual cooperation’ and to act reasonably. Even if there 
was some implied term of good faith, it would not and could not circumscribe or restrict what the 
parties had expressly agreed in Clause 13.3, which was in effect that either of them for no, good or bad 
reason could terminate at any time before the term of four years was completed. That is the risk that 
each voluntarily undertook when it entered into the Contract, even though, doubtless, initially each may 
have thought, hoped and assumed that the Contract would run its full term.’ 
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sign that entering into partnering contracts and using ‘quasi good faith’ clauses was 
not something to be dreaded. Mosey expressed this relief in saying that ‘TPC has 
retained its hard commercial edge without giving up its collaborative processes’.
39
  
Aside from these two main issues raised by this case, it is noteworthy to comment on 
what the Court understood ‘working together’ to mean. The following paragraph 
provides an elucidating example: 
‘One can see that there has to be substantial co-operation between the parties 
to arrange for this work. South Anglia might, in acting reasonably, have to 
seek to facilitate as many of these operations in a specific area or street at 
about the same time; it would be reasonable, arguably, and fair to seek to do 
this not only on the grounds of efficiency but because it might well be 
cheaper for TSG, compared with 5,526 separately arranged visits at different 
times. Similarly, TSG could be expected, in acting reasonably, when doing 
annual services to put right defects which it actually noticed did not need 
putting right exactly at that time but which foreseeably would go wrong or 
fail before the next annual service’. 
 
This is an interesting point because the definition could also be used in the context of 
the offshore oil and gas industry, and generally in a client-contractor environment. Mr 
Justice Akenhead holds that ‘in acting reasonably’, both the client and contractor 
should be expected to assess the overall state of the project and facilitate the probable 
and reasonable needs of their counterparty, as the above paragraph describes. This is a 
point that could be considered in the context of offshore oil and gas contracting, and 
in the same line of thought, operators and contractors should facilitate one another’s 
work if they work in an environment of collaboration, as in this case.  
4.3.1.3 Fujitsu Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd 
 
The case of Fujitsu Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd 
40
 provides insight into 
several issues: partnering contracts, the relationship of the contractor and 
                                                 





subcontractor – which is a common phenomenon in the offshore oil and gas industry – 
and the issue of good faith and fiduciary duty.  
IBM United Kingdom Ltd [hereinafter ‘IBM’] agreed to provide IT services for a 
period of ten years to the company DVLA under a ‘Partners Achieving Change 
Together Partnering Agreement’ [hereinafter ‘PACT’]. At the same time, IBM 
entered into a contract with Fujitsu Services Ltd [hereinafter ‘Fujitsu’] and sub-
contracted certain services such as day-to-day management and support and 
maintenance. 
During the contract execution, Fujitsu claimed that IBM was not sub-contracting 
enough services according to their contract, and that this caused a loss of revenue of 
£36 million. The first issue that arose was whether this amount could be claimed in 
light of an exclusion and limitation of liability clause. This matter frequently appears 
in the context of adversarial offshore oil and gas contracts,
41
 however it is not the 
focus of this thesis’ analysis.  
The relevant issues were, first, whether IBM owed a fiduciary duty to Fujitsu and, 
second, whether there was an express duty of good faith that entitled Fujitsu to 
compensation. 
With regard to the issue of the fiduciary duty, Fujitsu claimed that under the PACT 
agreement, IBM ‘had a duty to act in good faith for the benefit of both parties’ in its 
relationship with the client (DVLA).
42
 Mrs Justice Carr held that the relationship was 
not within one of the settled categories of principal and fiduciary, and that the sub-
contract did not make any mention of partnering, but rather kept the relationship at 
arm’s length, stating that ‘to import fiduciary obligations would be to distort the true 
                                                                                                                                            
40 Fujitsu Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd [2014] EWHC 752 (TCC); [2014] 1 C.L.C. 353; 153 
Con. L.R. 203.  
41 Chris Kidd, ‘Consequential Loss Exclusion Clauses in Offshore Contracts: The Need for Greater 
Clarity’ in Baris Soyer and Andrew Tettenborn (eds), Offshore Contracts and Liabilities (1st edn, 
Informa Law 2015); See also section 1.2.4. 
42 Fujitsu Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd [para 121], ‘FSL contended that the cardinal issue 
was that IBM was not entitled ‘when dealing with arrangements which affect[ed] the Sub-Contract or 
under it … to put [its] interests ahead of [FSL's] or to act in such a manner as to disadvantage [FSL] at 
[FSL's] expense.’ IBM had ‘a duty to act in good faith for the benefit of both parties in dealings which 
relate[d] to under the [PACT Agreement] which can affect or do affect [the] Sub-Contract or are 
capable of affecting the Sub-Contract or capable of affecting [FSL's] expectations under the Sub-
Contract’.; note that the Court referred to Fujitsu as ‘FSL’. 
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bargain between the parties’.
43
 Commentators on this issue have argued that future 
partnering contracts will slowly move in the direction of the introduction of a 
fiduciary duty,
44
 while others disagree fiercely with this notion.
45
 The thesis submits 
that this is a welcome statement as the introduction of fiduciary duties would be 
definitely problematic in the context of an operator-contractor offshore oil and gas 
contract. This argument has been put forward in the offshore contracting context, but 
only in the relationship between the operator and the joint venturers, and the existence 
of a fiduciary duty is doubtful even in this case.
46
 
The second issue under consideration was whether there was an express duty of good 
faith in the sub-contract between IBM and Fujitsu. Fujitsu claimed that the contract 
referred to ‘good industry practice’ and should be read in the partnering spirit of the 
PACT agreement. Mrs Justice Carr held that ‘in a detailed contract like the Sub-
Contract, one would expect clear words if there was to be an express duty of good 
faith; (t)here are no such clear words’.
47
The absence of clear words pointing to an 
express duty of good faith made also the reference to ‘good industry practice’ not 




4.3.2. Good faith and collaboration 
 
Good faith is a vast subject that has been debated and analysed for many years. It has 
undergone many different ‘phases’, from complete hostility in the ‘classical’ contract 
                                                 
43 Ibid [para 144] ‘Put simply, to import fiduciary obligations would be to distort the true bargain 
between the parties. It cannot be said that obligations of a fiduciary nature could reasonably be 
expected to apply to the Sub-Contract which was a contract between main contractor and sub-
contractor for the supply of services.’ 
44 Jim Mason, ‘Collaborative working: Age of the team players’ (Building.co.uk, 25 September 2014) 
<http://www.building.co.uk/collaborative-working-age-of-the-team-players/5070865.article>. 
45 Begg, P.D., ‘Fiduciary content in joint ventures and partnering contracts in the construction industry’ 
(2003) Scottish Law & Practice Quarterly 272-288 
<https://openair.rgu.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10059/180/fiduciaryobligations%20paper-%203-10-
03.pdf?sequence=1>. 
46 Peter Roberts, Joint Operating Agreements: A Practical Guide (3rd edn, Globe Law and Business 
2015). 
47 Fujitsu Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd [para 152]; See also [para 153] ‘Secondly, it is 
difficult to see why in the context of the warranty in clause 19.4(f) an obligation of good faith on the 
part of IBM would arise. The warranty to perform makes such an obligation otiose.’ 
48Fujitsu Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd [para 160] ‘Thus the warranty in clause 19.4(f)(c) 
does not give rise to an express obligation of good faith on the part of IBM in the performance of its 
duties under the Sub-Contract. Again, there is no claim for breach of IBM's warranty that the personnel 
supplied by IBM would discharge IBM's obligations with all due skill, care and diligence in accordance 
with “Good Industry Practice” ’. 
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law era, to recent cases that favoured the introduction of good faith, in a direct or 
indirect way, in the English law of contract.  
4.3.2.1 Express term of good faith  
 
The starting point and the most important distinction when it comes to the issue of 
good faith is the distinction between an express and implied duty of good faith. The 
rule is that an express duty of good faith should be included in the contract in order 
for it to be taken into account in its construction. As the cases demonstrated above, 
express terms of good faith can often take the form of ‘quasi good faith clauses’, i.e. 
using wording similar to that of a good faith clause but avoiding to mention the words 
expressly.  Examples of these ‘quasi-good faith’  clauses are the clauses of ‘the spirit 
of trust, fairness and mutual co-operation’ found in the long-term version of PPC2000 
(TPC2005) and the clause of ‘spirit of mutual trust and co-operation’ found in NEC, 
as explained in the above sections. 
The question that arises in this situation is whether an express duty of good faith has 
an overriding effect on other clauses of the contract. As explained in the case of TSG 
Building Services plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd analysed above, it was held that 
such good faith and ‘quasi good faith’ clauses do not have an overriding effect on 
other, more specific, and express contract clauses – such as the clause for termination 
at convenience in this instance.  
4.3.2.2 Implied term of good faith  
 
A more complicated issue is the effect of an implied duty of good faith. The 
traditional approach of the English courts was that an implied duty of good faith may 
not be recognised. However, Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation 
Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) [hereinafter Yam Seng] sparked a wave of doubt on this 
matter. This case is also an example of the point made in the introduction that certain 
contract law doctrine notions do not have a clear and set meaning. In Yam Seng Pte 
Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd, the issue of the implied duty of good faith 
turned on the characterisation of the contract as ‘relational’.  
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In Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Trading 
Ltd (Court of Appeal), the Court of Appeal held that there must be an express 
contractual reference for a duty of good faith to be invoked; an implied duty of good 
faith does not suffice.  
A further consideration about the nature of good faith is its potential link to the idea of 
a ‘joint maximisation’ principle.
49
 The joint maximisation principle could be a helpful 
guide in constructing collaborative contracts. It should be noted that idea of the joint 
maximisation principle is spelled out by the authors in the context of hardship of 
commercial contracts to the extent that contractual devices may offer practical and 
effective solutions. The thesis however suggests that the principle can provide 
structural guidance in the case of collaborative contracts. 
The authors explain that US case law
50
 has linked the notions of good faith and joint 
maximisation. In the context of English law however, caution may be due in the 
transposition of the US line of thought, as ‘it might thus be said that the traditional 
English law canons of construction are tacitly hostile to the joint maximisation 
approach’.
51
 This is because the rationale of English law requires that ‘for joint 
maximisation to work, it needs to be demonstrated that the object of joint 
maximisation is a bilateral matter (namely a matter of presumed intention) between 
the parties (as against some sort of public or greater economic good)’.
52
 Notably, this 
means that a joint maximisation principle could be accepted in the context of English 
                                                 
49 Catherine Pédamon and Jason Chuah, Hardship in Transnational Commercial Contracts (Paris Legal 
Publishers 2013) 82 
50 Empire Gas Corp v American Bakeries Co. 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988) ‘It is a nice question how 
exigent the buyer's change of circunstances must be to allow him to scale clown his requirernents from 
either the estimated level or, in the absence of estimate, the “normal” level. Obviously it need not be so 
great as to give hirn a defense under the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, or frustration, or 
under a force rnajeure clause. (…) The reason may be that parties linked in an ongoing relationship - 
the usual situation under a requirerments contract - have a strong incentive to work out disagreements 
amicably rather than see the relationship destroyed by litigation’.[emphasis added] 
51 Catherine Pédamon and Jason Chuah, Hardship in Transnational Commercial Contracts (Paris Legal 
Publishers 2013) 84; See also Jason Chuah, ‘The Factual Matrix in the Construction of Commercial 
Contracts’ (2001) 294 I.C.C.L.R 12  
52 For a better analysis on this matter see Ibid. 84 ‘The idea of using joint maximisation as a factor to 
guide the interpretation of the hardship clause is subject to these prevailing notions of what the 
interpretation process should set out to achieve. In the case of English law, for joint maximisation to 
work, it needs to be demonstrated that the object of joint naxirnisation is a bilateral matter (namely a 
matter of presumed intention) between the parties (as against some sort of public or greater economic 
good). The four corners rule thus makes it diffcult for an English court to admit joint maximisation if 
joint maximisation is characterised as an extrinsic good. However it is not at all natulal to presune joint 
maximisation as an intencled objective of both parties. It might thus be said that the traditional English 
law canons ofconstruction are tacitly hostile to the joint maximisation approach.’ 
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law, if it can be demonstrated that it is a bilateral matter and reflects the presumed 
intention of the parties. As the thesis suggests, in a collaborative contracting 
environment, the parties do express their intention for close collaboration, regardless 
of the wording that will be used, i.e. good faith, mutual trust and co-operation type of 
clauses.  
4.3.3. ‘Relational contracts’ and collaboration 
 
4.3.3.1 Overview of the relational contract theory 
 
The issue of relational contracts has long been debated in academic literature, and it is 
once again in the spotlight after recent judicial awards. Before explaining its 
relevance to offshore contracting, a brief introduction is in order. The theory of 
relational contracts was developed by Ian Mcneil in the US in the late 1960’s.
53
 The 
theory developed in various disciplines; however, it is outside the scope of the 
research to examine the theory’s more socio-legal dimensions.
54
 The theory sparked a 
debate as it was at odds with the dominant classical and neo-classical contract theory 




                                                 
53For the most important pieces of work by Mcneil, see Macneil, ‘Whither Contracts?’ (1969) 21 
Journal of Legal Education, 403; Macneil, ‘Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation’, 
(1974) 60 Virginia Law Review, 589; Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’, (1974) 47 Southern 
California Law Review, 691; Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations 
under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’, (1978) 72 Northwestern University Law 
Review, 854; Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: internal and external’, (1983) 78 Northwestern University 
Law Review, 340; Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries’, (2000) 94 
Northwestern University Law Review, 877 
54 See for example Macneil, Contracts, instruments for social cooperation, East Africa: text, cases, 
materials (Rothman 1968); R. Macneil, The New Social Contract (Yale University Press 1980);  
Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Limberg & de Vos.’, (1987) 
143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 272; Also the critique in Carl J Circo, ‘The 
Evolving Role of Relational Contract in Construction Law’, 32 Constr. Law. 16 (2012).  
55 For the most eminent work on the subject in UK literature see David Campbell, Linda Mulcahy 
and Sally Wheeler, Changing Concepts of Contract: Essays in Honour of Ian Macneil (1st edn, 
Palgrave Macmillan 2013); D. Campbell, D. Harris, ‘Flexibility in Long-term Contractual 
Relationships: The Role of Co-operation’, (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society, 166; D. Campbell 
(ed), The Relational Theory of Contract: Selected Works of Ian Macneil (Sweet & Maxwell, 2001); D. 
Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of Remedy: Co-operation as the Implicit Second Principle of 
Remedies for Breach of Contract’, (2005) 11 Texas Wesleyan Law Review, 455; Penny-Anne 
Cullen, Richard Hickman, ‘Conflicts between Contract Law and Relational Contracting, Lean 
Construction Journal’ (2012) 44-60. 
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In UK literature, ‘relational’ contracts were often synonymous with the idea of long-
term contracts.
56
 They were frequently used in case law in the context of employment 
contracts, which have frequently been characterised as relational.
57
  
For the thesis’ view, the most succinct and ‘accurate’ meaning that the term 
‘relational contract’ should have is Eisenberg’s, which arose over 25 years ago. 
Despite the subsequent literature on the subject, the thesis submits that this 
explanation remains the most robust, congruent and timely as per the time it was 
written. Unfortunately, the ‘transposition’ of the term ‘relational contract’ has not 
been particularly successful in English case law in the thesis’ view, and this has been 
the root of the many misconceptions discussed in the following sections.  
The first elucidating realisation that Eisenberg points to is that classical law was 
developed on the premise that all transactions are ‘discrete’, which means that there is 
no relationship involved between the parties and that each party should strive for its 
self-interest, which was by default at odds with the interests of the counterparty. The 
relational contract theory did rightly highlight that this was a wrong application of 
classical contract law, and in this way the relational contract theory was a ‘reaction’ to 
this rigidity of the classical contract law. In the author’s opinion, Eisenberg provides a 
very insightful and convincing explanation of the misconception around relational 
contracts, which if taken seriously into account, could help in clarifying the concept in 
current English law doctrine. Briefly, classical contract law was missing the true point 
that most transactions are not discrete and should not be treated always in an arm’s 
length, adversarial way. Relational contract theory was right in identifying this 
mistake, but made the same mistake on the other side of the spectrum, by wanting to 
introduce a separate category of ‘relational contracts’ within the same framework of 
classical contract law that it criticised.
58
 
                                                 
56 For example,  McKendrick refers to relational contracts as ‘long term’ contracts, see subsequent 
analysis; Ewan McKendrick, ‘The Regulation of Long-Term Contract in English Law’ in  
Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (OUP 1995). 
57 See for example, TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd [2013] EWHC 1151 
(TCC); [2013] B.L.R. 484; 148 Con. L.R. 228 para 51 following ‘It can of course be said that 
employment contracts, given the nature of the relationship between employer and employee, fall into a 
somewhat different category to commercial contracts but these dicta at least provide a pointer which is 
germane.’ 
58 The explanation of Eisenberg on this point is elucidating, see Melvin A Eisenberg, ‘Relational 
Contracts’ in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (OUP 
1995) 298 ‘Once it is understood that most contract are relational, it is easy to see why modern contract 
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Eisenberg continues by laying out what is his perception of the true nature and correct 
definition of a relational contract. The thesis adopts this definition and explains how it 
could be utilised to shed light to recent English cases. According to Eisenberg’s 
definition, ‘the obvious and straightforward definition of a relational contract is a 





4.3.3.2 Relational contracts in English case law and their relevance to offshore 
contracting 
 
The issue of relational contracts in English case law came under the spotlight recently 
after the decision in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd, where a 
normal commercial distribution contract was regarded to be relational.
60
 Mr Justice 
Leggatt did not elaborate on the nature and characteristics of what constitutes a 
relational contract in English law and confined his examples to some ‘some joint 
venture agreements’.
61
 A similar view was expressed in Bristol Groundschool Ltd v 
Intelligent Data Capture Ltd where relational contracts were described as being ‘akin 
                                                                                                                                            
law has overthrown classical contract law, based, as the latter body of law was, on the mistaken 
premise that most contract were discrete. The irony, however, is that relational contract theory has 
made the same empirical mistake as classical contract law. Classical contrat law took the discrete 
contract as the paradigmatic case, and then made rules that failed to fit most contracts. Relational 
contract theory properly stresses that not all contracts fit the discrete-contract paradigm, but does not 
really reject the empirical premise of classical contract law, that relational contract are unusual. Instead, 
relational contract theory tacitly accepts that premise, and then argues that these unusual contracts 
should be governed by special rules, rather than by the general rules of a properly formulated body of 
contract law.’  
59 For a more elaborate explanation see Melvin A Eisenberg, ‘Relational Contracts’ in Jack Beatson 
and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (OUP 1995) 296 ‘Once we 
identify bargain as the core of the contract for this purpose, the meaning of the adjective relational is 
easy. A bargain is an exchange in which each party views his performance as the price of the other 
party’s performance. Accordingly, every bargain contract necessarily involves an exchange. However, 
not every bargain contract necessarily involes a relationship between the contracting parties. Therefore, 
the obvious and straightforward definition of a relational contract is a contract that involves not merely 
an exchange, but also a relationship, between the contracting parties. (Correspondingly, the obvious 
and straightforward definition of a discrete contract is a contract that involves only an exchange and 
not a relationship). This definition can not only be operationalised, but reflects the everyday, common 
sense meaning of the term “relational”. This definition also highlights a major shortcoming of 
competing definitions: any definition of a relational contract that fails to make critical whether the 
contract involves a relationship is bound to be incongruent with the ordinary meaning of the term it 
purports to define.’ 
60 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB); [2013] 1 All E.R. 
(Comm) 1321; [2013] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 526; [2013] 1 C.L.C. 662; [2013] B.L.R. 147; 146 Con. L.R. 




to a joint venture’.
62
 It seems that the characterisation of the distribution agreement as 
relational is done almost ‘automatically’ – there is no justification or elaboration 
about the characteristics that makes any particular distribution contract ‘relational’. 
The same is the case in Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd, 
where there is no further explanation of the relationship of relational contracts and its 
relevance to a ‘joint venture’. Furthermore, as the previous section explained, in the 
theoretical background of relational contract scholars, it would hardly be impossible 
to find support for the assertion that the gist of relational contracts is something ‘akin 
to a joint venture’. Furthermore, recent case law has used relational contracts in the 
context of employment contracts, which is again irrelevant to commercial contracts. 
However, joint ventures are only one example, and they do not go the core of what is 
relational. 
 
In respect of the relevance of the relational contracts to the context of offshore 
contracts, one may speculate as to whether the characterisation of offshore contracts 
as ‘relational’ is – first of all – possible, and if it would be beneficial. As 
demonstrated from the analysis so far, the introduction of relational contracts in the 
English case law has been problematic. In this regard, the thesis submits that it is a 
redundant notion overall, which adds to confusion rather than facilitating 
collaborative relationships. Therefore, it is submitted that this is not a concept that 
would benefit offshore oil and gas contracting in any way. 
 
However, the real value of the relational contract debate may be that it draws attention 
to a key question: that is, how a contract should be construed when the intention of the 
parties themselves is to have a close, collaborative working relationship, regardless of 
the terminology that is used to express this intention.  McKendrick provides 
interesting insight into the issue of co-operation and relational contracts. 
McKendrick’s view is generally sceptical about the idea of relational contracts; his 
final conclusion is that they are redundant as a notion and distinct category for 
English contract law – which would apply in the case of offshore contracts as well, as 
explained.
63
 However, the very hostility of McKendrick’s view on relational contracts 
                                                 
62 Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch). 
63 Ewan McKendrick, ‘The Regulation of Long-Term Contract in English Law’ in  
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renders his view on the intentional use of ‘co-operative’ language, as he refers to it,
64
 
yet more convincing. On that matter, he notes that ‘where the parties choose to 
express themselves in co-operative language, as where they accept a duty to re-
negotiate the contract in good faith on the occurrence of an event which causes 
exceptional hardship to one of the contracting parties, then it suggests that such a 
clause serves a useful purpose from the perspective of the parties which should, if 
possible, be enforced by the courts’.
65
 In that particular quote, McKendrick mentions 
examples of ‘a duty to re-negotiate the contract in good faith’ in the event of a 
‘hardship’; however this is just one of the many examples that one could mention.  
 
What matters is the thought process, and this is what the argument of the thesis aims 
to support: that there is a major difference between collaboration and its 
consequences, whether this is expressed by the parties as their own intention or not. If 
the parties themselves opt for collaborative wording, then this is something that 
should be taken into account by the courts, as McKendrick argues. 
  
4.3.4. ‘Partnering’ and ‘alliancing’ contracts and collaboration 
 
This part examines the notions of partnering and alliancing and their relevance to 
collaboration and the oil and gas industry. These terms are frequently used 
                                                                                                                                            
Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (OUP 1995) 332 
‘English law would not be justified in taking the step of recognizing the existence of a formal category 
of relational contracts. In the vast majority of cases parties can insert into their contracts provisions 
which will provide the flexibility necessary to enable them to adapt their contract to changing 
circumstances.’ 
64 The term co-operative can be easily replaced by ‘collaborative’ and the way they are used is 
indentical.  
65 For the quotation in its full context see Ewan McKendrick, ‘The Regulation of Long-Term Contract 
in English Law’ in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law 
(OUP 1995) 315; ‘The fïnal point of distinction, relating to the co-operative relationship engendered by 
a relational contract, can be pushed too far. Co-operation in the face of change should not be 
considered in isolation from the need to ensure a degree of stability and control at the moment of 
formation of the contract; risks must be allocated between the parties and the ability to shift that risk 
must be limited, if not eliminated. While a contracting party may choose, for extra-legal reasons, to co-
operate with the other contracting party and to adjust the bargain on the occurrence of some unexpected 
event, this is not the same thing as saying that the party should be compelled to forego her legal rights 
in the interest of “co-operation” and the preservation of a harmonious relationship. But, where the 
parties choose to express themselves in co-operative language, as where they accept a duty to re-
negotiate the contract in good faith on the occurrence of an event which causes exceptional hardship to 
one of the contracting parties, then it suggests that such a clause serves a useful purpose from the 
perspective of the parties which should, if possible, be enforced by the courts’.  
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interchangeably and their exact legal meaning is uncertain. The thesis examines their 
similarities and differences in light of the MER Strategy.  
More than a decade after the first specialised book on partnering was written, the 
comment that ‘it is widely accepted that partnering means different things to different 
people and that the term is far from being a term of art’ still holds true.
 66
 The authors 
provided the two more generally accepted definitions of partnering in the construction 
sector, written by the National Economic Development Council in 1991
67
 and the 
Reading Construction Forum in 1995
68
. What becomes apparent from these 
definitions is that the term ‘partnering’ is essentially a management approach. 
Therefore, it should not be confused with the strict legal sense of ‘partnership’.
69
 
However, the legal nature of partnering and partnering agreements often creates 
confusion. 
 In fact, partnering can take two forms, non-contractual and contractual.
70
 In non-
contractual partnering, the parties agree to adopt the processes laid down in a non-
contractually binding partnering charter. As Ashworth puts it, ‘(…) the result is that 
the partnering agreement rather than the contract documentation drives the 
relationship between the parties’.
 71
 On this matter, Chitty takes the view that 
                                                 
66 D. Jones, D. Savage, R. Westgate (eds), Partnering and Collaborative Working: Law and Industry 
Practice (Informa Professional 2003) 
67 National Economic Development Council, ‘Partnering: Contracting Without Conflict’ (National 
Economic Development Office 1991); Partnering is ‘(…) a long term commitment between two or 
more organisations for the purpose of achieving specific business objectives by maximising the 
effectiveness of each participant’s resources. The relationship is based on trust, dedication to common 
goals and an understanding of each other’s individual expectations and values. Expected benefits 
include improved efficiency and cost-effectiveness, increased opportunity for innovation, and the 
continuous improvement of quality products and services’. 
68 Reading Construction Forum (1995), ‘A management approach used by two or more organisations to 
achieve specific business objectives by maximising the effectiveness of each participant’s resources. 
The approach is based on mutual objectives, an agreed method of decision making and an active search 
for continuous measurable improvements.’ 
69 Partnership Act 1890 s 1(1); ‘Partnership is the relation which subsists between persons carrying on 
a business in common with a view of profit.’ 
70 For an elaboration on this see Christina D. Tvarnø, ‘To bind or not to bind: Formalizing 
collaboration through partnering contracts in the US, British and Danish construction industries’ (2016) 
Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation 288-314; ‘The article compares the different types of 
collaborative partnering contracts in the three countries, and provides a conclusion on whether the 
collaborative partnering contract should be binding or non-binding, based on the three empirical 
contracts analyzed in this article.’ 
71 Ibid. 221 ‘There is some doubt as to the legal status of the partnering charter. There is concern that 
making explicit statements that a partnering charter does not create a legally binding relationship 
between partners does not necessarily mean that none exists. Although the construction contract 
provides a framework of rights and obligations, partnering has the potential to impact upon the 
allocation of risk established by the contract and subsidiary contracts. If the partnering arrangement 
breaks down, a party may find itself in a position where it is necessary, or at least attractive, to assert 
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partnering is always intended not non-contractual and chooses not to include it in the 
scope of construction contracts at all: ‘the essence of partnering is that it is intended 





In contractual partnering, the standard forms that are used take a more contractual 
route and seek to achieve partnering in a way intended to be legally enforceable. An 
example of this form is the PPC 2000 which has been recently the subject of judicial 
interpretation. 
73
 The National Audit Office seems to have embraced the practice of 
contractual partnering in at least one major report. In an accompanying report to the 
‘Good practice contract management framework’,
74
 which aimed at assessing the 
efficiency of government’s contractors,
75
 it was suggested that the existence of a 
‘partnership charter outlining the behaviour expected of each party for the duration of 
the contract’ 
76
 was an example of good practice.  
 
Partnering is not an unknown practice in the offshore oil and gas industry. An older 
study had attempted to identify which are the perceived ‘success factors’ for 
partnering in the UK upstream industry.
77
The fact that it is a notion close to 
                                                                                                                                            
that the contractual risk allocation has been altered, either by the provisions of the partnering charter or 
by subsequent conduct or representations in the course of the partnering process.’ 
72 Chitty on Contracts, Vol. II Specific Contracts (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 37-058; ‘English 
law does not recognise a more general duty of good faith which might prevent the employer rejecting 
tender offers at any stage, or ending negotiations at any time. Given the general antipathy of English 
law towards a broader understanding of pre-contractual duties and obligations of good faith, 
professionals in the construction industry have-sought to develop new approaches to the problems of 
financial risk experienced by tenderers, as well as the risk, cost and uncertainty to which the employer 
is exposed. The phenomenon of ‘partnering’ in the construction industry (an expression covering a 
loose amalgam of different strategies for cooperation and collaboration between contracting parties) 
can be considered in this light. Partnering arrangements may be based on the long-term relationship 
between contractor and employer or may be project-specific. Partnering charters set out the broad aims 
of the parties, such as cooperation in a spirit of openness and team work. Partnering agreements may 
provide for more concrete collaboration between the parties, such as shared use of information and 
resources. The essence of partnering is that it is intended not to create enforceable contractual rights, 
and is therefore beyond the scope of this chapter.’ 
73 David Mosey, ‘Partnering's tough side’ (25 June 2013) available at 
<http://www.building.co.uk/partnerings-tough-side/5056796.article>. 
74 NAO, ‘Good practice contract management framework’ (December 2008) 
<https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Good_practice_contract_management_framework.pdf>.  
75 NAO, ‘Central government’s management of service contracts’ (19 December 2008) 
<https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/080965.pdf>. 
76 Ibid., at 20 
77 SM Mamotazul Haque, Richard Green, William Keogh, ‘Collaborative Relationships in the UK 
Upstream Oil and Gas Industry’ Problems and Perspectives of Management (1/2004) 
<http://businessperspectives.org/journals_free/ppm/2004/PPM_EN_2004_01_Haque.pdf>.; The study 
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collaboration could resurface the question whether it is a suitable method the 
requirements under the MER Strategy.  
 
Recent case law provides further insight into the current understanding of partnering 
in English courts. In TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd, the High 
Court made clear that partnering should be not be confused with the legal notion of 
partnership: ‘the standard terms used by the parties, albeit somewhat specifically 
adapted, in addition to Clause 1.1, provide for what might loosely be called 
‘partnering’, which is to be distinguished from legal partnership. It would be wrong to 
say that the partnering envisaged an equal sharing of the profits or losses suffered by 
the parties’.
78
Furthermore, in the same case, the clause in the contract that was drafted 
by the two parties provides a rather elucidating insight of what they expected their 




Portsmouth City Council v Ensign Highway Ltd
80
 provides another recent example 
where a partnering agreement was used. This case also involved a system of failure 
points, and featured also a term of good faith and a potential implied term of good 
faith. The Court based its core thinking on the case of Medirest v Mid Essex Hospital 
Services (Court of Appeal). The relevant good faith clause in this case was under a 
heading of ‘Liaison and Partnering’ and read as follows:
81
 
                                                                                                                                            
had concluded that factors such as the ‘absence of shared aligned goals’, ‘absence of clear targets’, 
‘absence of trusting attitudes’, ‘absence of fair allocation of risk and reward’, ‘absence of commitment’ 
and ‘presence of adversarial behaviour’ are viewed as the main factors which often cause failure of 
partnering 
78 TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd para [25]. 
79 Ibid. ‘The Partnering Team members shall establish, develop and implement their partnering 
relationships, within their agreed roles, expertise and responsibilities and in accordance with the 
Partnering Documents, with the objectives of achieving for the benefit of the Term Programme and for 
the mutual benefit of Partnering Team members: – (i) trust, fairness, mutual cooperation, dedication to 
agreed common goals and an understanding of each other's expectations and values; (ii) satisfaction of 
the agreed pre-conditions to implementation of the Term Programme referred to in clause 6.1; (iii) 
implementation of Tasks within the agreed time and price and to the agreed quality pursuant to Orders 
issued in accordance with clause 6; (iv) innovation, improved efficiency, cost-effectiveness, lean 
production, improved Sustainability and other measurable continuous improvements by means of the 
Processes referred to in clause 2.2 and by reference to the agreed KPIs and Targets referred to in clause 
2.5; (v) commitments to people including staff and Users; (vi) any additional objectives stated in the 
Term Partnering Agreement’. 
80 Portsmouth City Council v Ensign Highways Ltd [2015] EWHC 1969 (TCC); [2015] B.L.R. 675; 
161 Con. L.R. 71; [2015] B.L.G.R. 791; [2015] C.I.L.L. 3717 [hereinafter ‘Portsmouth City Council 
v Ensign Highways Ltd’]. 
81 Portsmouth City Council v Ensign Highways Ltd para [27]. 
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Clause 44.3 provides for Best Value Reviews. These are to be held once 
every five years. Under the heading 'Liaison and Partnering', clause 44.4 
provides as follows: 
44.4.1 PCC and [Ensign] shall deal fairly, in good faith and in mutual co-
operation with one another and with Interested Parties. 
The Court in this case also favoured a narrow understanding and textual 
understanding of the ‘duty to co-operate’. 
 
Alliancing is another method tested in various industries and contexts, including the 
offshore oil and gas industry. In an alliancing arrangement, the owner and service 
providers work as a single integrated team to deliver a specific project under a 
contractual framework where their commercial interests are aligned with actual 
project objectives. Alliancing involves a formal contract in which the parties 
undertake to act in the best interests of the project. This is a key difference from 
partnering, where the undertaking to act in such a manner is purely voluntary.
82
 An 
even bolder approach is the idea of strategic alliancing, which has also been proposed 
as an alternative solution by certain consultancies.
83
 Project alliancing has been used 
in the UKCS in the past. The most notable example is the BP Andrew field, which is 
often mentioned as the most successful alliancing project in the offshore oil and gas 
sector.
84
 For this project, BP developed a new ‘painshare-gainshare’ compensation 
program. This contracting methodology involved complete open-book accounting, 
sharing all ‘uninsurable’ risk between all project members, and setting an initial target 
cost generated by the whole project team. This target cost would then be compared to 
the final cost and the under or overruns would be shared by all project participants. 
                                                 
82 Charles MacDonald, ‘What are the important differences betweenn partnering and alliance 
procurement models and why are the terms so seldom confused?’ 
<http://cms.3rdgen.info/3rdgen_sites/107/resource/MacDonald-AIPMOct05.pdf>. 
83 ‘Project-by-project contracts and frame agreements have many advantages, but they can be 
adversarial in nature and limited to meeting the contractual terms for a specific project. The more 
collaborative approach of strategic alliances, which some operators and contractors are now 
considering, could drive greater value in project delivery. These alliances may be particularly helpful in 
today’s upstream environment, where operators and contractors are facing major financial and 
competitive challenges.’; Boston Consulting Group, ‘Strategic Alliances in Upstream Oil and Gas: 
Getting Serious About Collaboration’ (27 April 2015) 1-2 
<https://www.bcgperspectives.com/Images/BCG-Strategic-Alliances-in-Upstream-Oil-and-Gas-Apr-
2015_tcm80-186438.pdf >. 




Another critical aspect of BP’s new contracting strategy involved team member 
selection. The main contractors that formed the alliance with BP were not selected 





Although alliancing first appeared in the UK, it was further developed and 
systematically used in Australia.
86
 In the Australian offshore oil and gas sector, the 
East Spar development and the Wandoo B oil platform are often mentioned as case 
studies.
87
 In Australia, an even further step has been suggested to standardise project 
alliance agreements.
88
 Therefore a currently relevant question is whether alliancing 
could be a potential alternative for realising the new collaborative culture that is 
required in the UKCS. Notably, after the recession, there was a rise in alliancing in 
the UK construction sector.
89
 However, alliancing does not come without legal 
challenges, which revolve mainly around the legal nature of the relationship of the 
parties, e.g. the existence of a fiduciary duty. In the context of Australian law, good 






                                                 
85 Matthew W. Sakal, ‘Project Alliancing: A Relational Contracting Mechanism for Dynamic Projects’ 
Lean Construction Journal Vol 2 (1 April 2005) 
<http://www.leanconstruction.org/media/docs/lcj/LCJ_05_005.pdf>.  
86 Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance, ‘In Pursuit of Additional Value: A benchmarking 
study into alliancing in the Australian Public Sector’ (2009)  
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29% of the total infrastructure spend of $110 billion in the same sectors across the whole of Australia’ 
87Australian Constructors Association, ‘Relationship Contracting: Optimising Project Outcomes’ 
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4.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
The first conclusion of this chapter answers the following question: is the idea of 
‘collaboration’ in the English law of contract similar to the MER notion of 
collaboration? As explained in chapter 2, collaboration has its own characteristic 
meaning within the MER. To sum up its most prominent features, various meanings 
could include collaboration between operators – ‘the required action and behaviour’, 
different methods of collaboration under different sector strategies, or the generic 
meaning of ‘working together for a common purpose’. As is evident, none of these 
definitions is relevant to the legal meaning explained in chapter 4. Therefore, the 
answer to the question is that the notion of collaboration in the context of the MER 
Strategy, and its interpretation in the English law of contract are completely distinct. 
However, this is not contradictory to the argument of the thesis. The thesis seeks to 
shed light to what collaborative contracting means when it takes place between a 
client and a contractor - and in the case of the offshore industry, operators and 
contractors. This question is a separate question, regardless of its relevance to the 
meaning of collaboration in the MER Strategy context.  
The second conclusion is about the relationship between collaboration and the ‘ethos’ 
and ‘ideologies’ of English contract law. The thesis argues that the dominant, 
formalist approach – as set out and explained in section 4.2 – is the preferred platform 
on which to found a collaborative relationship. It is important to explain and stress 
that a collaborative contractual relationship can take place both in the context of a 
formalist and a contextualist contractual framework. It is misconception that 
collaborative contractual relationships can only take place in a contextualist 
framework. The difference between the two would be that in the case of a formalist 
framework, the dominant general contract theory would be applied. A practical 
example of the aforementioned discussion is the rationale of 
TSG Building Services Plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd. Although the contract under 
consideration was a ‘collaborative’ contract specifically designed for this purpose, the 
Court ruled that the ‘trust, fairness and mutual co-operation’ clause would not have an 
overriding effect.  
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The third conclusion regards the relationship with collaboration and good faith. The 
thesis drew attention to the two possibilities when discussing good faith: where it is 
expressed as an express term and an implied term. In the case of express terms, the 
conclusion is that the wording and the intention of the parties must be very clear. The 
‘mutual trust and co-operation’ or ‘quasi good faith; clauses do not reach that 
threshold of express terms, as case law has shown. In the context of offshore 
contracting, that is arguably a positive development. Offshore contracting has 
traditionally been very close to the adversarial end of the spectrum, and the fear of 
overriding principles of good faith only made collaborative contracts more 
unpredictable in the mind of the practitioners. The strict, formalist interpretation that 
the courts seem to follow in the latest cases is a development that can paradoxically 
promote the use of collaborative contracts. Since the fear of overriding clauses has 
been dispelled, the industry may now focus on what collaborative contracts offer: the 
collaborative processes and contract and commercial management principles that aim 
at project success. For implied terms of good faith, the thesis explained the rationale 
that was followed after the decision in Yam Seng. It seems that this trend has changed 
and that subsequent cases were very conservative in finding implied terms of good 
faith in contracts.  
The fourth conclusion is about collaboration and relational contracts in general, as 
well as the case of offshore oil and gas contracting in particular. The chapter 
demonstrates that relational contract theory has deep theoretical roots and can take 
different academic pathways. From a contract law point of view, it can be said that 
relational contract theory was developed as a ‘reaction’ to the rigid and narrow view 
of the dominant ‘classical’ or ‘formalist’ model of contract law. The chapter explains 
that although the relational contract theory as a legal branch is not to be dismissed and 
has certainly fertilised the academic debate, it must be approached with caution when 
it comes to its practical consequences. A specific example that explains this statement 
is the arguably problematic fashion in which relational contract theory has been 
applied in recent English cases. Through the cases analysed in this chapter, it is 
evident that the transposition of the term lost any of its intended theoretical meaning 
and became an unpredictably applied sui generis term. Specifically, in the context of 
offshore contracting, the introduction of relational contracts would not be a step in the 
right direction. The gist of relational contracts, the ethos and philosophy of 
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collaboration, can be introduced through mutual trust and co-operation. The additional 
layer of characterising a contract as relational would not add anything, but would 
rather obscure the aim of the collaborative contractual relationship. The chapter also 
demonstrates that collaboration can work in a formalist context and that the 
relational/contextualist context is not necessary.  
The final part of the chapter delivers a conclusion about partnering and alliancing 
contracts. The conclusion on partnering is that it is still not a legal notion. The chapter 
explains how partnering is seen mainly as a management process rather than a legal 
notion. However, partnering contracts do exist, and their use is gaining ground in the 
construction sector in particular. There are suites of contacts, such as the PPC 2000 
family of contracts, for which there has been specific case law in the recent years. 
Alliancing contracts also have certain peculiarities about their legal nature. They have 
been used in the offshore sector in the past and can offer an alternative solution in 



















5.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
This chapter describes the conclusions reached on the research questions, and what 
the thesis proved or disproved. It also identifies certain limitations beyond the scope 
of the research or the capacity of the writer and suggests topics for future research. 
The research questions introduced in the introductory chapter are: (1) to explain the 
meaning of ‘collaboration’ within and beyond the context of the MER Strategy; (2) to 
explain the notion of ‘modern contracting’ and ‘contract and commercial 
management’ and argue that offshore oil and gas contracting in the UK should follow 
this contracting paradigm, which is also aligned with the MER Strategy; and (3) to 
ascertain the meaning of ‘collaboration’ in the English law of contract and explain its 
relevance to UK offshore oil and gas contracting. 
Regarding the first question, chapter 2 comprehensively examines the various 
meanings of the term ‘collaboration’, both within and beyond the MER Strategy 
context. In the MER context, the term has two main meanings: first, that of a 
‘required action and behaviour’ under the MER Strategy and second, a separate 
obligation under the Asset Stewardship Strategy and the Asset Stewardship 
Expectations. Furthermore, the word ‘collaboration’ has miscellaneous uses such as 
‘working together for a common purpose’. Another conclusion from chapter 2 is that 
collaboration is a notion that is designed to be applied between operators under the 
MER Strategy. However, it is argued that the question about the exact relationship 
between operators and contractors remained unanswered. As is explained in chapter 3, 
and the section below, the thesis argues that the best contracting model for the 
offshore oil and gas industry is a collaborative one between operators and contractors. 
This is also evident from the SSCoP, which already points out the fact that operators 
should collaborate with the supply chain. The future direction of the Oil and Gas 
Authority is worth considering in this respect. The thesis speculates that the Oil and 
Gas Authority will not take a hard line in order to force a collaborative contracting 
model among the supply chain. However, it is again important to stress the thesis’ 
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argument that since one of the major roles of the Oil and Gas Authority is to 
‘influence’, it could provide clearer support to collaborative contracting operator-
contractor models in the future.  
Regarding the second question on modern contracting, CCM and contracting in the 
UK offshore oil and gas sector, the following question was raised: what is the 
preferred method of contracting between operators and contractors in the offshore oil 
and gas industry? The thesis’ answer is that collaborative contracting models are the 
optimal model for the offshore oil and gas industry. The thesis stresses the importance 
of modern contracting and contract and commercial management and argues that the 
offshore contracting paradigm should be built around BS Standard 11000-1. 
With regard to the third question about the meaning of collaboration in the English 
law of contract and its impact to the MER Strategy, as explained also above, is not a 
question that is relevant only in the context of offshore oil and gas contracting. In fact, 
it is a much wider question, applicable across contract law doctrine. It is submitted 
that in order to answer this question, one parameter would certainly be to examine the 
meaning of collaboration within a business context. Therefore, it is argued that the 
thesis makes a contribution to this answer by examining the question in the context of 
first, offshore oil and gas contracting, and second, to wider cases which refer to a 
client-contractor relationship. 
In answer, the first point is that ‘collaboration’ is not a legal term of art, and none of 
the case law examined in the thesis ever addressed it as such.. Its relationship to legal 
doctrine is its interaction with established doctrinal terms, as demonstrated in chapter 
4: good faith, relational contracts, partnering and alliancing.  
The examination of the case law in chapter 4 reveals that recent cases seem to prefer 
the formalist, traditional approach to English contract law. The debate on an 
alternative framework for English contract law has long been debated, as set out in 
section 4.2. The most recent resurfacing of the debate took place after the rationale in 
Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd, which could be read as an 
attempt to transform the fundamental formalist approach into a more contextualist 
approach. However, the series of cases examined in chapter 4 have demonstrated the 
trend to persist with a formalist approach. 
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The question that arises hence is, what does collaboration mean in practice? Can it 
still work within the traditional and formalist framework of English contract law? The 
answer is yes. What differentiates collaborative working is its interdisciplinary nature 
and the inclusion of management – project and contract management – characteristics. 
The thesis agrees with Mosey’s comment that it is ‘the contractual processes of 
collaboration that are of critical importance rather than the mutual declarations’.
1
 It is 
the contractual tools explained in chapter 3 that differentiate collaborative working, 
and not merely the risk allocation wording of the contract.  
 
5.2 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS   
 
Having concluded with the comprehensive outline of the research conclusions, it is 
necessary to acknowledge certain limitations of the research. The first limitation, as 
the very title of the thesis suggests, is the focus solely on English law. This is largely 
unavoidable since the MER Strategy and its implications on offshore oil and gas 
contracting is an instrument founded on statute governed by English law. For this 
reason, adopting a more regional or international approach is beyond the scope of the 
thesis; however, an analysis with elements from other common law jurisdictions with 
significant offshore oil and gas production, such as the United States of America, 
Canada or Australia, could offer valuable insight into the matter of offshore oil and 
gas contracting. Another main theme of the research is the notion of collaboration. 
Although this notion is analysed thoroughly at many levels, both within and beyond 
the MER context and from an English law standpoint, the thesis could not analyse the 
relationship between collaboration and other notions with the same level of detail. 
One example of such an extension is the conflict between competition law and 
collaboration as envisaged in the MER Strategy.  
Another limitation is that the thesis did not ‘dig’ deeper in the theoretical backgrounds 
of contract law and where the notion of collaboration fits in the context of contract 
law theory.
 2
 In the author’s opinion, the theoretical background and assumptions of 
contract law have a direct influence on the evolution and interpretation of contract law 
                                                 
1 David Mosey, ‘Partnering's tough side’ (Building.co.uk, 25 June 2013) 
<http://www.building.co.uk/partnerings-tough-side/5056796.article> [emphasis added]. 
2 See the analysis in section 4.2. 
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doctrine by the courts; this perception is at odds with the prevalent viewpoint that 
contract theory is an area for academic scholars and is irrelevant for practitioners. 
Although it might be true that practitioners focus on the hectic task of following new 
case law developments and view contract theory to be redundant, the thesis argues 
that the answer to many ‘practical’ questions can only come through a better 
understanding of the theoretical foundations of contract law. An elucidating example 
is the problematic ‘transposition’ of the relational contract law theory in English law, 
which requires a deeper understanding of contract theory. The thesis highlighted this 
point
3
, however it did not seek to provide an answer about the ‘correct’ 
implementation of the relational contract law theory in the English law of contract. 
These observations serve only to highlight the rule that no research can be perfect, 
and the present thesis is not an exception. Nevertheless, the final section of the thesis 
suggests areas for further research and provides concrete research directions that 
could build on the work of the present thesis.  
 
5.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This section elaborates on certain areas for further research that could utilise this 
thesis as a theoretical platform. In the introduction, it was explained that the thesis is 
library-based and uses mainly qualitative criteria, as it is beyond the capacity of the 
author to conduct quantitative analysis. One direction for further research would be 
interdisciplinary research. The field of contracting should be seen as a holistic, 
interdisciplinary field. The areas of management, economics, law, organisational 
theory, each describe part of the contractual phenomenon, but no single discipline can 
approach the whole ‘truth’.  
 
From a legal standpoint, there are several interesting issues that deserve closer 
scrutiny. In the specific context of offshore oil and gas contracts, it is submitted that 
the issue of implied duties is important in a way similar to industries such as the 
shipping industry. For example, in the leading book for ‘tug and tow’ contracts, 
Rainey mentions specific implied duties that derive from long-established commercial 
                                                 





 The same is the case in the US oil and gas industry, where there has been 
interesting literature on the implied duties in the sector.
5
 Another noteworthy aspect 
from a legal standpoint is a more thorough theoretical analysis of the relationship 
between collaboration and its meaning within the English law of contract. This theme, 
which essentially constitutes chapter 4 in the thesis, is composed of many more 
theoretical threads that can be explored. The thesis, as explained in the chapter 
introduction, intentionally confines the subject to the client-contractor relationship 
and included only specific parameters in order to define the meaning of collaboration 
in the offshore contracting context. However, the theoretical debate mentioned in 
section 4.2 could be explored in further depth. 
 
Beyond the academic points made above, there are other directions for further 
research. For example, one interesting and current issue is ‘decommissioning’, which 
is the last phase of the upstream cycle of offshore oil and gas operations. The ‘hot 
potato’ is certainly the allocation of the costs for an activity which is essentially a 
financial liability for oil and gas companies, with no potential financial upside. On the 
other hand, this activity is a lucrative opportunity on the side of the contractors, as the 
costs are often substantial. In this context, collaboration could also be the centre of the 
debate to allocate the costs among the industry players.  
 
Additionally, the thesis suggests that the MER Strategy could be turned into an 
example for the exploitation of ‘mature’ oil and gas fields. This is an expressed 
intention of the OGA, which aspires to make the MER Strategy a ‘success story’ that 
can be replicated in other ‘mature’ oil provinces around the world. The Oil & Gas 
Technology Centre established in Aberdeen could be seen as an example towards this 
direction.
6
 The potential of ‘exporting’ the know-how of mature field exploitation 
could also provide a more international approach to the current thesis. As mentioned 
above, one of the thesis limitations is its sole focus on the UKCS and English law. 
However, as other oil provinces will inescapably reach a similar level of ‘maturity’, 
applying the experience and the lessons learned in the UK legal jurisdiction to other 
jurisdictions could be a useful expansion of this thesis. 
                                                 
4 Simon Rainey, The Law of Tug and Tow and Offshore Contracts (3rd edn, Informa Law 2011). 
5 John Burritt McArthur, Oil and Gas Implied Covenants for the Twenty-First Century (Juris 
Publishing 2014). 
6 The Oil & Gas Technology Centre, ‘About Us’ < https://theogtc.com/about-us/at-a-glance/> 
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